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Articles
ARE LAW CLERKS FAIR GAME? INVADING
JUDICIAL CONFIDENTIALITY
Charles W. Sorenson, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent disbarment of two attorneys and suspension of a third in
Bar Counsel v. Curry,1 for their surreptitious sting directed at a former
trial court law clerk, presents one of the most bizarre and troubling cases
of attorney misconduct imaginable. At first blush, the story seems so
outlandish that one assumes that it must be fiction of the type penned by
a novelist, or perhaps, a television writer for “Boston Legal.”2 In fact, the
229-page special hearing officer decision and final Massachusetts Board
of Bar Overseers (“BBO”) decision read more like pages from a tabloid
than a typical bar discipline decision. Nothing is typical about this case.
It involves an underlying multimillion (if not billion) dollar lengthy
dispute among family members over a supermarket empire.3 It involves
a colorful and controversial trial judge, who subsequently became a
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1
Bar Counsel v. Crossen, Curry, Donahue, BBO File Nos. C1-97-0602, C1-97-0589, & C197-(9)589 [hereinafter Bar Counsel v. Curry II], available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/
ccd2.pdf. A prior hearing officer’s report recommended disbarment of all three attorneys.
Bar Counsel v. Curry, BBO File Nos. C1-97-0602, C1-97-0589, & C1-97-(9)589, 229 (Special
Hearing Officer’s Hearing Report May 11, 2005) [hereinafter Bar Counsel v. Curry I],
available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/ccd.pdf. The hearing officer’s report was
adopted virtually in total by the BBO, except that the Board recommended that attorney
Donahue be suspended rather than disbarred. See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra, at 2, 51.
Only lawyers Crossen and Curry appealed the recommendation. The Supreme Judicial
Court heard their arguments on October 4, 2007 and February 6, 2008 and adopted the
board’s recommendation to disbar lawyers Crossen and Curry. See In re Crossen, 880
N.E.2d 352, 388 (Mass. 2008); In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 411 (Mass. 2008).
2
See ABC, Boston Legal, http://abc.go.com/primetime/bostonlegal/index?pn=about
(last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (describing the television program as stories about “emotionally
challenged attorneys[]” who “continually stretch the boundaries of the law.”).
3
See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4.
*
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television judge.4 The lawyers involved arguably represent the best and
possibly the worst of the profession.5 The victim, and former law clerk,
is both a sympathetic and very unsympathetic character.6 Finally,
perhaps what is most remarkable, given the backgrounds and numbers
of lawyers who were involved in, or aware of, the elaborate and
convoluted events that transpired over a six-month period in 1997, is the
fact that no one put a stop to it and the fact that afterward some lawyers
apparently thought the defendant lawyers did nothing wrong.7
Reduced to the bare essence, the facts are as follows: lawyers
representing the losing side in a very contentious, lengthy, and
expensive dispute over control of a supermarket empire pursued a
scheme by which they hoped to get a new trial. Convinced that the trial
judge who presided over their case was prejudiced against them, they hit
upon what they believed was a way to expose the judge through the
former law clerk who had worked on the case. The lawyers set up a false
job interview for a “dream job[.]”8 The former law clerk was initially
lured to Nova Scotia, presumably because surreptitious taping was not
illegal there.9 In the course of the fake job interview, the interviewers
repeatedly tried to get the law clerk to reveal the extent of his
4
Christopher Muther, Judge Lopez Takes Tough Style to TV, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2006,
at A1, available at http://boston.com/ae/tv/articles/2006/09/09/judge_lopez_takes_
tough_style_to_tv.
5
See notes 31, 35.
6
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 221–23. Former law clerk Walsh was
described as a vulnerable victim by the special hearing officer based in part on his
difficulties in finding work after his first year as a law clerk for the superior court and his
naiveté. Id. at 221; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396 n.13, 397 n.16; In re Crossen, 880
N.E.2d at 387. On the other hand, Walsh clearly engaged in puffery and dishonesty in his
bar application and violated his duties of confidentiality to the court. See Bar Counsel v.
Curry I, supra note 1, at 50, 64, 223; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 362, 365, 366 & n.26; In re
Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397–98.
7
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 119–27.; Board of Bar Overseers Hears
Arguments in Conduct Case Against Boston Attorney, MASS LAW. WEEKLY, Mar. 6, 2006, at 2,
available at 2006 WLNR 9318898 (reporting that former Massachusetts Attorney General
Robert H. Quinn had planned to testify that Curry’s conduct was ethical); Joan Vennochi,
Righting a Wrong, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at A19; Ralph Ranalli, For Demoulas Case
Clerk, Vindication, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2005, at A1; Ralph Ranalli, Recommendation
Shocking to Some in Boston Legal Circles, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2005, at B4; John Strahinich,
Lawyers Get ‘Sordid’ Out; Judge Recommends Trio Be Disbarred for Demoulas Case Action,
BOSTON HERALD, May 13, 2005, at 26. Defendants’ lawyers who had not been involved in
the law clerk contact and ruse initially and who were skeptical of its value and propriety
when they found out about it, did not stop it. See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at
122–25. Apparently one lawyer, however, Edward Barshak advised lawyer Donahue that
he would leave the case if the law clerk information was used. See id. at 127.
8
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 404–05 (internal quotation marks omitted); Bar Counsel v.
Curry II, supra note 1, at 6.
9
See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396–97; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 34–35.
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responsibility for drafting the decision in the case, and more importantly,
that the judge had decided the outcome of the case prior to hearing
evidence.10 The job interview ruse was continued several weeks later in
New York City, essentially in an effort to elicit more specific, and
hopefully admissible, evidence of prejudgment by the trial judge.11
Finally, when the results of the two fake job interviews yielded less than
the lawyers had hoped they would, a third interview was arranged with
the law clerk—this time in Boston—for the purpose of “brac[ing]” the
former law clerk.12 This included revealing that the job offer was false
and threatening to go public with information that would be damaging
to the former law clerk, unless the law clerk cooperated with the lawyers
by signing a statement that would more clearly support the claim of the
trial judge’s prejudgment.13 Instead, the former law clerk went to the FBI
and participated in a reverse sting that eventually resulted in the
exposure of the lawyers and bar discipline proceedings.14
After the longest proceedings in the history of the Massachusetts
BBO,15 the lawyers were found to have violated numerous provisions of
the Massachusetts Code of Professional Conduct. The elaborate ruse
they perpetrated was found to have run afoul of proscriptions on lying,
deceiving, and making misrepresentations.16 Efforts seemingly aimed at
coercing the law clerk into testifying favorably to the defendant-lawyers’
position were seen as attacks on the administration of justice and
inconsistent with the fitness to practice law.17 What received relatively
less attention, however, is the aspect of the case that struck me first when

See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 at 7–8.
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 399–400; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 362–63; see Bar Counsel
v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10–15.
12
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363, 364–66 (internal quotation marks omitted); Bar
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17, 34, 44.
13
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365–66; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17–19.
It appears that in addition to revealing the law clerk’s obvious breach of confidentiality, the
lawyers also threatened to reveal that the law clerk’s bar application had been supported
by a letter written by a lawyer who did not know the law clerk. See In re Crossen, 880
N.E.2d at 366; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 145–46. Such a submission would
have violated Massachusetts Disciplinary Rules 1-101 (A) (false statement in support of bar
application) then in effect. See MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE NEW
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 130 (James S. Bolan ed., 1998) (quoting old rule DR 1101(A) that subjected a lawyer to discipline that “made a materially false statement
in[] . . . connection with[] his application for admission to the bar[.]”), available at
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/disciplinaryrules.pdf; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.1(a) (2003).
14
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366–69; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20–26.
15
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 2.
16
See infra Part II.C.
17
See infra note 88.
10
11
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I read the newspaper reports concerning the case. Unlike other cases
involving lawyer lying, deceit, or undercover stings, which have been
directed at potential criminal activity or civil wrongdoing by private
parties, the ruse in this case was a blatant effort to invade the
confidential relationship between a judge and a law clerk.
While I recognized that lawyer deceit in the forms of undercover
criminal stings, the use of testers in civil rights and intellectual property
infringement cases, and the use of puffery in negotiations were
permissible in some circumstances,18 I assumed that it was widely
understood that efforts to get a former law clerk to reveal confidential
information, just like ex parte contacts with law clerks and judges
generally,19 were clearly an impermissible interference with a judge-law
clerk confidential relationship that would be inconsistent with
fundamental principles governing the administration of justice. Close
examination of the defendant-lawyers’ conduct and arguments, the
BBO’s analysis of the issue, and the state of the law in this area suggests
18
See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462–64, 471
(D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s investigators calling to order
stamps to test compliance with a consent order for a copyright was unethical behavior);
Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that plaintiff’s
videotaping of gas station attendants to evince that African Americans were required to
prepay for gas, while Caucasians were not, in a civil rights action was not unethical); In re
Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 972 (Or. 2000) (suggesting that an attorney’s deceitful conduct
in a criminal sting operation would not be unethical if the attorney’s reliance on Bar
Counsel’s letter was reasonable); Transp. Ins. Co. V. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 282 (Tex.
1995) (stating that “puffery[]” regarding the value of an unliquidated claim during
negotiation is permissible).
19
See, e.g., Mallory v. Hartsfield, Almand & Grisham, LLP, 86 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Ark.
2002) (stating that attorney’s ex parte communication with judge’s “law clerk[] . . . is a
violation[]” of the state’s code of judicial conduct); Vanzant v. R.L. Products, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 435, 438 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that an attorney’s attempt to elicit comments on
the merits of cases from law clerks are “impermissible ex parte communication[s] with
chambers.”); Davis v. United States, 567 A.2d 36, 40 n.8 (D.C. 1989) (stating that judges
should not consider ex parte communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 113(1) (2000) (“A
lawyer may not knowingly communicate ex parte with a judicial officer before whom a
proceeding is pending concerning the matter, except as authorized by law.”); Today’s News:
Update, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1, 1 (explaining that a law professor was “publicly
censured . . . for engaging in ex parte communications with [a] . . . [j]udge . . . and his law
clerk[]”); John R. Maley, 1997 Federal Civil Practice Update for Seventh Circuit Practitioners, 31
IND. L. REV. 483, 498 (1998) (citing judge that stated that ex parte communications with a
law clerk about a case are just as inappropriate as direct ex parte communications with a
judge); Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that
law clerks have a duty to avoid ex parte “contacts outside the record that might affect the
outcome of the litigation.”); Boston Bar Association Civilty Standards for Civil Litigation,
BOSTON B.J., Sept.–Oct. 1994, at 11, 13 (“A lawyer should avoid ex parte communication on
the substance of a pending case with a judge (or his or her law clerk) before whom such
case is pending.”).
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that the courts should be concerned that their former clerks, and
apparently some lawyers, generally do not share this understanding, but
assume, instead, that the information that former law clerks have about
the judges for whom they clerked is fair game for acquisition.20
Questions about the confidentiality of the relationship between
judicial law clerks and their judges, as well as the extent to which the
communications between law clerks and their judges are subject to some
sort of evidentiary privilege, have arisen sporadically over the past
century. Usually, the issue has arisen in the context of an asserted breach
of confidentiality by law clerks in writing an expose of the inner
operations of the Supreme Court21 or in the context of a public
investigation into alleged judicial wrongdoing.22
Prior to Curry,
apparently no cases had addressed efforts by lawyers to privately
acquire confidential information from law clerks for reasons related to
ongoing cases.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the issue of whether a
lawyer’s mere act of attempting to obtain confidential information from a
former judicial law clerk violates accepted standards of lawyer conduct
so as to justify bar discipline. Part I briefly reviews the circumstances
giving rise to, and the findings in, Bar Counsel v. Curry. Part II explores
the judge-law clerk relationship, focusing particularly on the uniquely
private and confidential nature of that relationship. It also reviews cases
and circumstances in which judge-law clerk confidentiality has been
discussed. Part III explores possible legal doctrines that are related to
law clerk confidentiality and that might support discipline against
lawyers who attempt to acquire confidential information from a judge’s
former law clerk. The Article concludes that the relationship between a
law clerk and judge is widely recognized as uniquely confidential and
worthy of protection. Furthermore, efforts by lawyers to induce a former
law clerk to breach that confidentiality should be seen as either the
improper acquisition of privileged information23 or the improper
inducement of a breach of a law clerk’s fiduciary duty of
confidentiality.24 Given the obvious deleterious impact that such
impropriety would have on the judicial system, lawyers who engage in
20
Indeed, one indication of the extent to which lawyers may believe that acquiring
confidential information from former law clerks is permissible is reflected in the statement
by lawyer Donahue in this case to the effect that law firms routinely hire former law clerks
as associates because of their confidential information. See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra
note 1, at 76; see also infra note 59.
21
See infra notes 130–59 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 244–323 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 372–96 and accompanying text.
24
See infra Part IV.D.
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such actions must be seen as behaving in a manner that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice so as to justify imposing severe discipline
under the Rules of Professional Conduct.25 However, this Article also
concludes that the law in this area should be clarified. The most effective
way to accomplish this would be by express judicial recognition of the
common-law limited privilege for judge-law clerk communications.
Such recognition would reduce the deleterious impact of lawyer
intrusions on the judge-law clerk relationship. In combination with
existing rules of professional conduct prohibiting lawyer interference
with privileges and conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice,26 recognition of this privilege would protect the judicial
deliberative process and provide an unquestionably clear basis for
lawyer discipline.
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE DISBARMENTS
A. The Demoulas Supermarket Dispute
Two brothers—George and Telemachus Demoulas—created and
operated an extremely successful supermarket chain beginning in 1964.
Ownership of the corporation was shared evenly by the two brothers’
families in 1971 when George died. At that point, Telemachus assumed
control of the management of the company. In 1990, members of the
George Demoulas family filed two state court suits in the same court
against Telemachus Demoulas and his family. The first was a suit in
which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had fraudulently
transferred company stock from the George Demoulas family to the
Telemachus Demoulas family in breach of their fiduciary duties. The
second suit was a shareholder derivative suit alleging that Telemachus
and his immediate family had diverted corporate opportunities from the
jointly-owned supermarket company to entities owned and controlled by
the defendants. The same lawyer represented the plaintiffs in both
suits.27
Both cases were assigned to the same Massachusetts Superior Court
Judge—Judge Maria Lopez. The fraudulent stock transfer case was tried
first to a jury. The shareholder derivative suit was tried subsequently to
the judge.28 Both cases were lengthy, expensive, very acrimonious, and
characterized by numerous ancillary disputes and allegations of
25
26
27
28

at 3.
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wrongdoing by one side or the other, which is not surprising given the
fact that about one billion dollars in assets were at stake.29
Lawyer Gary Crossen was part of a large team of lawyers
representing the defendants—the Telemachus Demoulas family.30
Crossen had been involved in the trial of both cases. He had a relatively
distinguished background and reputation.31
In May 1994, a jury returned a verdict in the stock transfer case
primarily in favor of the plaintiff—the George Demoulas family. The
bench trial in the shareholder derivative suit began in December. The
law clerk assigned to assist Judge Lopez was Paul Walsh. Walsh, who
had been unsuccessful in finding a lawyer job after the first year of his
Superior Court Clerkship, was beginning his second year as a law clerk
in the fall of 1994. He worked for Judge Lopez throughout the trial of
the case beginning in December 1994 until August 1995 when it ended
with the judge entering a decision finding for the plaintiffs and ordering
“rescission of certain transactions, surrender of all illicit gains from those
transactions, and payment of attorney’s fees.”32
Given the enormity of the losses they faced, defendants pursued
several post-trial measures in an effort to reverse their losses. They hired
another attorney, Edward Barshak, to handle the appeal in the derivative
action and to assist in other post-trial matters.33 They brought in Richard
K. Donahue “to supervise and coordinate the continuing litigation, to
monitor its cost, and to handle public relations for them.”34 Like
Crossen, Donahue had enjoyed a distinguished career and reputation to
that point. In fact, Donahue had been the Chair of the BBO, the
disciplinary agency for the state.35
See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 3–4.
Essentially, as a result of losing the two cases, the defendants were not only faced with
having to pay millions of dollars in attorneys fees and losing “enormously valuable assets,”
but would also lose control of the Demoulas supermarket empire to the plaintiffs. Id. at 4;
see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394.
30
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 358 (Mass. 2008); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note
1, at 4.
31
The special hearing examiner found that Crossen, who had served as an assistant
district attorney, chief of a major crimes unit in the United States Attorney’s Office, and a
member of the state’s Judicial Nominating Commission, had a “reputation for excellence in
the legal community.” Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 214, 216–18; see also In re
Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 358.
32
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393–94.
33
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4.
34
Id.; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 399 n.21.
35
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 206, 218. The special hearing officer
described Donahue as follows: “A respected Massachusetts practitioner for five decades,
he is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and has served as chair of the MBA
[Massachusetts Bar Association] Commission on Professionalism, chairman of the Board of
29
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While defendants’ counsel believed that the shareholder suit would
be difficult to overturn on appeal, given that the decision was “well
written, well researched, and founded on credibility determinations[,]”
they doubted that the decision had been written by Judge Lopez.36
Moreover, both defendants’ counsel and defendants believed that the
judge had been prejudiced against them.37 Apparently, it was this belief
that led to several post-trial efforts, including the elaborate fake job ruse
involving the judge’s former law clerk, to establish judicial prejudice as
grounds for obtaining a new trial.38
B. The Post-Judgment Sting
The notoriety of the case, the defendants’ belief that the judge was
prejudiced against them, the defendants’ wealth, and the potential loss
that the defendants faced after the judge’s decision in the shareholder
derivative suit probably attracted lawyer Kevin P. Curry and his
investigator, Ernest P. Reid, to the defendant Telemachus Demoulas and
provided the incentive for Curry and Reid to create the ruse directed at
the judge’s former law clerk.39 At the time of the August 1995 decision in
the shareholder derivative case, lawyer Curry had not been involved in
the supermarket litigation.40 Unlike defendants’ lawyers Crossen and
Donahue, Curry did not have a distinguished reputation. In fact, he was
described by one of defendants’ lawyers as a “bottom dweller[.]”41
Bar Overseers, assistant to President John F. Kennedy and president of Nike Corporation.”
Id.
36
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394–95.
37
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394–95, 398; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 358–59 & n.6
(Mass. 2008); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4.
38
In addition to trying to establish judicial prejudice through information obtained from
the former law clerk, defendants’ lawyers, including Gary Crossen, repeatedly attempted
to establish prejudice based on allegations that Judge Lopez had dined with the plaintiffs’
lawyer during the litigation. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 358–59; Bar Counsel v. Curry II,
supra note 1, at 4. Crossen also brought a federal court proceeding on behalf of defendants
trying to establish that plaintiffs had bugged the offices of Telemachus Demoulas in order
to acquire information for the litigation. See Kate Zernike, Demoulas v. Demoulas, BOSTON
GLOBE MAGAZINE, Jan. 11, 1998, available at http://graphics.boston.com/globe/magazine/
1998/1-11/family.
39
See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393–96; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 3–5.
40
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394 n.7; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5.
41
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10, 16 (finding that other lawyers for
defendants warned Crossen and Donahue “to have nothing to do with Curry[]”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 68 (finding that an
attorney involved had doubts about the “probity” of Curry). The special hearing officer
stated: “Curry, by contrast, does not enjoy a stellar reputation. He introduced no character
evidence. During closing argument, his counsel quipped that Curry’s character witnesses
would fit in a telephone booth.” Id. at 219.
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Shortly after the August 1995 decision in the Demoulas shareholder
derivative action, Reid, the investigator who worked with lawyer Curry,
contacted defendant Telemachus Demoulas to set up a meeting
“concerning ‘a matter of importance and confidence.’”42 Thereafter, at a
meeting with Telemachus and his son, Arthur Telemachus, Curry
reinforced defendants’ belief that Judge Lopez was prejudiced and
corrupt, telling them that the “case ‘was over before it began.’”43 Curry
advised the defendants that he and Reid could do an investigation that
would reveal misconduct by the judge that could be used to obtain a
reversal of the shareholder derivative decision. Curry and Reid were
retained by the defendants by Labor Day, 1995.44
The investigation included sifting through public records concerning
Judge Lopez and her husband, Steven Mindich.45 It also included
reading all of the judge’s written opinions with the goal of establishing
that she had not written the Demoulas decision. Apparently, as part of
their scheme to elicit information from the judge’s former law clerk,
Walsh, they also investigated him. This included obtaining his bar
application, a Motor Vehicles Registry Report, his and his parents’
addresses and phone numbers, and his and his parents’ neighbors’
addresses and telephone numbers.46
In the spring of 1997, based on their investigation, Curry and Reid
launched their ruse aimed at Walsh. Walsh had found it difficult to find
a job after his clerkship. He had even submitted resumes to some of the
Demoulas defendant’s lawyers. At this point, he was working for a
Boston firm earning $68,000 a year, but was dissatisfied.47 Based on the
information they had gathered about Walsh, Curry and Reid created a
fake job opportunity to be used as a lure to “pump” Walsh for
information about the Demoulas case and the judge. A fake $90,000 a
year job as in-house counsel at an international corporation with offices
in Bermuda, Boston, and London was designed to appeal to Walsh’s
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5.
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5.
44
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5. The
investigation and other activities proved to be quite lucrative—Curry was paid at least
$130,000 for his work for the defendants. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395 n.11; Bar Counsel v.
Curry II, supra note 1, at 5.
45
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395 n.9.
There had been substantial press coverage of the public and private lives of the Judge and
her publisher husband. See Muther, supra note 4; Chris Wright, The Wrong Publisher,
BOSTON MAGAZINE, Sept. 2006, available at http://www.bostonmagazine.com/
arts_entertainment/articles/city_journal_the_wrong_publisher/AmericanProfile.com, Ask
American Profile, Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.americanprofile.com/article/18985.html.
46
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396.
47
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 25.
42
43
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interests and supposed abilities; it was “‘Walsh’s dream job, and they
knew it.’”48 Portraying himself as a headhunter representing a client,
Reid called Walsh and described the job, telling Walsh that they were
looking for “someone with no history of ethical problems or other
skeletons in his closet, who was married and ‘settled down,’ and who
had ‘excellent writing skills.’”49 Perhaps indicating Walsh’s naivete,50
the bait worked immediately. When asked by Reid if he had worked on
any significant cases, Walsh told him he had worked on the Demoulas
shareholder derivative case. When Reid subsequently asked for a
writing sample, Walsh gave him the decision in that case, which Walsh
said had been read, but not edited, by the judge.51
In May 1997, Reid again contacted Walsh, telling him that the client
was especially impressed by the Demoulas decision writing sample and
asking him questions about how it was written. Reid told Walsh that
representatives of the client, an international insurance underwriting
company, wanted to meet him, probably in New York or Halifax.52
Subsequently, Reid told Walsh that he was the only remaining candidate
for the job and that the interview with a person named “‘Kevin
Concave’” on behalf of the client would be held at a hotel in Halifax.53
Reid gave Walsh an airline ticket and $300 as compensation for the day.
In preparation for the fake job interview, Reid and lawyer Curry, who
was to be “‘Kevin Concave,’” brought in another investigator named
Richard LaBonte to play another representative of the corporate client at
the interview.54
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 6; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396.
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 6; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396.
50
Given Walsh’s previous difficulties finding a job, his background, the Boston job
market at the time, and the “out of the blue” nature of the headhunter call, perhaps Walsh
should have been more cautious and skeptical as the ruse played out.
51
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 6–7. Oddly,
lawyer Curry attached great significance to the fact that Walsh had written the decision,
reportedly telling defendant Arthur T. Demoulas that if defendants could show that a third
person wrote the decision, it “‘could tip the whole darn thing[.]’” Id. at 7. Drafting judicial
opinions is one of the primary activities of law clerks. See infra text accompanying note 101.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the defendants’ other lawyers saw this fact as virtually
meaningless. See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 359 (Mass.
2008); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9.
52
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396–97; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7. It appears
that New York and Halifax were chosen based on the belief that surreptitious taping would
be permissible in those locations. See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396–97; Bar Counsel v.
Curry II, supra note 1, at 34–35.
53
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7.
54
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7. The ruse was
carried so far as to have business cards printed for Curry and LaBonte listing a fake
company, “British Pacific Surplus Risks, Ltd.” at a real address in London. In re Curry, 880
N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7. They also hired someone to
48
49
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Taking on false identities as representatives of the corporate client,
Curry and LaBonte met with Walsh in a hotel in Halifax. The focus of
the interview was on the Demoulas decision and how it was prepared,
with Curry and LaBonte asking Walsh questions that were intended to
reveal the judge’s deliberative process and extent of involvement in
writing the decision, as well as to unearth damaging personal
information about the judge.55 Walsh’s response to the interview
questions reiterated that he had been completely responsible for the
drafting of the decision and that the judge had merely read and signed
the opinion. He also indicated that the judge had told him at the
beginning of the bench trial that “‘very quickly he would know who the
good guys were and who the bad guys were’ and who the winners and
losers were going to be.”56 Finally, Walsh made disparaging remarks
about Judge Lopez and other state judges. Afterward, lawyer Curry was
apparently quite satisfied that the ruse had worked, reporting to
defendant Arthur T. that, ‘“I think we got him.’”57
Defendants’ lawyers Crossen and Donahue became involved in the
Curry and Reid law clerk ruse shortly after the Halifax phony interview.
Defendant Arthur T. Demoulas told them what Curry had related about
Walsh’s claims to have written the shareholder derivative decision and
answer the telephone number listed in London. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel
v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7.
55
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8. An
interesting and ultimately significant side issue that arose during the interview related to
Walsh’s stuttering. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8.
At the beginning of the interview when Walsh began to stutter, Curry told him they
already knew about it. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1,
at 8. When Walsh asked how they knew, LaBonte said they had read it in a letter in
Walsh’s bar application. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note
1, at 8. LaBonte asked why a friend who writes a letter of recommendation would mention
the stuttering. Id. Walsh explained that a friend had not actually signed the letter. In re
Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8. Walsh had asked an
attorney named Edward Cotter to write the letter but Cotter couldn’t submit the letter
because he was suspended from practice. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397 n.17; Bar Counsel
v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8. Cotter had obtained the signature of a friend named Mulcahy
on the letter and Mulcahy had also signed Walsh’s bar application as a sponsoring lawyer
despite not knowing Walsh. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397 & n.17; Bar Counsel v. Curry II,
supra note 1, at 8. Thus, in the interview Walsh revealed information that he had violated
the Massachusetts Code of Professional Conduct. See MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 13. This information was subsequently used by lawyers for the
defendants to attempt to induce Walsh’s cooperation. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 366
(Mass. 2008) (“Donahue told the law clerk that, if he did not cooperate with them, the false
letter submitted with his bar application would be made public.”); Bar Counsel v. Curry II,
supra note 1, at 19 (threatening to go public with bar recommendation letter if Walsh did
not cooperate).
56
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398.
57
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9.
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his statements about the judge’s purported predisposition. Crossen and
Donahue thought that Walsh’s statements about the judge’s alleged bias
were “‘troubling’” and “‘significant.’”58 Both thought the information
was significant and that it should be pursued further. At that point,
neither seemed to be overly concerned about the ruse or the fact that it
was being used on a former law clerk to obtain confidential
information.59 In considering the available options, Crossen thought
about doing nothing, filing a motion accompanied by affidavits from
Curry, Reid, and LaBonte, or doing further investigation.60 Despite his
years of experience as a state and federal prosecutor and his awareness
that procedures existed for investigating juror misconduct,61 Crossen did
58
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 359; Bar Counsel v. Curry
II, supra note 1, at 9.
59
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 359–60; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9; Bar
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 61–63. Donahue relied on Crossen’s supposed
expertise. See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9. He also gave Crossen a copy of a
case, Matter of Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978), that he apparently thought was
somehow relevant. See id. A review of the Bonin case reveals that the case, which involves
an investigation into a judge’s alleged out-of-court misconduct by a judicial conduct
committee at the behest of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, is only remotely, if at
all relevant. See Bonin, 378 N.E.2d at 670. The case does not involve a ruse upon a judicial
law clerk and does not involve issues of confidentiality or judicial privilege. See id. at 671–
74 (summarizing the allegations made against the judge). While the committee’s
investigation included obtaining testimony by the administrative assistant to the judge,
ultimately the court opinion did not even directly address admissibility issues. See
generally id. at 673–85 (discussing testimony from judge’s administrative assistant, but not
addressing admissibility of testimony). A few days later, Donahue claims to have raised
with Crossen the propriety of having contact with a former law clerk, but was really not
concerned about it because “‘every major law firm in Boston’ [sic] quizzes their former
clerks on the judges for whom they clerked” and “former law clerks [are] often asked how
a judge might react to a particular argument[.]” Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 76.
Nothing in the record indicates research by either Donahue or Crossen into the propriety of
contacts with former law clerks prior to their involvement in the second fake interview
with Walsh, except that prior to the second interview, Donahue apparently sought and
received a memoranda from another attorney in his firm about the admissibility of affidavit
statements by the law clerk and investigators in support of a motion to recuse the judge.
See id. at 71–72, 76–77, 100; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 11–12. The memo
apparently only addressed hearsay issues, but not the propriety of either the ruse or
contacts with the former law clerk, or of any privilege or confidentiality protection attached
to a law clerk’s information. See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 100, & Ex. 20 & 20A
(on file with the author). In fact, they relied on cases arising in a completely different
context—testimony in judicial misconduct proceedings by court administrative clerks. See
id. at Ex. 20, Ex. 20A.
60
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 359; see Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9; Bar
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 63.
61
Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 63. In Massachusetts, the Rules of Court
prohibit lawyer contact with jurors, but where allegations of misconduct arise, case law
establishes a specific process for bringing the matter to the attention of the court. See infra
pp. 99–101.
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not consider the obvious remedy of referring the matter to the chief
justice of the superior court for an investigation of the matter or formal
questioning of Walsh.62
After rejecting the notion of filing a motion accompanied by the
Curry and LaBonte affidavits because of doubts as to their admissibility
and credibility,63 Curry, Crossen, and Donahue decided to conduct a
second fake interview with Walsh, to be held in New York and taped.64
The plan was that at the interview, Walsh would confirm the statements
he had previously made in Halifax regarding writing the decision and
the judge’s prejudice, and once this occurred Crossen would “‘brace[]’”
Walsh—that is confront him with the ruse and his statements and try to
convince him to testify on behalf of the defendants’ position that the
judge was predisposed against them.65 Walsh was again lured to the
fake interview with money and a plane ticket. Reid, LaBonte, and
another investigator, Joseph Rush, hired by defendants’ lawyers,
conducted the fake interview at a hotel. The interview was taped and
observed by video by Crossen from an adjoining room. Rush and
LaBonte tried to elicit clear statements by Walsh that the judge had
improperly prejudged the case. They also, for a second time, raised a
matter concerning a recommendation letter that they knew Walsh had
submitted to the Bar in violation of the Massachusetts Code of
Professional Conduct, but Walsh indicated that he did not see a problem
with it. At a break, investigator Rush reported to Crossen that “Walsh’s
statements on predisposition were ‘very weak[,]’”and Crossen told Rush
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 63. The mere fact that the Bonin case,
recently given to Crossen by Donahue, involved a formal proceeding for investigating
superior court judge misconduct, see supra note 55, should have alerted Crossen to this type
of formal remedy. See supra note 59. Furthermore, the authority to “receive information,
investigate, [and] conduct hearings[] . . . concerning allegations of judicial misconduct” is
also vested in the Commission on Judicial Conduct by statute. See MASS GEN. LAWS ch.
211C, sec. 2(1) (1987); see also In re Markey, 696 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Mass. 1998) (explaining that
an aggrieved litigant filed complaint alleging judicial misconduct with the Commission on
Judicial Conduct).
63
See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at
69–70.
64
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 360; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 399–400 (Mass. 2008); Bar
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10–11. New York was selected based on the belief that
it allowed taping with only one party’s consent. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 360; In re Curry,
880 N.E.2d at 399; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10–11; see also Bar Counsel v.
Curry I, supra note 1, at 69–70, 73–75. Apparently, after the decision to hold the fake
follow-up interview in New York was made, a New York federal court decision, Miano v.
AC&R Advertising, 148 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), was brought to Crossen’s attention under
which a lawyer’s involvements in surreptitious taping in the context of a ruse was
disapproved. See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 75–76, 88, 203.
65
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 360–61; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 11; Bar
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 81–84, 95.
62
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to go back and try again.66 Although Walsh made additional statements
in the interview that suggested that the judge had pre-formed views as
to credibility and what had occurred, he did not agree that the judge had
“‘predetermined’” the case, stating that “‘she kept some sense of, of
open-mindedness.’”67
Apparently, because of the inconsistencies
between Walsh’s New York interview and the statements attributed to
Walsh from the Halifax interview, Crossen decided not to “brace” Walsh
at the interview. Instead, Walsh was told by Rush that they would get
back to him shortly about the job.68
After the fake interview in New York, Crossen reviewed the tapes,
concluding they were a “‘mixed bag’” because Walsh had answered
inconsistently regarding the issue of predisposition.69 Meetings with
other lawyers for the defendants were held regarding the Demoulas
litigation and the events involving the former law clerk. At one of these
meetings Crossen was asked about the propriety of contacting a former
law clerk, and Crossen answered that “he did not think [it was
improper] but would look into the matter.”70 Some of defendants’ other
prominent lawyers, who had not previously been aware of the law clerk
contacts and ruse, listened to the tapes or read the transcripts and
viewed them as largely worthless in terms of establishing predisposition
by the judge.71
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 at 13; see also In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363.
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363 n.20; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 at 14.
Essentially, Walsh had indicated that he and the judge had discussed the case and evidence
after each trial session, and that her views as to who was going to win were influenced by
the fact that she had seen most of the witnesses and much of the evidence in the previous,
substantially overlapping jury trial. See id. at 13–14; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at
103–11.
68
See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 14.
69
Id.; see also In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363.
70
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15. He did in
fact have an associate at his firm research the issue and was given a voicemail, notes, and
cases that supported the existence of limited judicial privilege between judges and law
clerks, policy arguments against such contacts, and proscriptions on contacts with jurors,
but no outright prohibition on contacts with law clerks. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363–
64. Crossen did not discuss the issue further with the associate, but read the cases. See
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 117–19.
Among the cases was a case about Judge Alcee Hastings, Matter of Certain Complaints Under
Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court adopted a limited privilege.
See id. at 118. For further discussion of Hastings and the confidentiality privilege, see infra
notes 262–84.
71
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 364; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15–16; see
also Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 119–25. Among the lawyers who listened to the
tape were Edward Barshak and (former Superior Court Judge) Samuel Adams. See In re
Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 364; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15–16. At that point, a
post-trial motion to recuse Judge Lopez was filed based solely on allegations of a dinner
66
67
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Crossen, Curry, and Donahue decided that the final act of the ruse
would entail bringing Walsh to a meeting at a hotel in Boston
purportedly to offer him the job. In fact, the plan was to reveal the ruse
to Walsh and attempt to get him to confirm statements of prejudgment
by the judge in an affidavit and otherwise cooperate with the defendants.
They also planned to place him under surveillance to find out if he went
to the judge or the plaintiffs’ lawyer after the meeting.72 When Walsh
arrived for the fake job offer, he was met by Rush and lawyer Donahue.
Rush told him of the ruse, Donahue told him that defendants hired them
to look into misconduct by Judge Lopez, and both of them told him that
they had tapes and affidavits of both the Halifax and New York
interviews. Crossen then entered the room and attempted to get Walsh
to clearly confirm that he had written the entire decision and that the
judge had been predisposed against the defendants. He essentially
advised Walsh that if Walsh did not cooperate with defendants, the
damaging tapes and information would be revealed. Lawyer Donahue
raised the issue of the false bar recommendation letter, threatening to
make it public if Walsh did not cooperate.73
As might be expected in the circumstances, the former law clerk,
who had been expecting to be offered his “dream job,” was angry and
distraught at learning that he had been tricked and manipulated by the
defendants’ lawyers. During the lengthy encounter, he refused to
discuss the judge’s supposed predisposition, stated that he had just been
puffing his credentials to get the job, and repeatedly asked to hear the
tapes.74 Crossen refused the request to hear the tapes and told the
former clerk that he should seek “independent counsel[]” advice, which
Crossen believed would result in the law clerk cooperating with the

meeting between the judge and one of the counsel for the plaintiffs during the trial; no
mention was made of any of the Walsh information. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 364. At
about the same time, Crossen also was representing defendants in the retrial in federal
court of a related action in which the Demoulas case defendants alleged that one of the
plaintiffs had bugged the defendants’ office. Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 16–17.
Interestingly, that case, Kettenbach v. Demoulas, involved another ruse apparently
orchestrated by Crossen. 901 F. Supp. 486, 489–91 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining that woman
cooperated to set up a “rendez-vous” to Kittery, Maine to secretly record a conversation
regarding “involvement in electronic operations conducted in and around [the] DSM
headquarters[,]” and “to intercept oral communications”). The Demoulas defendants lost
both the motion to recuse and the federal court case about the same time their lawyers
Crossen, Curry, and Donahue decided to try again to get damaging information from
Walsh. See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17.
72
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17.
73
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 19.
74
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365–66; see Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 137–51.
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defendants counsel in providing information.75 As it turned out, Crossen
could not have been more wrong about the effect that obtaining
independent counsel would have.
After the meeting, Walsh, believing that his career was going to be
destroyed if the tapes and bar letter were made public, felt “‘[s]ad,
scared, [and] emotionally very hurt[.]’”76 He returned to work, where
his employer found him sitting in a conference room “crying and
distraught[.]”77 At the suggestion of his employer, Walsh immediately
contacted and retained a lawyer who, rather than contacting Crossen to
negotiate some sort of cooperative arrangement, put Walsh in contact
with the FBI. This resulted in Walsh wearing a wire as part of a reverse
sting over the next two weeks in which Walsh had four telephone
conversations and two in-person meetings with Crossen in an effort to
document what was viewed by the FBI as a possible extortion attempt.78
These conversations involved Walsh repeatedly asking to hear the
tapes before he would discuss the matter further and Crossen repeatedly
stating to Walsh that Walsh would have to have a “‘candid
conversation’” with Crossen first. By this, Crossen apparently meant
that Walsh would have to confirm that the judge had prejudged the
Demoulas case.79 The fraudulent bar recommendation letter was also a
frequent topic during the conversation, with Walsh expressing his
concern about what Crossen intended to do with that information, and
Crossen doing little to alleviate Walsh’s concerns. In fact, when Crossen
and Donahue finally decided to play a section of the tape from the New
York meeting, it was the section in which Walsh explained how he had
submitted a false letter in support of his bar application.80 Then, Walsh
believed, and the hearing examiner in the discipline case found, that
Crossen used the letter to “pressure Walsh into agreeing to have the
‘candid conversation[;]’ [and i]f Walsh agreed to cooperate with him,
Crossen would use his experience and position to do his ‘best . . . to keep
it from coming out.’”81 In the last conversation between Walsh and
75
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 19; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 150;
see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366.
76
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 19–20.
77
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366.
78
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366–68; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20–26;
Vennochi, supra note 7; Judy Rakowsky, Decision on Lawyers Looming at Justice, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2000, at B4. Interestingly, the law clerk’s lawyer was retained to represent
him for all aspects of the Demoulas matter, including “the possible publication of his story.”
Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 154.
79
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20; Bar
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 157–81.
80
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 367; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 23.
81
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 23; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 367.
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Crossen on August 25, 1997, Crossen tried to pressure Walsh into
providing an affidavit supporting defendants’ position by telling him
that a client strategic meeting was coming up in a couple of days and
that Crossen “was not ‘optimistic that if we don’t get something done
before [then] . . . that the client won’t insist upon me dropping the
hammer[.]’”82
Instead, shortly after this conversation, “the hammer” dropped on
Crossen, Donahue, and Curry. Crossen found out on August 29, 1997,
that grand jury subpoenas had been served on the investigators who had
been involved in the ruse and that the FBI was investigating him. Walsh
and his lawyer held a press conference on September 17, 1997, and on
September 26, 1997, the Superior Court Chief Justice filed a complaint
with the Massachusetts attorney discipline authority—the Office of Bar
Counsel.83
C. The Board of Bar Overseers Proceedings
The Bar Counsel waited to act formally until after the FBI and United
States Attorney’s Office completed the criminal investigation into
Crossen’s, Curry’s, and Donahue’s conduct. Eleven months after the
lawyers were advised that the matter was being closed without
indictments, the Bar Counsel filed a petition for discipline against the
lawyers on January 3, 2002.84 The hearings before the specially
appointed hearing officer, who was a former Chair of the Massachusetts
BBO, were the longest in the history of the BBO, with twenty-five days of
82
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 25; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 368. This
statement was false, as was Crossen’s denial during the conversation that defendants’
investigators had been following Walsh for weeks. See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note
1, at 24–26. The special hearing officer found that during these post New-York ruse
meetings Crossen and Donahue had “attempted to get Walsh to state under oath that Judge
Lopez had predetermined the . . . Shareholder Derivative Case” by threatening to disclose
embarrassing or compromising statements that Walsh had made in the Halifax and New
York interviews, and by disclosing the false bar recommendation letter that Walsh had
submitted with his bar application. See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 185–86. The
BBO accepted these findings. See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 33–35, 37–39, 42–
43, 46–51.
83
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 385 n.57; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 26.
84
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 368; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 26; Bar
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 1. The delay was based in part on a request from Curry
and Donahue to defer the matter until after the FBI investigation was completed and in
part on the fact that key documents and evidence were in the possession of the FBI until
after the investigation was closed. Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 209–10. Many
questioned whether Crossen, as a former head of the Criminal Section of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, had received special treatment. See Shelley Murphy, US Says It Won’t
Press Case Against Lopez Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2001, at B1; Maggie Mulvihill, Ethics,
Law Probe Has Legal Observers Scratching Heads, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8, 2000, at 37.
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hearings lasting about 18 months.85 In a 229-page decision, with detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the hearing officer recommended
that all three lawyers be disbarred. The lawyers appealed to the BBO,
not only challenging the findings of fact, but arguing that their conduct
was proper, or alternatively, that ambiguity or uncertainty in the
standards of conduct warranted no punishment, or at most, only a
reprimand. The BBO heard arguments in January and February of 2006,
and on October 16, 2006, and with minor exceptions, unanimously
adopted the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. As
to the final disposition, the BBO recommended that Curry and Crossen
be disbarred and that Donahue be suspended for three years.86
The vast majority of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
both the hearing officer’s decision and the BBO’s decision related to the
misrepresentations and deceits that were part of the fake job ruse and the
threats that were made to expose the former law clerk’s statements and
bar recommendation letter if he did not cooperate. The significance of
the fact that the ruse and threats were directed at a former law clerk or
that the contacts, regardless of their nature, were intended to penetrate
the confidential law clerk judge relationship, received only passing
attention. Thus, with regard to Curry, the co-architect of the initial ruse,
the special hearing officer and Board found that the “scheme to induce a
former law clerk under false pretenses into disclosing confidential
communications with a judge regarding the decision-making process[,]”
his “holding out to a former law clerk the false promise of lucrative
employment[,]” his false representations of his and his associates’
identities, and “luring the former law clerk out of the Commonwealth on
the false pretext of a job interview for the purpose of inquiring into the
deliberative processes of a judge in a case . . . violated Canon One, DR 1102(A)(2) and (4)–(6), and Canon Seven, DR 7-102(A)(5) and (7).”87
85

See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 1; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at

2.
See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 369; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 401 (Mass. 2008); Bar
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 1–2. Final determinations of disbarment and
suspension are made by at least one justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
See, e.g., In re McBride, 865 N.E.2d. 1110, 1112 (Mass. 2007).
87
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 27–28; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 400–01. At
the time of the events in this case, Massachusetts’s ethical rules were based on the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See Mass.gov, Rules, http://www.mass.gov/
obcbbo/rules.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). DR 1-102 defined misconduct, stating in
relevant part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
...
(2) [C]ircumvent a disciplinary rule through actions of another.
...
86
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Oddly, this same language regarding trying to acquire “confidential”
information about the judges’ “deliberative process” was not used by the
special hearing officer with regard to lawyers Crossen and Donahue.
Instead, the special hearing officer stated that it was Crossen’s, Curry’s,
and Donahue’s “conduct in planning, executing, and participating in a
scheme to induce a former law clerk to make damaging or compromising
statements about himself or about the judge for whom he clerked with
the false inducement of lucrative employment . . . in order to force the
judge’s recusal or undermine her decisions in an ongoing case, [that]
violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(2) and (4)–(6), and Canon Seven, DR 7102(A)(5) and (7).”88
(4) [E]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
(5) [E]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
(6) [E]ngage in other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 13, at 130; see MASSACHUSETTS
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES DR 1-102, available at http://www.mass.
gov/obcbbo/disciplinaryrules.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). The substance of these rules
is now contained in Rule 8.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (h) of the Massachusetts Rules of
Professional Conduct. MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 13, at
130; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2003). DR 7-102 provided in relevant
part:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . .
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact. . . .
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal or fraudulent.
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 13, at 130. The counterparts
under the current Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct are, Rule 4.1, which states
“[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person[,]” and Rule 1.2, which states “(d) A
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent.” Id. at 10, 336; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.2(d), 4.1(a) (2003).
88
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 28–31; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 368. See
supra note 87 for the content of the rules. In addition, the three lawyers were also found to
have violated DR-102(A)(2) (acts of another) and (4)–(6) (dishonesty, prejudice to
admininstration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102 (A)( 5) (false statement) and (7)
((fraud) by setting up the New York fake job interview for purposes of taping the
conversation without Walsh’s consent. Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 28–31.
Crossen and Donahue were also found to have violated DR-102(A) (4)–(6) (dishonesty,
prejudice to administration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102(A)( 5) (false
statement) and (7) ((fraud) by misrepresenting to Walsh that the Halifax conversation was
taped, threatening to disclose Walsh’s “embarrassing or compromising statements” made
during the fake job interviews, and threatening to disclose that Walsh had submitted a false
recommendation letter with his bar application if Walsh did not attest that the judge had
predetermined the outcome in the shareholder derivative suit. Id. at 29–32. Finally,
Crossen was found to have violated violated DR-102 (A) (4)–(6) (dishonesty, prejudice to
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Given the outrageousness of the lawyers’ behavior during the ruse
and the relative clarity of the ethics rules violations relating to the ruse
and other false statements,89 this focus is not surprising. A close
examination, however, reveals that the special hearing officer and the
BBO assiduously avoided directly taking on the question of whether the
mere fact that the lawyers had targeted a former law clerk in an effort to
get confidential information, in and of itself, would warrant discipline.
Thus, the BBO, apart from its literal recitation of the hearing officer’s
findings above, did not mention the fact that the lawyers were
attempting to pierce a confidential relationship between a law clerk and
judge, except that it did note that the whole ruse was essentially hatched
because the lawyers did not expect Walsh to “disclose, in violation of his
obligations as a clerk, confidential communications with a judge unless

administration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102 (A)( 5) (false statement) and (7)
(fraud) by placing Walsh and his wife under surveillance, and denying it. See id. at 30.
Curry was found to have violated DR-102(A)(2) (acts of another) and (5)-(6) (prejudice to
administration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102(A)(7) (illegal or fraudulent
conduct) by investigating Walsh’s personal life to get damaging personal information. Id.
at 28.
89
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 403–04 (“Curry’s conduct in this matter raised ‘dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation’ and ‘false statement[s] of law or fact’ to heady levels.”);
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 376–79 (discussing the obviousness of Crossen’s violations of
rules prohibiting false statements and misrepresentations, distinguishing cases involving
testers and prosecutors’ undercover stings); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI,
LEGAL ETHICS—THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 4.1–2 (2007)
(citing examples that illustrate the broad brush of the prohibition of false statements by
lawyers); Michael S. Frisch, Zealousness Run Amok, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1035, 1054–55
(2007) (discussing the patently unethical nature of the deceptions engaged in by lawyers
Curry, Crossen, and Donahue); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 577, 577–78 (2005) (explaining that courts “abhor” all types of deception and quoting
the New Hampshire Supreme Court as stating, “‘it is the responsibility of every attorney at
all times to be truthful.’”); Livingston Keithley, Comment, Should a Lawyer Be Allowed to Lie?
People v. Pautler and a Proposed Duress Exception, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 301, 301–04, 325 (2004)
(explaining that lying to a murderer on the grounds that it may save lives was not held to
be an exception to the prohibition of lying and deception by lawyers and that allowing
“‘justifiable deception’” would result in a slippery slope); W. William Hodes, Seeking the
Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and Lying with
an Explanation, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 62–64 (2002) (explaining that truthfulness and honesty
are ‘“core values’” that separate attorneys from other professionals and that even “few
instances of real dishonesty[]” can compromise the system); Rebecca Graves Payne,
Investigative Tactics, They May Be Legal, but Are They Ethical?, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 46
(quoting the Colorado Supreme Court as stating “[p]urposeful deception by an attorney
licensed in our state is intolerable, even when . . . attempting to secure the surrender of a
murder suspect.”); Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception and Lawyers: Away from a Dogmatic
Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 744–46
(1989) (explaining the rationales for the “rigid” prohibition on deception and lying by
lawyers).
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he were seduced by an offer he could not refuse.”90 The extent to which
the BBO saw this effort as wrongful per se is drawn into question by the
BBO’s statement earlier in its opinion apparently suggesting that rather
than launching the ruse, while in her fax the lawyers should have made a
“straightforward
request to Walsh that he tell them what had
happened[.]”91 Even such a straight forward request seemingly would
have sought confidential information about the judge’s deliberative
process.
The special hearing officer more directly, even if not without
ambiguity, addressed the attempt to invade a confidential relationship.
Despite the fact that she found that the purpose of the defendants’
lawyers’ contacts with Walsh was to get him to breach his duties of
confidentiality as a former law clerk, and that the parties had extensively
briefed the question of whether the defendants’ lawyers had invaded a
“judge-[law] clerk privilege” by their approach to Walsh, the special
hearing officer “pass[ed] the question[]” because she found that the
lawyers’ actions had violated their “ethical duties even [if] no such
privilege had existed.”92 Later she stated: “Because the deception
sought improperly to undermine the integrity of a judicial proceeding—
even assuming there existed no judge-clerk privilege to invade—I
further find that it constituted misconduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice in violation of . . . DR 1-102(A)(5)” and violates
DR 1-102(A)(6) because “such conduct reflects adversely on one’s fitness
to practice law[] . . . .”93 The problem is that this brief, ambiguous
passage, which is not addressed or cited by the BBO, could be read in its
context of a discussion of defendants’ lawyers’ dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation, to mean that it was the deception that was critical.
It also could be read to mean that the contact with the former law clerk
for the purpose of undermining the integrity of the judicial proceeding
through acquisition of confidential information is itself a violation of the
ethical proscriptions. Given the special hearing officer’s repeated “pass”
on the judge-law clerk privilege question, it should probably be read as
the former.
Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 60–61.
Id. at 53 n.13; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 370 n.33.
92
Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 195 & n.75. She also stated that the fact that
they were trying to induce the law clerk to breach his duty to the judge was the reason that
they “could not ask him their questions directly and honestly. Having in mind specific
answers they sought as to predisposition and authorship, they tailored their
blandishments, interviews, and interrogation first to trick[ and] later to frighten Walsh into
making statements he ‘otherwise would not have made.’” Id. at 195; see In re Crossen, 880
N.E.2d at 357, 370.
93
Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 198 (citation omitted).
90
91
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Like the special hearing officer and the BBO, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the disbarment of lawyers Curry
and Crossen, focused almost entirely on the lawyers’ false statements
and misrepresentations that were part of the fake job ruse. In brief
passages, the court did, however, acknowledge the importance of the
confidentiality of deliberative process communications between a judge
and law clerk to the administration of justice and the possible existence
of a judicial deliberations privilege.94 More importantly, while declining
to address in these cases whether a deliberative privilege should exist
regarding judge-law clerk communications, the court indicated that even
absent such a privilege, “efforts to pierce the confidential
communications of a former law clerk and a judge in a pending matter to
benefit one of the litigants also constitute ‘conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.’”95 Thus, the court seemingly indicated, the
efforts by the lawyers here to induce a former law clerk to reveal
confidential judicial deliberative information, quite apart from the use of
misrepresentations and false statements, alone would run afoul of the
rules of professional conduct, at least where it occurred in the context of
an ongoing case.
III. THE JUDGE-LAW CLERK RELATIONSHIP
A. Generally
The judicial law clerk institution in the United States got its start in
Massachusetts in 1875 when Chief Justice Horace Gray of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, because of his increasingly heavy
workload, hired a high ranking recent law graduate as his legal
“‘secretary.’”96 When Justice Gray was appointed to the United States
Supreme Court in 1882, he brought this practice with him, and soon
thereafter the practice spread. Justice Oliver Wendell Homes Junior,
upon joining the Supreme Court in 1882, emulated Gray’s practice of
employing a recent honors law graduate because ‘“no one can do all the
work without breaking down.’”97 In 1886, at the recommendation of the
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 373; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406.
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 373; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406.
96
See Robert Bloom, The Origin of the Supreme Judicial Court Law Clerk System, LAW
CLERKS’ SOCIETY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (2003), http://sjclawclerks.socialaw.
com/history.htm. Gray called this secretary, whom he had to pay out of his own pocket, a
puisne judge. See id.; Gerald Lebovits, Judges’ Clerks Play Varied Roles in the Opinion Drafting
Process, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jul–Aug. 2004, at 34; J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: for Better or for
Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 323 (1988); see also JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & ROBERT S.
THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1980).
97
Bloom, supra note 96.
94
95
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Attorney General, Congress authorized a ‘“stenograhic clerk’” for each
justice to be paid $1,600 a year by the government, but it appears that, at
least as used by Justice Gray, the clerk’s duties were very similar to those
of judicial law clerks as they have become traditionally viewed—
“reviewing newly filed cases, discussing opinions [proposed] by other
justices [on the Court], [and] engaging in . . . vigorous colloquy on
opinions[.]”98 The law clerk institution was introduced into the states
and lower federal courts in the 1930s.99
There is substantial variability among judges and courts in terms of
the roles of law clerks and their relationships to particular judges. While
some courts and institutions attempt to describe generally the functions
of the law clerk, the actual role of an individual law clerk is usually
determined by the judge for whom that law clerk works in the context of
what is widely recognized to be a uniquely personal relationship.100 In
its most recent edition of the Federal Law Clerk Handbook, the Federal
Judicial Center described the basic functions as follows:
In most chambers, law clerks concentrate on legal
research and writing. Typically, law clerks’ broad range
of duties includes conducting legal research, preparing
bench memos, drafting orders and opinions, editing and
proofreading the judge’s orders and opinions, and
verifying citations. Many judges discuss pending cases
with their law clerks and confer with them about
decisions.
District court law clerks often attend
conferences in chambers with attorneys. Frequently, law
clerks also maintain the library, assemble documents,
serve as courtroom crier, handle exhibits during trial,
and perform other administrative tasks as required by
the judge to ensure a smooth-running chambers.
Law clerks for district court, bankruptcy court, and
magistrate judges have substantially more contact with
attorneys and witnesses than do their appellate court
98
See id.; Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Mahoney, supra note 96, at 324. Gray’s clerks
were also asked to draft opinions that were used for discussion purposes. Bloom, supra
note 96; see also 24 Stat. 254 (1886).
99
See Bloom, supra note 96; Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Mahoney, supra note 96, at 325–
26; John Paul Jones, Some Ethical Considerations for Judicial Clerks, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 771,
771 n.1 (1990–91).
100
See David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships With Their Judges, 69
JUDICATURE 236, 236, 240 (1986); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 326–27; FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 1 (Sylvan A.
Sobel ed., 2d ed. 2007); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK 1 (2d ed. 2007);
Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L REV. 152, 153–54 (1990).
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counterparts. The principal function of an appellate
court law clerk is to research and write about the issues
presented by an appeal, while law clerks for district,
bankruptcy, and magistrate judges may be involved in
the many decisions made at every stage of each case.101
This description probably accurately describes the broad, common
outlines of the duties of most federal and state law clerks, but it does not
communicate the potential breadth of law clerks’ functions or the
unique, intimate access that many of these functions give the law clerk to
the judge’s inner thoughts and private life. A much more striking
picture emerges from examining comments judges themselves have
made about the law clerk relationship. Judge Patricia Wald of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated
that “[t]he judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually
dependent one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love
affair.”102 Similarly, Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has described the relationship as a
“human” one in which “a young lawyer becomes part of the judge’s
extended family, a disciple, an ally, quite possibly a friend.”103 Given the
closeness of the relationship, both professionally and personally,
“[m]utual trust and respect are not merely desirable, they are
essential.”104
Other courts have noted that
[l]aw clerks are not merely the judge’s errand
runners.
They are sounding boards for tentative
opinions[,] and [they are] legal researchers who seek the
authorities that affect decision[s]. Clerks are privy to the

101
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 100 at 1; see also Mahoney, supra note 96, at 327–28;
ALVIN B. RUBIN & LAURA B. BARTELL, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW
CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 1, 16 (1989). There is also often a mentoring or pupil-teacher
relationship between the judge and a law clerk. Comment, The Law Clerk’s Duty of
Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1232 (1981).
102
Wald, supra note 100, at 153; see also Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE
L.J. 1707, 1708–09 (1991) (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Judge
Kozinski agreeing).
103
Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1708. Judge Kozinski notes further that it is not an
ordinary employer-employee relationship, but one that “calls for an uncommon degree of
trust, respect and goodwill.” Id. at 1718; see also Comment, supra note 101, at 1232 & n.17
(describing friendships that arise).
104
Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1709.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1

Sorenson, Jr.: Are Law Clerks Fair Game? Invading Judicial Confidentiality

2008]

Invading Judicial Confidentiality

25

judge’s thoughts in a way that neither parties to the
lawsuit nor his most intimate family members may be.105
Citing and quoting this assessment with approval, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has added the following
commentary:
In contrast to court clerks, who frequently perform
ministerial functions, a law clerk generally performs
discretionary acts of a judicial nature. Indeed, a law
clerk is probably the one participant in the judicial
process whose duties and responsibilities are most
intimately connected with the judge’s own exercise of
the judicial function. . . .
“Law clerks are closely
connected with the court’s decision-making process. . . .
Law clerks are simply extensions of the judges at whose
pleasure they serve.”106
The closeness of the judge-law clerk relationship arises from, and is
probably reinforced by, a number of practical factors. The sheer
workload that most judges face requires that they rely heavily on their
law clerks for legal research and opinion drafting.107 Moreover, the
isolated nature of a judge’s life greatly reduces the number of sources for
input, feedback, or discussion of issues that a judge has. As Judge Wald
has noted, her “[law] clerks are basically the only persons a judge can
talk to in depth about a case. . . . If she is in doubt, troubled, or just plain
frustrated, the clerk is her wailing wall.”108 The judge explained further
that judges are “often unsure of [their] analyses” and “need to test ideas
before exposing them to the hard probing of colleagues.”109 They turn to
law clerks, who must be “unambiguously” loyal and committed to the
judge, for criticism, especially because judges need to occasionally “let
Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983).
Olivia v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Olivia v. Heller, 670 F. Supp.
523, 526 (S.D.N.Y 1987)) (citation omitted); see also Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 417 & n.6
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting the closeness of the judge and law clerk’s work and the need for
loyalty, cooperation, and responsibility by law clerks); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 326–27.
107
See Mahoney, supra note 96, at 340; see also Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 417 (noting the
relationship of law clerk assistance to the “staggering case loads that have crushed all
courts, but especially [the] state judiciaries[’ courts].”); Wald, supra note 100, at 154.
108
Wald, supra note 100, at 153; see also Crump, supra note 98, at 240 (noting the solitary
remote nature a of judge’s job and the need for collegial atmosphere); see also Mahoney,
supra note 96, at 342 (noting that because judges cannot seek outside assistance on analysis
and practically cannot consult with busy colleagues, the law clerk “sounding board
function” is “indispensable”).
109
Wald, supra note 100, at 153.
105
106

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1

26

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

[their] guard down, to speculate, to experiment, to argue, even to make
frank and sometimes uncharitable appraisals of our colleagues’ drafts
and suggestions.”110 Judge Wald believes that “our jurisprudence is
better for the give and take among judges and law clerks than if judges
had to go it alone.”111
Moreover, the close physical proximity of the law clerk to the judge,
in chambers and otherwise, necessarily results in law clerks having
access to private personal information about, and from, the judge and
frequently results in close social interaction.112 For example, during my
clerkship for a federal appellate judge, it was common for the judge and
law clerks, as well as other judges and their law clerks, to socialize
together.113 Furthermore, the mere fact that I spent hours a day in the
same office suite necessarily resulted in my acquiring a substantial
amount of information about the judge’s private life, including tastes,
political opinions, opinions about lawyers and other judges, food
preferences, personal and family relationships, work habits, and
financial information.114 Given this kind of access, it is little wonder that
Judge Kozinski has noted that the judge-law clerk relationship “calls for
an uncommon degree of trust, respect and goodwill.”115
B. Confidentiality
Given law clerks’ functions and access to private information, it is
hardly surprising that law clerk confidentiality has been traditionally
viewed as a fundamental aspect of the judge-law clerk relationship.116
Indeed, from a judge’s perspective, it is essential both for functional and
personal reasons. As the Seventh Circuit has stated, “‘[t]he absence
of . . . confidentiality is disruptive and inevitably impairs the operation
of any court.’”117 Judges rely on the ability to engage freely in testing of
their thoughts and ideas with their law clerks. Without confidentiality,
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–54; see also Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1723 (stating that a clerk advises and
debates with the judge and “serves as his eyes and ears[]”); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 342
(clerk’s “opinions or suggestions often result in a more careful search for the means by
which a just decision should be reached[]” and may compel “a judge to consider
alternatives that might otherwise have been ignored or considered inadequately.”).
112
See Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1708–09, 1723; Crump, supra note 100, at 240 (quoting
Judge Coffin’s statement that “‘[t]he pleasure of [a law clerk’s] company is one of a judge’s
most refreshing fringe benefits.’”); Comment, supra note 101, at 1235.
113
This would include informal lunches, dinners, parties, and attending events.
114
Cf. Comment, supra note 101, at 1235 (stating that clerks have unique views of judges).
115
Kozinksi, supra note 102, at 1718.
116
Crump, supra note 100, at 240; Jones, supra note 99, at 775–76; Mahoney, supra note 96,
at 335–36; Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Comment, supra note 101, at 1236–38.
117
Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1995).
110
111
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many judges would not engage in this process to the serious detriment of
their decision-making.118 This is because judges understandably would
be hesitant to publicly expose their uncertainties, possible mistakes or
unsettled ideas, or unpopular conclusions.119 Moreover, as Judge
Mahoney of the Second Circuit has noted, disclosure of “the workings of
a chambers, or any apprehension that this is likely to occur, can only
undermine the personal relationships involved and tend to induce a
formal and defensive atmosphere that will undermine collegiality in
chambers.”120
Other rationales have been offered in support of confidentiality.
These have included “[p]reserving public confidence in the judiciary,”
which is based on the notion that judicial decisions, particularly
appellate decisions, are often the product of compromise. It is the final
written decision that is relevant and should be relied upon and assessed
by the public. Disclosure of the compromise or sometimes strident
differences of opinion leading to the compromise would undermine the
public’s faith in the justice system.121 Other interests include preventing
exploitation of information and imposing cost on the system and
others.122 This is particularly likely to be a problem in pending cases or
very recently decided cases that are still subject to appeal or
reconsideration. A notorious example of exploitation is the 1919 case in
which a Supreme Court law clerk allegedly leaked information, about a
pending decision, that was used to engage in insider trading.123
Improper imposition of costs on the system and opposing parties might
See Jones, supra note 99, at 776; Comment, supra note 101, at 1236.
See Jeffrey B. Abrahamson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information?, 63
JUDICATURE 361, 362 (1979–1980). In part, this can be explained by the possibility that
“courts inevitably will become politicized [if] they are forced to conduct their intramural
arguments in public.” Id. at 402.; see also, Comment, supra note 101, at 1239 (noting the
potentially negative impact on independent judicial reasoning from outside influence if
candid internal discussions of unpopular ideas are subject to public scrutiny).
120
Mahoney, supra note 96, at 335–36; see also Comment, supra note 101, at 1237–39
(stating that judges reported on a survey question that the breach of confidentiality impact
included “negative impact on the closeness of the relationship” and the type and amount of
information discussed with clerks, more inhibition by the judge, stricter hiring practices,
and use of permanent law clerks).
121
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1239–40.
122
See id. at 1240. A recent example of an effort apparently aimed at avoiding
exploitation of law clerk information is a policy of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit under which the identities of law clerks is maintained as
confidential by the clerks office to avoid ex parte contacts by law firms. See Emma
Schwartz, D.C. Circuit Keeps Clerks Confidential, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at 3, 3. Several
other Circuit Courts have similar policies. See id.
123
See infra text accompanying notes 136–37. See infra text accompanying notes 164–66
also for a discussion of the case of the former Illinois Appeals Court law clerk’s use of a
judge’s memo in the clerk’s run for the judge’s seat in an election.
118
119
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occur where one party attempts to use confidential information as a basis
for reopening a case, as was contemplated in the Curry case that is the
subject of this Article.124
In addition, law clerk confidentiality serves to protect judges’
privacy and reputation interests.125 An example of intrusion upon
privacy interests could involve a law clerk’s public disclosure of a
judge’s health issues.126 A judge’s reputation could also be unfairly
harmed by a law clerk’s revelation of confidential information outside
the context of a judicial disciplinary proceeding and before the veracity
of the information is established.127 Finally, there is the interest of
avoiding dissemination of a law clerk’s distorted or inaccurate
disclosures. Commentators have cautioned that law clerks’ perspectives
may not be accurate and may be distorted by their own interests, biases,
or relationships with a judge. Also, law clerks’ revelations may be
distorted by the press.128 An example of such law clerk distortion based
on personal interest occurred in Bar Counsel v. Curry, where the law clerk
engaged in puffery regarding his role in drafting the Demoulas
shareholder derivative decision and made statements about the judge’s
prejudgment of the case because he thought that was what the job
interviewers wanted and it would aid him in landing the job.129
Those who would limit or reject confidentiality have relied on public
interest rationales. Probably the most frequent justification for breaches
of confidentiality, at least by former Supreme Court clerks, is the
historical and scholarly value of the information.130 Another rationale is
that because courts are political institutions that frequently decide
See supra text accompanying notes 4–13. It would be improper where the confidential
information is not a sufficient basis for obtaining a new trial. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d
at 373–74 (bias does not exist merely because a judge’s opinions may be based on
information from earlier proceedings); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 54–55
(indicating that the mere fact that a judge was influenced by evidence in a prior similar case
is not sufficient for recusal); infra text accompanying notes 260–82, 283–87, 302–24
(information is privileged and therefore generally inadmissible).
125
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1240.
126
See id. (citing the disclosure in The Brethren of details of Justice Douglas’s last illness).
127
See id. at 1240–41.
128
See id. at 1241.
129
See, e.g., Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 223; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365.
130
See David J. Garrow, “The Lowest Form of Animal Life”?: Supreme Court Clerks and
Supreme Court History, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 893–94 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, Opening
Closed Chambers, 108 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090–1104 (1999); Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 403–
04. But see Jones, supra note 99, at 776 n.23 (political and historical value does not justify
breach of confidentiality in a judge’s lifetime); Richard W. Painter, Open Chambers?, 97
MICH L. REV.1430, 1436 (1999) (historical and scholarship value is not worth the damage to
the law clerk judicial relationship). This justification has a much diluted force outside the
context of the Supreme Court.
124
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matters of fundamental public policy, democratic theory requires that
the people be informed not only of decisions but also of the basis of those
decisions.131 A related rationale applicable in states where judges are
elected is that in order to make informed judgments, voters need
information about the judges’ internal deliberations and the basis for
their decisions; in addition, even where judges are appointed, such
information would be highly relevant to court reform efforts.132 Finally,
commentators and some courts have noted that exposing wrongdoing by
members of the judiciary would justify an exception to the law clerk
confidentiality duty.133
While originally this secrecy surrounding what goes on in chambers
may have been simply a tacit understanding, over the years judges and
court systems have increasingly formalized the confidentiality
requirement in the face of lapses by law clerks.134 They have also
clarified that the duty of confidentiality does not expire at the end of the
clerkship; it continues indefinitely.135 Also, although the exact contours
of the law clerk confidentiality duty may be blurry at the periphery,
when it comes to general information about a judge or the procedural
operations of chambers or the law clerk’s experiences, there is no
question that a law clerk’s information about the judge’s decisionmaking process in particular cases is generally considered secret.136
See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 402–04; Comment, supra note 101, at 1241; David
Lane, Bush v. Gore, Vanity Fair, and a Supreme Court Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 874–75 (2005). Opening deliberations to public scrutiny may not
be worth the cost because it can result in loss of the testing of ideas with other judges and
law clerks, premature judgments, and private and less informed decision-making. See
Philip B. Kurland, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 185, 189 (1979)
(book review); Comment, supra note 101, at 1241 n.60; supra text accompanying notes 116–
19.
132
See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 403; Comment, supra note 101, at 1242.
133
See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361, 363, 402; Comment, supra note 101, at
1242; infra note 222.
134
See Richard W. Painter, supra note 130, at 1441–42, 1454–55; Mahoney, supra note 96, at
335–36; text infra text accompanying notes 142–45; see also George Anastaplo, Legal Realism,
the New Journalism, and The Brethren, 1983 DUKE L. J. 1045, 1046 (1983) (noting unwritten
nature of Supreme Court secrecy rule at the time of The Brethren).
135
See infra note 175; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST: ETHICS
FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS 6–7 (2002); Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Mahoney,
supra note 96, at 336; Painter, supra note 130 at 1441–42, 1446–48, 1467–68. But see
Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1093–94 (arguing that the 1989 Supreme Court Law Clerk
Code did not impose a continuing duty of confidentiality); Garrow, supra note 130, at 893–
94 (reviewing former Supreme Court law clerks post-clerkship revelations generally many
decades later).
136
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1090–91, 1093 (drawing distinction between
general conversations and experiences and conversations between law clerk and judge
about a decision in a particular case and stating that “[n]o consensus exists as to what
131
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The most notorious confidentiality breaches have been those
associated with former Supreme Court law clerks who divulged
information relating to the operations of chambers and the “inside
stories” of famous cases, usually in their own later writings or in
interviews given to other writers. These have spawned a plethora of
literature debating the extent to which post-clerkship law clerk
confidentiality is the expected ethical norm and the extent to which
specific disclosures by law clerks breached such a norm.137
Probably the most infamous breach of confidentiality by a Supreme
Court law clerk occurred in 1919 when Ashton F. Embry, a long-time law
clerk to Justice Joseph McKenna, allegedly divulged information about a
not yet released decision in United States v. Southern Pacific Co.138 to some
co-conspirators who used the information to profit in the stock market.
When discovered, Embry resigned and was indicted for “‘conspiracy to
defraud
the
[g]overnment
of
its
right
of
secrecy
concerning . . . opinions.’” The law clerk’s motion to dismiss, on the

former Supreme Court [Law] [C]lerks can and cannot say.”); Leboivits, supra note 96, at 35
(drawing distinction between writing about experience and divulging secrets); Painter,
supra note 130, at 1457–58 (noting ambiguity but arguing that most communications
between a Justice and a law clerk about the decision-making process and Court’s opinions
are confidential); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 135, at 5–6 (confidential information
“includes any information you receive in chambers that is not filed in the public docket[,]”
such as instructions from the judge and discussions of the judge’s assessment of a case);
Comment, supra note 101, at 1253–66 (discussing proposed law clerk confidentiality
guidelines and types of information covered and surveyed from judges’ perspectives as to
what is confidential). But see Garrow, supra note 130, at 859–74, 893 (reviewing writings of
former Supreme Court law clerks that revealed aspects of the decision-making process and
comments by Justices about other Justices, suggesting that as to former Supreme Court law
clerks there has been a long history of disclosures, usually after the passage of some time).
137
See, e.g., David J. Garrow, supra note 130, at 859–75, 892–93 (based on historical review
of disclosures by Supreme Court law clerks, author concludes there has been a “longstanding historical tradition [of disclosure] that has developed over the past sixty years.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1090–1104 (arguing that former Supreme Court law clerk
Edward Lazarus’s book Closed Chambers about Justice Blackmun and the Supreme Court
does not violate confidentiality or other legal and ethical duties); Lane, supra note 131, at
863–76 (reviewing Supreme Court law clerk’s duties of confidentiality and the breaches
that occurred in The Brethren, Closed Chambers, and an article in Vanity Fair about the Bush
v. Gore decision); Painter, supra note 130, at 1434–71 (arguing that former Supreme Court
law clerk Edward Lazarus’s book Closed Chambers about Justice Blackmun and the Supreme
Court violates confidentiality and other legal and ethical duties, and reviewing law clerk
confidentiality generally). See generally Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J.
835 (1999) (excoriating Edward Lazarus’s revelations in Closed Chambers as unethical and
immoral); Laura Krugman Ray, America Meets the Justices: Explaining the Supreme Court to
the General Reader, 72 TENN. L. REV. 573, 578–612 (2005) (discussing The Nine Old Men, The
Brethren, and Closed Chambers—books about the Supreme Court based on law clerk
information).
138
251 U.S. 1 (1919).
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grounds that there was no law forbidding the alleged conduct, was
denied, and the appeal and petition for certiorari were also denied.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor ultimately dismissed the prosecution.139
This is one of the few examples of a breach of confidentiality by a law
clerk during their employment discussed in the literature. The more
well-known disclosures discussed below involved former Supreme
Court law clerks who were either sources for, or authors of, books
written primarily for the general public about the inside workings of the
Supreme Court.
Probably, the most famous of these was Bob Woodward’s and Scott
Armstrong’s 1979 book, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court.140 This
bestseller chronicles the Court from the October 1969 term through June
1976, with a focus on the personalities and interactions of the Justices,
including private conversations and comments about other Justices,
during the decision-making process on major cases. Of particular
importance here is the fact that the authors revealed that the general
sources of their work included “interviews with more than two hundred
people, including several Justices, more than 170 former law clerks, and
several dozen former employees[,]” who were promised confidentiality
by the authors.141 Moreover, the authors stated that their sources
provided them “internal memoranda between Justices, letters, notes
taken at conference, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts
of opinions and, in several instances, drafts that were never circulated
even to other Justices.”142
The revelation that 170 former law clerks had contributed to The
Brethren did not go unnoticed. Indeed, it has drawn a firestorm of
criticism as an egregious example of a breach of confidentiality regarding
139
Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Garrow, supra note 130, at 859; see also Chester A.
Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299,
310 (1961); John B. Owens, The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker: Ashton Embry and the
Supreme Court Leak Scandal of 1919, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2000).
140
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979). The Brethren, however, was not the first of its genre. In 1936, Washington
newspaper columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen wrote: The Nine Old Men, which
has been described as “a breezy summary of the Court’s history and the major New Deal
cases[]” that focuses on individual Justices and gives “brief accounts of the Justices that
expressly tie their decisions to their individual identities and experiences.” The point was
to present the legal realist perspective that the Court’s decisions (and Justices’ resistance to
the New Deal) were “shaped by unconstrained individuals rather than by the impersonal
force of law.” Ray, supra note 137, at 579. Unlike The Brethren, however, The Nine Old Men
does not reveal the sources for its anecdotes and reports of verbatim private conversations.
Id. at 580.
141
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 140, at 3–4. For a review of some of the more
interesting aspects of THE BRETHREN, see Ray, supra note 137, at 589–99.
142
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 140, at 4.
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what goes on in chambers.143 It also served as the impetus for the
adoption of a law clerk code of conduct in 1981 by the United States
Judicial Conference.144 That Code specifically states: “‘The relationship
between judge and law clerk is essentially a confidential one. . . . [A law
clerk] should never disclose to any person any confidential information
received . . . in the course of his duties, nor should he employ such
information for his personal gain.’”145 In 1996, the Judicial Conference
implemented a Code of Judicial Conduct for Judicial Employees,
including law clerks and other employees, which clarified the duty and
duration of confidentiality.146 It provides as follows:
A judicial employee should never disclose any
confidential information received in the course of official
duties except as required in the performance of such
duties, nor should a judicial employee employ such
information for personal gain.
A former judicial
employee should observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of confidential information that apply to a
current judicial employee, except as modified by the
appointing authority.147
The next major controversy over Supreme Court law clerk breaches
of confidentiality erupted with Edward Lazarus’ publication in 1998 of
Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside
the Supreme Court.148 Lazarus, a law clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun
during the Court’s 1988 term, provided detailed accounts and
documents concerning the Court’s decision-making process in major
cases decided that term. During Lazarus’s service to the Court in 1989,
the Court enacted a Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks that
emphasized the law clerk’s duty of confidentiality to the Justice for
whom the clerk works and to the Court. Canon 2 of the Code
143
See, e.g., Anastaplo, supra note 134, at 1053–57; David R Fine, Lex, Lies, and Audiotape,
96 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 460–61 (1993–94); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 335–36; Painter, supra
note 130, at 1454–55.
144
See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS (Judicial Conference of the United States
1981); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 329 n.43.
145
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3(C); see Mahoney, supra note 96, at 336
(quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3(C)).
146
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES (U.S, Judicial Conference of the United
States 1996), available at http://www. uscourts.gov./guide/vol2/ch2a.html. Supreme
Court employees were not covered by the Code.
147
Id. at Canon 3(D) (emphasis added).
148
EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998).
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specifically stated that “[a] law clerk owes the . . . Justice . . . and the
Court . . . complete confidentiality, accuracy, and loyalty[,]” that “[t]he
Justice relies[] . . . on confidentiality in discussing . . . performance
of . . . judicial duties[,]” and that a law clerk “is in a position to receive
highly confidential circulations from . . . chambers of other Justices [, [sic]
and owes a duty of confidentiality with respect to such material similar
to the duty owed to the Justice employing the clerk[]”; Canon 3 added
that “[a] law clerk should never disclose to any person any confidential
information received in the course of the law clerk’s duties, nor should
the law clerk employ such information for personal gain.”149
Apparently anticipating the confidentiality controversy that would
arise from his book, Lazarus attempted to deflect criticism in an
introductory author’s note in which he essentially stated that although
he had insider access to information, his accounts were based on
independent sources.150 He later also asserted that the Supreme Court
law clerk code in effect at the time of his writing did not apply to former
clerks.151
Lazarus’s efforts to stave off criticism proved largely
Lane, supra note 131, at 877–78 (quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR SUPREME COURT LAW
CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Canons 2, 3 (1989)). See Painter,
supra note 131, at 1441–42, for a discussion of the 1989 Code. The only sanction expressly
mentioned in the 1989 Code was dismissal. See id. at 1446; Chemerinsky, supra note 131, at
1094.
150
See LAZARUS, supra note 148 at xi, 1426. Lazarus states:
[I]n describing the private decision-making of the Justices, I have been
careful to avoid disclosing information I am privy to solely because I
was privileged to work for Justice Blackmun. . . . I have reconstructed
what I knew and supplemented that knowledge through primary
sources (either publicly available or provided by others) and dozens of
interviews . . . .
Id. Lazarus’s most probable sources for his revelations of conference discussions and
conversations involving other Justices and their law clerks are his interviews with “dozens
of former clerks who agreed to speak with [him] candidly about life inside the Court.” See
id. at ix; see also Painter, supra note 130, at 1438, 1452 (noting Lazarus’s reliance on
statements by other law clerks that would also be breaches of confidentiality). Lazarus
apparently failed to see the ethical problem with his revealing other law clerks’ confidential
information. See id. at 1459 (arguing that Canon 3 of the 1989 Supreme Court Law Clerk
Code protecting the confidentiality of “circulations . . .[among] chambers” would cover such
communications between law clerks); Kozinski, supra note 137, at 840 (same). But see
Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1098 (arguing 1989 Code cannot be read to apply to former
law clerk conversations with other former claw clerks at all).
151
See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, AND FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT x (1999) (author’s note to the paperback edition with the changed
title); Kozinski, supra note 137, at 845 (recounting and critiquing Lazarus’s arguments that
the Code should be read to only apply to current clerks); Painter, supra note 130, at 1446–48
(recounting and critiquing Lazarus’s arguments that the Code should be read to only apply
to current clerks); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1093–94 (supporting Lazarus’s
position that the Code did not apply to former clerks).
149
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ineffective, and publication was met with a flurry of book reviews and
other critiques of Closed Chambers asserting that Lazarus had behaved
unethically by revealing confidential information.152
The most important reaction to Closed Chambers, however, was by the
Supreme Court itself.153 In 1998, the Court removed much, if not all,
ambiguity about the scope and duration of the law clerk confidentiality
obligation when it revised the Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law
Clerks.154 The revised Code indicated that the duty of confidentiality
was owed not only to the appointing Justice, but to “all other Justices
and the Court as an institution[.]”155 This duty of confidentiality
encompasses “[a]ll oral and written communications from the Justices or
clerks in other chambers pertaining to the work of the court . . . [,]”
including the outcomes, votes, identities of opinion authors in cases,
“and the positions or preliminary ideas or views of any justice with
respect to cases that have been before the Court, are pending before it, or
are likely to come before it.”156 The confidentiality relationship exists
between law clerks and other Justices, and between law clerks; “[a]ll
intra- and inter- chambers communications are confidential and
communications from the chambers of another Justice enjoy the same
protections of confidentiality, including communications from one law
clerk to another discussing the work of the Court.”157 Moreover, after
the law clerk’s employment ends, “communications with the press are
governed by the continuing obligations[.]”158 Finally, not only does the
revised Code specifically state that the confidentiality obligation “is a
152
See, e.g., supra note 137. For a recent summary of the reactions to Closed Chambers, see
Ray, supra note 137, at 599–611.
153
See Lane, supra note 131, at 868 & n.47 (noting that not only the timing suggested, but
a contemporaneous news report stated, that the law clerk rules were tightened to
“‘discourage [clerks] from writing tell-all books that reveal the [C]ourt’s inner workings.’”).
It is also clear from a review of the provisions emphasizing the continuing nature of the
confidentiality obligation and potential sanctions beyond employment, and explicitly
including communications between law clerks for all Justices, see infra text accompanying
notes 154–58, that the revised code is responsive to Lazarus’s arguments in defense of his
actions in Closed Chambers. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
154
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(June 15, 1998). See Lane, supra note 131, at 877–79 for the relevant part of the Code as
revised. Interestingly, the law clerk code itself apparently became a confidential document
and is not available. Id. at 868 n.47; Todd Peppers, Law Clerks and Confidentiality, EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES, Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/
03/law_clerks_and_.html (stating that Todd Peppers in writing a book on Supreme Court
Law Clerks was told by the Court and Justice Rehnquist’s Chambers that it was not
publicly available).
155
Lane, supra note 131, at 877 (emphasis omitted).
156
Id. (emphasis omitted).
157
Id. at 877–78 (emphasis omitted).
158
Id. at 879 (emphasis omitted).
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continuing one” that applies to former law clerks, it provides that this is
a “condition[] of their employment, as attorneys, and as members or
future members of the bar. Any breach of these provisions is prejudicial
to the administration of justice and therefore will subject the law clerk to
appropriate sanctions.”159
Despite the clarity of the revised Supreme Court Code of Conduct on
the issue of law clerk confidentiality, the Supreme Court’s controversial
involvement in the 2000 presidential election in Bush v. Gore 160 provided
the next impetus for major breaches of that duty. Four years after the
Court’s decision, writer David Margolick relied on interviews with
former Supreme Court law clerks in his Vanity Fair magazine article “The
Path to Florida,” detailing the behind the scenes, and supposedly
political machinations, of the Court’s decision.161 However, none of the
safeguards in place at the time—the tradition of confidentiality, the
recent Law Clerk Code, and apparently the fact that the law clerks had
signed a confidentiality agreement with the Court when they accepted
their positions did162—prevented the breaches. According to Margolick,
the law clerks justified their actions because they believed that the Court
had acted improperly in taking and deciding Bush v. Gore as it did.163
Not surprisingly, as with the publication of Closed Chambers and The
Brethren, the public criticized the law clerks’ disclosures to Margolick.164
In fact, “90 prominent lawyers and former Supreme Court law clerks,
including former attorneys general Richard Thornburgh and William
Barr” took the unusual step of issuing a joint statement condemning

159
Id. (emphasis omitted). This latter provision clearly ties the confidentiality obligation
to the Rules and Codes of Professional Conduct and potential disciplinary sanctions
applicable to attorneys through bar authorities. See supra note 87; infra text accompanying
notes 397–416. The provision thereby expands the explicit sanctions beyond those, such as
dismissal, that could be imposed by the Justice for whom the clerk worked as reflected in
the 1989 Code. See Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1094; Lane, supra note 131, at 871
(quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Canon 6 (1989)). Another possible sanction that might be available would be a breach of
contract claim against the former clerk. See Lane, supra note 131, at 872 n.60; Comment,
supra note 101, at 1248; infra text accompanying notes 358–61.
160
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
161
See David Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 4, 2004, at 310–12, 320,
available at http://makethemaccountable.com/articles/The_Path_To_Florida.htm. Among
the accusations were that conservative members of the Court—Justices Rehnquist,
Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas—acted as partisans rather than neutral jurists. See
id. at 319–22, 355–59.
162
Id. at 320 n.2.
163
Id. (stating the “‘extraordinary situation . . . [justifies] breaking an obligation we’d
otherwise honor[]’”).
164
See, e.g., Lane, supra note 131, at 863–67.
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Margolick’s law clerk sources’ breaches of confidentiality.165 The article
even spurred a call for a congressional investigation into the alleged law
clerk misconduct because, as put by Texas Republican Senator John
Cornyn, “‘[i]f members of the judiciary cannot rely on the confidentiality
of their deliberations and discussions with law clerks, the judiciary as we
know it simply could not function.’”166
Understandably, with the much diminished press and academic
interest in the lower federal and state courts’ operations, instances of
breaches of the duty of confidentiality by law clerks in those courts have
received little attention.167 As will be discussed in Part III.C below, most
reported cases involving questions of law clerk confidentiality in these
courts have arisen in circumstances in which information was sought
from present or former law clerks as part of an official investigation or
court proceeding.168 However, one example of a somewhat unusual and
blatant breach of confidentiality involved John N. Gregorich, a former
Illinois Appellate Court research staff attorney,169 who used confidential
information as part of his political campaign for a judgeship against one
of the judges he had worked for on the court. The confidential
information, which the staff attorney argued demonstrated the judge’s
unfitness, consisted of an internal court memorandum in which the
appellate judge had made a comment about a then-pending case—that
“he was willing to ‘chalk up [his] present reservations to [his] chronic
state of confusion about civil law and (once again) simply slink away in
the night with a quiet concurrence.’”170 In response to the charge that the
former research attorney had “failed to act in a manner consistent with
165
Tony Mauro, Lawyers Bemoan Breach: Prominent Attorneys Blast Law Clerks Blast Clerks
for “Bush v. Gore” Leaks to the Press, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 4.
166
Toney Mauro, Chasing Clerks, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at 3.
167
A recent novel written by a former law clerk for a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, has received some attention. See SAIRA RAO, CHAMBERMAID
(2007). CHAMBERMAID has been described as follows: “With Chambermaid, debut novelist
Saira Rao breaks the code of silence surrounding the clerkship and boldly takes us into the
mysterious world of the third branch of US government, where the leaders are not elected
and can never be fired.” Powell’s Books, http://www.powells.com/biblio?show=
9780802118493 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). Eighteen percent of the state and federal court
judges who responded to a 1981 survey by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
indicated that they believed their court had experienced a breach in confidentiality by law
clerks. Comment, supra note 101, at 1238 & n.43. The survey included a sampling of
federal and state appellate and trial court judges, in addition to all United States Supreme
Court Justices. Id. at 1263.
168
See infra text accompanying notes 262–323.
169
A research staff attorney in the Illinois Appellate Court is generally the functional
equivalent of a law clerk. See Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1995).
170
Carol McHugh Saunders, Judge Candidate Who Used Court Memo Faces Suspension, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 16, 1996, at 1.
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the integrity and independence of the judiciary, engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty[,] and breached his fiduciary duty by improperly
revealing the contents of the confidential memo[,]” the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Committee recommended the attorney be
suspended for four years.171
IV. MECHANISMS OF IMPOSING AND PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Codes and Agreements
As the foregoing discussion reflects, the law clerk confidentiality
obligation no longer is grounded on mere tradition or customary ethics.
Courts have employed various measures to emphasize the importance of
confidentiality and ensure compliance.172 As discussed above, federal
courts have adopted increasingly expansive codes of ethics, like the 1981
Code of Conduct for Law Clerks,173 the 1996 Code of Conduct for
Judicial Employees,174 the 1989 Code of Conduct for Law Clerks of the
Supreme Court of the United States,175 and the 1998 revised Code of
Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks.176 Similar codes have been
enacted by many state courts,177 and some state courts also require law
Id. Interestingly, the same research attorney was involved in an unsuccessful 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suit, at about the same time, in which he argued that he had been fired for
engaging in union-organizing activities. In that case, the Seventh Circuit found that the
staff research attorney-judge relationship, including confidentiality, formed a basis for
finding that the judge, who fired the staff research attorney, was entitled to qualified
immunity because he could reasonably believe that such an individual should refrain from
an adversarial role to the court. Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 417–18.
172
See Mahoney, supra note 96, at 336 & n.65; Comment, supra note 101, at 1243.
173
See supra text accompanying note 144.
174
See supra text accompanying note 146.
175
See supra text accompanying note 149.
176
See supra text accompanying note 154.
177
See, e.g., Faye A. Silas, Mums the Word: The Law Clerk as Confidant, A.B.A. J., July 1985,
at 36, 36 (1985) (discussing South Carolina Code); ARIZONA CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES
AND JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES Canon 3(D) & Commentary (Aug. 1997) (imposing confidentiality
obligation), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/hr/Forms/CodeofConduct.pdf;
Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2006-8 (stating that “‘Deliberative Privilege
and Case Discussions in the Supreme Court[]’” provides that discussions, memos, and
correspondence regarding case deliberations are permanently confidential, except with
regard to certain judicial misconduct), quoted in Richard D. McLellan, Commentary:
Proper Time to Divulge Information on Charges Against Fellow Justices Is Now, MICH. LAW.
WKLY., Feb. 12, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2846279; MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE OF NEVADA Canon 3(D) (March 2004) (imposing
confidentiality for present and former judicial employees), avaliable at http://www.nv
supremecourt.us/documents/misc/jc_employeeConduct.pdf); RULES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE R. 46 Canon 3 (setting out confidentiality
obligations applicable to present and former law clerks), available at http://www.courts.
state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-46-3.htm; RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW
171
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clerks to sign confidentiality oaths.178 A large number of courts rely on
the provision of written or verbal guidance to law clerks about their duty
of confidentiality.179
Massachusetts, where lawyers Crossen, Curry, and Donahue
induced a breach of confidentiality by a state Superior Court law clerk,
does not have a law clerk code of conduct. However, at least since the
early 1990s, Superior Court law clerks, as well as legal interns working
for the court, have been given written guidelines emphasizing the law
clerks’ confidentiality obligations, particularly as to the judges’ decisionmaking process and opinions.180
Moreover, as a condition of
employment, law clerks must sign a confidentiality agreement.181 In fact,
the law clerk involved in Curry was required to sign a form employment
contract in which he agreed to the conditions of employment that had
been set out in the offer of employment letter from the Chief Justice of
the Superior Court, including the duty of confidentiality.182

JERSEY, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIARY EMPLOYEES Appendix I Code of Conduct for
Judiciary Employees, Cannon 2 (Feb. 2004) (imposing confidentiality restrictions on current
and former employees), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/appemploy.
htm. Prior to the enactment of many of these Law Clerk Codes, some courts dealt with the
issues through local rules. See Comment, supra note 101, at 1236.
178
See, e.g., Silas, supra note 177, at 36 (stating that South Carolina and Iowa require oaths
of confidentiality); Comment, supra note 101, at 1236, 1248 & n.102; Peter N. Thompson,
Confidentiality in Chambers: Is Private Judicial Action the Public’s Business, BENCH & B. MINN.,
Feb. 2005, at 14, 18 (stating that Minnesota Court of Appeals requires law clerk
confidentiality agreements).
179
See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 135, at 5–7; Silas, supra note 177, at 36 (stating
that oral instruction is the most common practice); comment, supra note 101, at 1236. A
nationwide survey of a sampling of state and federal judges conducted in 1981, following
the publication of The Brethren, showed that 94% of judges relied on oral instruction and
about 50% provided manuals to law clerks in addition to oral instructions. Comment, supra
note 101, at 1236 & nn. 35, 37.
180
See MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SUPERIOR COURT
CLERKSHIP 3–6 (Massachusetts Superior Court 1993–94), reprinted in Exhibit 33, at 3–6, Bar
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 (on file with author); Superior Court Ethical Guidelines
(on file with author).
181
See, e.g., Letter of Acceptance to Superior Chief Justice Barbara Rouse regarding
Employment as a Law Clerk to the Massachusetts Superior Court for the September 1, 2008
to August 31, 2009 term (on file with author).
182
Exhibit 11, Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 (Letter offer and employment contract
part of the record and on file with author). The law clerk testified that he understood that
“he was not supposed to reveal information gained in chambers to third parties and that
his obligation to maintain that confidentiality was to last ‘forever.’” Bar Counsel v. Curry I,
supra note 1, at 55.
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B. Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Privilege
It has also been suggested that law clerks function as lawyers for
their judges, essentially the way an attorney represents a client.183 This
raises the question of whether the attorney-client confidentiality
protections of the Rules of Professional Conduct184 and the common-law
attorney-client privilege185 would require law clerks to maintain the
confidentiality as a general matter, at least where a law clerk has been
admitted to the bar and is therefore covered by a jurisdiction’s law on
confidentiality protections. Although the application of the rules of
professional conduct and the attorney-client privilege would have little
significance where law clerks are subject to a special code of conduct that
includes a confidentiality obligation, or where a jurisdiction has
recognized the existence of a judge-law clerk evidentiary privilege,186 in
those jurisdictions that have not adopted such codes, applying the
lawyer rules of professional conduct would establish clearer and more
uniform principles regarding a law clerk’s continuing duty of
183
See Crump, supra note 100, at 240 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Norman Black);
Kozinski, supra note 137, at 842 & n.38 (analogizing a judge-law clerk relationship to an
attorney-client relationship); Comment, supra note 101, at 1245–46 (same); Painter, supra
note 130, at 1447–48, 1461–62 (same); Peter N. Thompson, supra note 178, at 17 (suggesting
lawyer code and privileges apply); see also, In re Cohen’s Estate, 174 N.Y.S. 427, 427–28
(Sur. Ct. 1919) (analogizing the privilege for communications between a judicial officer and
his clerk/stenographer assistants and the attorney-client privilege). But see Chemerinsky,
supra note 130, at 1095–96 (rejecting attorney-client privilege analogy).
184
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.6, which provides in
relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent[]” or it is permitted by an exception to the
rule (e.g., “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm[]” or “to prevent
the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of
which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services[]”). Id. This broad principle of
confidentiality applies to “all information relating to the representation, whatever its
source.” Id. at cmt. 3. The earlier Code of Professional Responsibility contained a similar
provision. Under DR 4-101, attorneys were required to preserve the “[c]onfidences and
[s]ecrets” of their clients unless otherwise authorized by the client or the rule. MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. Confidences were information protected by the
attorney-client privilege and “‘secret’ refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would
be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.” MASSACHUSETTS
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 4-101(A) (1981).
185
The attorney client privilege is an evidentiary privilege that shields, from compulsory
evidentiary production, the testimony of a lawyer about confidential communications with
the client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d
1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING 9-25 to -26 (3d. ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS §§ 68–70 (2000); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2003).
186
See discussion infra Parts IV.C.1–2.
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confidentiality, as well as the possibility of disciplinary sanctions for
violations by former clerks.187
As Judge Kozinski has noted, “[l]aw clerks perform many of the
functions of lawyers: They research the law, provide legal advice, and
draft legal documents.”188 Moreover, at least a major portion of the
rationale underlying both the attorney-client privilege and the rule of
confidentiality protection—that confidentiality regarding client
information is necessary so that the client may freely and candidly
communicate with the lawyer and, thereby, obtain the best legal advice
and promote the ends of justice—189 would seem equally applicable to
the relationship between the law clerk and the judge. Similarly, the
concept of loyalty underlies both the judge-law clerk and attorney-client
relationship.190 Moreover, where the rules of client confidentiality
protection or attorney-client privilege apply, they survive the
termination of the relationship,191 a principle that is consistent with the
law clerk code of confidentiality provisions.192
Apart from the fact that lawyer rules of conduct only apply to
members of a jurisdiction’s bar, thereby limiting their impact since law
clerks do not necessarily have to be admitted to the bar to work for
judges, the more significant problem with applying lawyer rules of
professional conduct relates to the definition of who is a client in the
government context for purposes of the rule.193 The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the rules of the states based thereon do not
expressly address the confidentiality aspect of the judge-law clerk
relationship. The comments to the lawyer confidentiality rules, however,
do discuss the applicability of the rule to government lawyers. For
example, the lawyer codes of many states specifically indicate that the
“requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information relating to

See Comment, supra note 101, at 1247.
Kozinski, supra note 137, at 842 n.38.
189
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003); Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c
(2000) (“The rationale for the [attorney-client] privilege is that confidentiality enhances the
value of client-lawyer communications and hence the efficacy of legal services.”).
190
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1243–44; Wald, supra note 100, at 153–54 (stating that
judges expect “unambiguous[]” “loyal[ty]”); supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
191
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(2) (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 77 (2000); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524
U.S. 399, 407–10 (1998) (holding that privilege applies even after client’s death); In re John
Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70–72 (Mass. 1990) (same).
192
See supra notes 160–17 and accompanying text.
193
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1245–46; Joshua Panas, Note, The Miguel Estrada
Confirmation Hearings and the Client of a Government Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541,
547–48 (2004); Thompson, supra note 178, at 17.
187
188
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representation applies to government lawyers who may disagree with
the policy goals that their representation is designed to advance.”194
Similarly, the comments to the ABA Model Rule provision relating to a
lawyer’s responsibilities to entity clients not only make clear that the
Rule 1.6 confidentiality obligation extends to entities, but also directly
states that the rule is applicable to “government organizations.”195
While there is no obvious reason that judges or the judicial branch
should not be generally encompassed within the term government
organization, the difficulty arises in precisely determining the “client[]”
to whom the confidentiality duty is owed—i.e., who would have access
to the information.196 The answer to the question may vary depending
on the context or particular governmental structure, as well as the
requirements of constitutions, statutes, and regulations.197 The Rules of
Professional Conduct provide only minimal guidance. Acknowledging
the difficulty of the issue, the comment to Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13 states as follows:
Defining precisely the identity of the client and
prescribing the resulting obligations of [government]
lawyers . . . is a matter beyond the scope of these [r]ules.
Although in some circumstances the client may be a
specific agency, it may also be a branch of government,
such as the executive branch, or the government as a
whole. . . . Thus, when the client is a governmental
organization, a different balance may be appropriate
between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that
the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public
business is involved.198

194
See, e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR R. 4-1.6 cmt. (2007), available at http://
www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/BC9881429B46D73985256BBC004B9AEC; MASS.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2003). This language was part of the ABA Model
Rules until it was deleted as unnecessary during the Ethics 2000 revisions since the rule
itself contained no exception regarding government lawyers. See ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION,
REPORT ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule16rem.html.
195
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 2, 6 (2003).
196
This is a question that has received substantial attention as to governmental lawyers
generally. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whisteblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 292, 296–98 (1991); Panas, supra note 193, at
546–59.
197
See Cramton, supra note 196, at 296; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 9
(2003).
198
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (2003) (citation omitted). Rule 1.13
addresses the responsibilities of lawyers representing entities, particularly where the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1

42

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

The Restatement is slightly more helpful. The comments to Section
97 recognize that a universal definition of the government lawyer’s client
is not possible, but that the identity of the client may vary depending on
the context and the functions being performed. While recognizing that
as a general matter it may be asserted that the government lawyer
represents the public or the public interests or perhaps the government
as a whole, it indicates that this is usually not that helpful. Instead, a
better approach in many instances is to regard an agency and those who
are empowered to direct that agency as to a particular matter as the
client. Ultimately, given the variety of forms and structures of
government, the determination of the client’s identity will depend on the
circumstances, considering “such factors as the terms of retention or
other manifestations of the reasonable understanding of the lawyer and
the hiring authority involved, the anticipated scope and nature of the
lawyer’s services, particular regulatory arrangements relevant to the
lawyer’s work, and the history and traditions of the office.”199
Thus, it is theoretically possible for the government lawyer’s client,
including the government judicial law clerk’s client, to be viewed as the
general public, the government as a whole, the branch of government for
whom the lawyer works, the agency (acting through its administrators)
for whom the lawyer works, or the agency official for whom the lawyer
works on public business. Nevertheless, the models that seem most
appropriate in the context of the confidentiality duty, and which seem to
be endorsed by most authorities, would be either the agency or branch
model.200 Unless otherwise mandated by statute, court order, or other

lawyer knows that a constituent of the organization is engaging in activity that is illegal or
violates a legal obligation to the corporation and is likely to injure the corporation
substantially. Id.
199
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000) (citation
omitted); see also Comment, supra note 99, at 1246–47 (citing Opinion 73-1 of the Federal
Bar Association to the effect that the government lawyer’s client, in terms of immediate
confidentiality obligations, is the employing agency and its administration); Panas, supra
note 193, at 549–50 (discussing Federal Bar Associations 1990 Model Federal Rules under
which the lawyer represents the employing agency, but obligations may be affected by
“more general obligations to the United States[]”).
200
See Cramton, supra note 196, at 298; Panas, supra note 193, at 556–57, 560–61;
Comment, supra note 101, at 1246–47; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000). The general public or public interest client model can be
criticized for being too amorphous or subjective, giving too much discretion to the lawyer,
interfering with the lawyer’s counselor functions, raising separation of powers concerns,
ignoring the democratic process, and providing virtually no guidance. See Cramton, supra
note 196, at 298–300; Panas, supra note 193, at 552. Similarly, critics of the government-as-awhole approach assert that it would violate separation of powers. Id. at 554.
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law,201 the law clerk’s obligation would run to the judges for whom the
law clerk worked and to those judges in charge of administration of the
court, as they conduct public business.202 Although it is conceivable that
in some circumstances confidential information that a law clerk has
about a particular judge would have to be disclosed to others within the
judicial branch or in law enforcement,203 the duty of confidentiality
would bar disclosures like those in the Curry matter made to private
individuals outside the government.204
While the issue has generated substantial debate,205 it has been wellaccepted that the attorney-client privilege generally applies to the
government client,206 and much of the previous discussion regarding the
identity of the aforementioned client in the context of the rule of conduct
confidentiality would be applicable here.207 Recent federal court
decisions, however, have indicated that at least in the context of criminal
grand jury proceedings seeking compelled testimony by government
lawyers, the issue of to whom the duty of confidentiality is owed and to
whom the privilege belongs is more complicated.
As part of the “Whitewater” investigation into the involvement of
President Clinton and Hillary Clinton with a savings and loan and land
201
See RESTAMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. d (2000). See
Cramton, supra note 196, at 303–14 for a discussion of the ways in which statutory and
regulatory provision, including whistleblower statutes, might impact the duties of the
government lawyer.
202
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1247.
203
For example, case law would suggest that in some circumstances a government
lawyer can be compelled to testify about client information as part of a grand jury
proceeding investigating criminal activity. See infra text accompanying notes 206–22.
204
Even if the particular matter fell within one of the exceptions to the lawyer conduct
rule confidentiality obligations, such as the authorization in ABA Model Rule 1.6(b) where
the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary “to prevent reasonably certain death
or substantial bodily harm[]” or “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud
that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests . . . of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used . . . the lawyer’s services[,]” the
disclosure would be limited. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007). As the
comment to the rule points out, authorized disclosures are limited to those necessary to
prevent the harm identified in the rule. “If the disclosure will be made in connection with
a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits . . . access to
the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it . . . .” Id. at cmt. 14. Thus, if a law
clerk reasonably believed that a judge had used the law clerk’s services to engage in fraud
or illegal conduct that would substantially injure a party, the proper recourse under the
rule would appear to be raising the matter within the court system, probably to a judge
with administrative responsibility. See id.
205
For a recent review of the issue, see Nancy Leong, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public
Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 166–73 & n.50 (2007).
206
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 (2000); Leong, supra
note 205, at 165.
207
See Panas, supra note 193, at 544–46.
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development corporation, the Office of Independent Counsel
subpoenaed for grand jury proceedings certain documents relating to
meetings between the President, Hillary Clinton, and White House
Counsel. The White House asserted that the documents were protected
by the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection.208
Treating the case as a dispute between two entities of the federal
government—the Office of Independent Counsel and the White House—
the court addressed the narrow issue of whether one of those entities
could assert the attorney-client privilege in the face of a grand jury
subpoena in the context of a criminal investigation.209 While the basis of
the court’s decision that the privilege would not apply is not entirely
clear from a doctrinal perspective, the court emphasized the following
factors: the criminal investigatory context and the importance of the
information to that investigation, the strong public interest in disclosure
of information relevant to public official wrongdoing, its view that there
would be minimal impact of the disclosure on the governmental entity
since the entity itself is not subject to criminal liability, and its view that
there would be a lack of impact on the government attorney’s advice as
to future conduct.210
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia confronted virtually the same issue.
The Office of
Independent Counsel sought information for a grand jury investigation
from Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey as part of the now
expanded Independent Counsel investigation into whether Monica
Lewinsky or others had engaged in perjury or obstruction of justice in
connection with the civil suit against President Clinton by Paula Jones.
Lindsey refused to answer questions about certain conversations with
the President, asserting the attorney-client privilege.211 While the court
recognized the existence of the government attorney-client privilege that
was “rather absolute” in civil contexts, the question here was whether
such a privilege existed in a grand jury investigation instigated by one
part of the government against another.212 The court’s conclusion that
the attorney-client privilege does not apply in this context rests heavily
on its view that the government lawyer’s loyalty lies not only with the
agency official or agency, but extends to serving the public interest by
providing evidence of criminal wrongdoing by public officials.213
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913–15 (8th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 915.
210
Id. at 918–24.
211
In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
212
See id. at 1269–72.
213
See id. at 1273–74. In support of this conclusion, the court relied in part on the policy
embodied in a federal statute that required Executive Branch officials to report possible
208
209
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The preceding two cases involved intra-federal government criminal
disputes where, arguably, a government lawyer’s duties can be seen to
extend beyond the immediate official or agency for whom the lawyer
works, consistent with the general public, or government-as-a-whole, as
client perspective.214 Two other recent cases reaching inconsistent results
have addressed the issue in the context of a criminal investigation by the
federal government into the activities of state governments. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the attorneyclient privilege was not available in In re: A Witness Before the Special
Grand Jury 2000–02,215 a case involving a federal grand jury investigation
into allegations of bribery in the Illinois Secretary of State’s office. When
federal prosecutors by grand jury subpoena sought the testimony of the
Department of State Chief Legal Counsel Roger Bickel regarding
conversations he had in his official capacity with the then Secretary of
State, the former Secretary of State invoked the attorney-client
privilege.216 Accepting the parties’ position that the privilege applies to
government lawyers in the civil context, the court saw the issue as
whether the privilege should apply in criminal proceedings where the
government lawyer was representing a government official.217 The court
adopted much of the reasoning of the earlier Eighth and D.C. Circuit
decisions in concluding that the privilege would not apply. In particular,
the court emphasized that in the context of criminal proceedings against
government officials, government lawyers have a higher duty than
merely representing an individual client; instead, they must serve the
public interest and ensure compliance with the law, as well as facilitate
an open and accountable government.218
In a very similar case involving a federal investigation into
allegations of bribery in the Connecticut Governor’s Office, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a contrary
conclusion on the privilege when federal prosecutors subpoenaed the
Governor’s former Chief Legal Counsel to testify regarding
conversations with the Governor and his staff.219 Reversing a district

violations of federal criminal law to the Attorney General. See id. at 1274 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
535(b)). The court noted that public officials who want complete confidentiality can obtain
personal, rather than governmental, counsel. Id. at 1276.
214
See Panas, supra note 193, at 512–54.
215
288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
216
Id. at 290–91.
217
Id. at 291–92.
218
Id. at 293–94. The court rejected the argument, based on federalism, that the privilege
should exist because of fact that the case involved a state lawyer and state client that were
involved in a federal criminal investigation. Id. at 294–95.
219
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 528–29 (2d Cir. 2005).
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court decision that had rejected the attorney-client privilege based on
public interest reasons, the court was unwilling to accept the proposition
that the public interest invariably lies with the disclosure of information
about possible criminal wrongdoing to a grand jury.220 Instead, the court
not only recognized the applicability of the privilege to government
lawyers in private civil litigation disputes, but also found that the
general instrumental rationale for the applicability of the privilege—to
induce candor by clients so that lawyers can receive all necessary
information to render and act upon the best legal advice—is equally if
not more applicable to the government lawyer and client.221 In essence,
the court believed that the public interest served by the privilege
outweighed the general public interest in law enforcement and
accountability served through grand jury proceedings.
The recent cases on the government attorney-client privilege, in the
context of grand jury criminal investigations of government officials,
should have relatively little impact on the availability of the privilege in
the judge-law clerk relationship. At most, they suggest that where a
judge is being investigated for criminal wrongdoing by government
prosecutors, the attorney-client privilege might not be found to exist
with regard to a grand jury subpoena of a law clerk’s confidential
information relating to advice and discussions on legal issues relevant to
that investigation. As will be discussed in sections IV.C.1 and IV.C.2
below, this result would be consistent with the result under a
particularized limited judge-law clerk privilege that has been adopted by
some jurisdictions. For most cases, however, including those involving
civil litigation like the Curry matter, the attorney-client privilege should
be available.222
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 533–35. The court stated as follows:
It is crucial that government officials[] . . . be encouraged to seek out
and receive fully informed legal advice. Upholding the privilege
furthers a culture in which consultation with government lawyers is
accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of
conducting public business. Abrogating the privilege undermines that
culture and thereby impairs the public interest.
Id. at 534. The court also noted that the Connecticut legislature had recognized this by
enacting a statute that applied the privilege absolutely to government lawyers. Id. at 534.
222
Commentators who have rejected the analogy to, or applicability of, attorney-client
confidentiality and privilege to law clerks have done so because they have viewed these
doctrines as inconsistent with their perception of the duty of confidentiality of law clerks,
largely because they see attorney-client confidentiality as a permanent bar to disclosure,
whereas they have argued that law clerk confidentiality does not extend indefinitely after
employment, see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1095, 1100, or that the attorney client
privilege is absolute, whereas law clerks should be able to disclose information where
relevant to a specific proceeding that involves the investigation of judicial wrongdoing. See
220
221
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C. Judicial Deliberations Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest recognized privilege for
confidential communications.223 One of the most recent privileges to be
formally recognized has been referred to as the judicial privilege, the
judicial proceedings privilege, or the judicial deliberations privilege.224
Given its relatively infrequent invocation, the exact source and precise
boundaries of this privilege have not been clearly identified.
Nevertheless, like other testimonial privileges, at its core, this privilege,
when applicable, shields from compelled or voluntary disclosure a
judge’s deliberative thoughts and communications among judges and
their staff, including law clerks.225

Comment, supra note 101, at 1260–61. As previously discussed, current law clerks’ codes
do make the duty of confidentiality permanent. See supra notes 133, 156–57, 175, 180 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the most recent case law on the government lawyer
attorney-client privilege would not apply the privilege in a criminal grand jury
investigation of government official wrongdoing. See supra text accompanying notes 213–
16. It should also be noted that the “[c]rime or [f]raud” exception to the attorney-client
privilege would vitiate the privilege, where a lawyer is consulted by the client for
assistance in committing a crime or fraud or where the client uses the lawyer’s services to
commit a crime or fraud. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 82 (2000).
223
See Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455
(1985) [hereinafter Developments]; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981);
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998). Cases from as early as 1577
acknowledge the existence of the attorney client privilege. Developments, supra, at 1456.
Other evidentiary communication privileges that have been widely recognized include the
spousal, doctor-patient, clergy, and psychiatrist-patient privileges. See id. at 1456–63.
224
The term “[j]udicial [p]rivilege” has been used in a variety of contexts to refer to not
only the evidentiary privilege that exists with regard to confidential communications
between judges and their law clerks, see, e.g., 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5674 (1992 & Supp. 2007); Robert S. Catz &
Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1987); Kevin C. Milne, The Doctrine of
Judicial Privilege: The Historical and Constitutional Basis Supporting a Privilege for the Federal
Judiciary, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213, 213 (1987), but also to doctrines that are generally
unrelated to the type of evidentiary privilege at issue here. Most often, the term has been
used to refer to the doctrine of tort immunity for allegedly defamatory statements made in
the course of judicial proceedings. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 8.1,
at 8-1 to -5 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that common law absolute privilege for judicial
proceedings dates at least to 1772 for civil and criminal case participants); Robert E.
Nunley, Judicial Privilege: Does It Have a Role in Military Courts-Martial?, 138 MIL. L. REV. 53,
53 & n.2. It has also been used generally in the context of judicial immunity to describe all
judicially created privileges and a descriptive label for a court’s right to engage in certain
activities or to summarize or comment on particular matters. See id; Catz & Lange, supra, at
121–22. To avoid confusion and to achieve a more accurate descriptive label, the term
“judicial deliberations privilege” will be used here.
225
See infra text accompanying notes 262–89, 304–23; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 89–
90; Milne, supra note 222, at 213; Nunley, supra note 224, at 55.
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Before addressing the history and details of the judicial deliberations
privilege, a brief review of the development of evidentiary privileges is
appropriate for contextual background. These privileges generally are
based on a determination that other societal interests outweigh the goal
of truth seeking.226
The most commonly asserted bases for
communication privileges are that such privileges are necessary (1) to
assure candor and openness in desirable communications between
individuals in certain relationships that will ultimately serve society’s
interests and (2) to protect the privacy expectations inherent in those
relationships.227 Moreover, in the context of government privileges,
preservation of constitutional separation of powers is implicated.228
As Professor Wigmore stated, as to the first instrumental rationale,
the following four conditions should exist for the establishment of a
privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The
relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.229

226
Developments, supra note 223 at 1454; Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and SelfCritical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege,
74 WASH. L REV. 913, 982 (1999); Denise P. Lindberg, The Accountant-Client Privilege: Does It
and Should It Survive the Death of the Client?, 1987 BYU L. REV. 1271, 1291 (1987); Note,
Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 928 (1987).
227
Developments, supra note 223, at 1471–72, 1481–83; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 95–
96; James J. Dalessio, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusion of Derivative Evidence:
Commentary and Analysis, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 625, 631–38 (1989). Some commentators
have argued that the privileges are actually established to benefit those in power or “as a
means of preserving the image and legitimacy of the legal system.” Developments, supra
note 223, at 1493–98, 1498–1500; see Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 98–100. Critics of
evidentiary privileges attack them primarily on the ground that no empirical support exists
for the instrumental rationale that privileges will encourage candid communication. In
other words, whether people have knowledge that a privilege exists or is available has no
bearing on their likelihood of candid communication. Developments, supra note 223, at
1474–75; Leong, supra note 205, at 187–92. For a review of the critiques of the rationales for
evidentiary privileges, see Developments in the Law, supra note 223, at 1472–83.
228
See infra text accompanying notes 239, 249, 257, 269; Milne, supra note 224, at 213–14;
Nunley, supra note 224, at 68–72, 78–82; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 119.
229
See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527
(John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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While evidentiary privileges initially were created by common law,
subsequently they have been created by statute or constitution.230 The
attorney-client and the spousal communication privileges are early
examples of the common-law privileges.231 In the Nineteenth Century,
states began supplanting common-law privileges with privilege
statutes.232
In the mid-to-late Twentieth Century, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the
Uniform Rules of Evidence that contained an article on privileges,
including the attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, and clergycommunicant privileges, which were ultimately adopted by many states,
at least in substantial part.233 Examples of constitutionally-based
testimonial privileges are the legislative privilege arising from the
Speech and Debate Clause,234 the implied executive privilege, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.235
Tracing the precise origins of the judicial deliberations privilege is
difficult, in part because its existence may have been presumed long
See Developments, supra note 223, at 1454–71; Nunley, supra note 224, at 55–59. For a
concise overview of the developments of privilege law in American courts, see
Developments, supra note 223, at 1454–71.
231
Developments, supra note 223, at 1456–57; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 93–94.
232
Developments, supra note 223, at 1458; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 100; Nunley,
supra note 224, at 57–58.
233
Developments, supra note 223, at 1462–63; see UNIF. R. EVID. Art. V (1974); 13 U.L.A.
2009 (1980). Privilege law in federal courts remained largely unsettled and non-uniform
until the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, with the courts relying on
state statutory law, state or federal common law, federal statutes, and the Constitution in
various contexts and times. See Developments, supra note 223, at 1463–66; Nunley, supra note
224, at 58. An unsuccessful attempt at specific codification of nine testimonial privileges
was made in Article V of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence transmitted to Congress
for approval in 1973. As a result of the very substantial controversy over this rule,
Congress substituted the current Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence under which
generally in diversity cases state privilege law applies and in federal question cases courts
rely on the Constitution, federal statutes, and federal common law. See Developments, supra
note 223, at 1465–70; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 103–04; Nunley, supra note 224, at 58–
59. A judicial communications or deliberations privilege was not among the nine
privileges originally specified. See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230–58 (1972).
234
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 provides:
Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony[,] and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
Id. The last part of this clause has been held to provide a form of immunity from
prosecutions for legislative acts and a privilege against testifying in court about those acts
that extends to legislators’ staffs. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615–18 (1972);
Nunley, supra note 224, at 68–69.
235
U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–09 (1974).
230
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before it was formally asserted or referred to in published opinions or
otherwise. While neither the Constitution nor federal statutes expressly
set forth an evidentiary privilege applicable to the judiciary, dicta in
some opinions suggest that such a privilege exists and emanates from
the Constitution in a manner similar to the Executive privilege.236 It has
also been regarded by some courts as essentially a common-law
privilege.237
1.

The Privilege in Federal Court

Probably the first formal intimation of a judicial testimonial privilege
relating to judicial proceedings occurred in 1953.238 As part of an
investigation into United States Department of Justice activities
apparently relating to certain grand jury proceedings, a House of
Representatives Sub-Committee subpoenaed a federal district court
judge to testify before the Committee at a hearing. The judge appeared
and read statements signed by all the judges of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California and by the Chief Judge of
the District, which asserted that under the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, Congress could not compel judges to testify
concerning judicial proceedings.239 Noting that the court was aware of
no instance in which a congressional committee had similarly
summoned a federal judge to testify, the judges stated:
“‘The
Constitution does not contemplate that such matters be reviewed by the
Legislative Branch, but only by the appropriate appellate tribunals. The
integrity of the Federal Courts, upon which liberty and life depend,
requires that such Courts be maintained inviolate against the changing
moods of public opinion.’”240 Apparently, nothing further occurred
See infra text accompanying notes 240–61; Nunley, supra note 224, at 68.
See infra text accompanying notes 246–49; Matthew Singer, Protecting the Public’s
Interest in an Open Government Through the Creation of an Executive Privilege?: The Dann v.
Taft Decisions, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (2007); Nunley, supra note 224, at 55; Catz &
Lange, supra note 224, at 90.
238
An issue of judicial testimonial privilege actually occurred at the time of the American
Constitutional Convention in the case of Trevett v. Weeden (Providence 1787) where the
judges of the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a state statute abrogating the right to a
jury trial in certain cases was unconstitutional under the state constitution. The Rhode
Island General Assembly summoned the judges before it to explain their holding, and
when the judges refused to answer questions, sought their removal. Eventually, the
removal proceedings were terminated because removal required a trial on criminal
misconduct. See Milne, supra note 224, at 216–17.
239
Statement of the Judges of the U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., Made to the
Subcomm. of the Comm. of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Dep’t of Justice
of the U.S., 14 F.R.D. 335, 335–36 (1953) [hereinafter Statement of Judges].
240
Id. at 336.
236
237

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1

Sorenson, Jr.: Are Law Clerks Fair Game? Invading Judicial Confidentiality

2008]

Invading Judicial Confidentiality

51

concerning this assertion of a testimonial privilege as to judicial
proceedings.241
Dicta in a series of federal court cases in the 1970s provide the next
references to a possible judicial deliberations or communications
privilege. The cases also linked the privilege to the rationale underlying
the then-emerging governmental deliberative process privilege and
Executive privilege. In his dissent in New York Times Co. v. United
States,242 in which he asserted that the Executive Branch of the
government had inherent authority to classify and withhold documents,
Chief Justice Burger analogized to what may well have been an implicit
assumption by prior courts as to their own power:
No statute gives this Court express power to establish
and enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy
of our deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt
as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the
confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever
judicial measures may be required.243
This notion of inherent judicial authority for a confidentiality
privilege was picked up at about the same time in a concurring opinion
in Soucie v. David,244 a case primarily involving the issue of the public
availability under the Freedom of Information Act of a report prepared

241
Nunley, supra note 224, at 73. It should be noted that the assertion of privilege was
limited to testimony about judicial proceedings. The judges expressed no objection to
congressional requests for testimony on “other than Judicial proceedings.” Statement of
Judges, 14 F.R.D. at 336. A similar issue of judicial testimonial privilege was apparently
recognized in In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. of Ala. 1959). In that case, the Civil Rights
Commission sought certain voting and registration records as part of an investigation.
Local officials refused to turn over the records, and some records were impounded by state
court Judge George C. Wallace. When the Commission issued a subpoena duces tecum to
Judge Wallace to produce the records, he did not appear. Id. at 65–67. In a subsequent
subpoena enforcement proceeding, the Judge argued that enforcement of the subpoena
“would constitute an improper inquiry into judicial acts of judicial officers.” Id. at 67.
Rejecting the argument, the court indicated that the subpoena was not seeking judicial
testimony or records, but county voting records, and that there was no “judicial privilege
or immunity” not to produce those records. Id. at 68–69. In dicta, the court noted that the
judge would still be immune from inquiry into judicial acts and that neither the
Commission nor Congress could question the Judge on “why he impounded these records
or what factors he took into consideration when he impound [sic] these records.” Id. at 69.
242
403 U.S. 713 (1971). In this case the government sought to enjoin publication of a
classified government study on United States involvement in Vietnam. The Court in a per
curiam opinion affirmed lower decisions allowing publication under the First Amendment.
243
Id. at 752 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
244
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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by a federal agency for the President.245 In his concurring opinion, Judge
Wilkey commented upon the constitutional privilege against disclosure
of the decision-making process, which he believed applied equally to the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and had both
common law and constitutional sources.246 He alluded to the “common
law principle . . . that public officials are entitled to the private advice of
their subordinates and to confer among themselves freely and frankly,
without fear of disclosure, otherwise the advice received and the
exchange of views may not be as frank and honest as the public good
requires.”247 In doing so, he specifically referenced its applicability to the
“‘deliberation[s] of judges in conference[]’” and the advice of
subordinates such as law clerks.248 Judge Wilkey saw this common-law
privilege on non-disclosure as bolstered further by the constitutional
principle of separation of powers, which protects each branch of
government from encroaching on the powers of the other branches.249
This principle would include a right of all three branches of government
to withhold information in certain circumstances,250 and would preclude
Congress, through acts such as the Freedom of Information Act, from

245
Id. at 1070–71. The Freedom of Information Act provides public access to federal
agency records and reports that are not exempt from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1)-(3)
(2000). In Soucie, private citizens sought release from the Office of Science of a report it had
prepared for President Nixon evaluating the Supersonic Transport. Soucie, 448 F.2d at
1070. The appeals court held that the Office of Science and Technology was a federal
agency covered by the Act, id. at 1073, and remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether a statutory or constitutional privilege would preclude disclosure.
Id. at 1079. The constitutional privilege referred to by the court, which had not been
asserted by the government at that point, was the executive privilege. Id. at 1071–72. The
statutory privilege most likely implicated—the deliberative process privilege—protects
“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other that an agency in litigation with the agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
The rationale underlying this qualified privilege is “to encourage the free exchange of ideas
during the process of deliberation and policymaking; accordingly, it has been held to
protect internal communications consisting of advice, recommendations, opinions, and
other material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes[.]” Soucie, 448 F. 2d at
1077. For a discussion of the deliberative process privilege generally, see Nunley, supra
note 224, at 74–75; Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege,
54 MO. L. REV. 279 (1989); Erin Hoffman, The Deliberative Process Privilege in Kentucky, 25 J.
NAT’L ASSN. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 485, 485–89 (2005).
246
Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1080–81 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
247
Id.
248
Id. at 1081. Judge Wilkey noted that as to the Executive Branch of the government
most of the common law privilege has now been covered by the Freedom of Information
Act exemption for interagency and intra-agency records. Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 1082.
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“conferring upon any member of the general public a right which
Congress, neither individually nor collectively, possesses.”251
Two years later, the existence of a judicial confidentiality privilege
again arose in dicta in another Executive privilege case. In Nixon v.
Sirica,252 the Special Prosecutor sought enforcement of a grand jury
subpoena for certain tape recordings between President Nixon and his
advisors that the President had refused to produce on the grounds of
absolute Executive privilege.253 The court recognized the existence of an
Executive privilege with constitutional underpinnings which is intended
to “protect the . . . executive decision-making process[ and] is analogous
to that between a congressman and his aides under the Speech and
Debate Clause; to that among judges, and between judges and their law
clerks; and similar to” exemption five of the Freedom of Information
Act.254 That privilege, however, while presumptively applicable, was
found not to be absolute, and thus subject to a balancing of interests.
That balance was found to favor disclosure in light of “the uniquely
powerful showing made by the Special Prosecutor in this case.”255
The Supreme Court addressed the Executive privilege in United
States v. Nixon,256 in the context of the President’s assertion of an absolute
privilege in the face of a subpoena for White House tapes for use in the
criminal trials of several presidential aides. The President argued two
grounds for the privilege: (1) the need for protection of communications
“between high Government officials” and their advisors; and (2) the
doctrine of separation of powers.257 The Court acknowledged the
importance of confidentiality, stating “[h]uman experience teaches that
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
detriment of the decisionmaking process.”258 Moreover, the Court

Id. at 1081.
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
253
Id. at 704–05.
254
Id. at 717 (footnote omitted); see id. at 713–17.
255
Id. at 717. In his dissenting opinion in Nixon v. Sirica, asserting that the executive
privilege should be absolute, Judge MacKinnon elaborated on the judicial privilege. See id.
at 740–42 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). He noted that “[e]xpress authorities sustaining this
position are minimal, undoubtedly because its existence and validity has been so
universally recognized. Its source is rooted in history and gains added force from the
constitutional separation of powers of the three departments of government[,]” and quoted
the executive’s brief for the proposition that “‘[i]t has always been recognized that judges
must be able to confer with their colleagues, and with their law clerks, in circumstances of
absolute confidentiality.’” Id. at 740.
256
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
257
Id. at 705–06.
258
Id. at 705.
251
252
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recognized the constitutional basis of the President’s generalized need
for confidentiality of communications with advisors, as one of those
powers or privileges incident to the “supremacy of each branch within
its own assigned area of constitutional duties.”259 Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that neither this ground nor separation of powers
justified an absolute privilege, but that these interests may be, and here
were, outweighed by the needs of the criminal judicial process.260 In
reaching this conclusion, however, the Court reiterated that the
fundamental importance of confidentiality of communications justified a
presumption that Presidential communications are privileged, and again
analogized to judicial deliberation, stating that this privilege:
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations,
for example, has all the values to which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to
those values, is the necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A President
and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately.261
The first federal court case to address in any detail and actually
apply a judicial deliberations privilege, Matter of Certain Complaints
Under Investigation by an Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of
the Eleventh Circuit,262 is also the case that first drew substantial academic
attention to the privilege.263 After Judge Hastings had been acquitted by
Id.
Id. at 706–13.
261
Id. at 708.
262
783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Hastings v. Godbold, 477 U.S. 904
(1986) [hereinafter Hastings II]. For a review of the history of the cases involving former
federal judge Alcee Hastings, including his efforts to quash his criminal indictment for
bribery (United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983)), and his subsequent acquittal on criminal charges (Hastings v. Judicial Conference
of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988)), see
Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 132–43; Nunley, supra note 224, at 845–89.
263
See, e.g., Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 132–43; Milne, supra note 224, at 224–26;
Nunley, supra note 224, at 84–89. Prior to the Hastings II case, a couple of federal court
cases had made passing reference to assertions of some form of judicial privilege. See
McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431, 432–33 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Magistrate, on
grounds of judicial privilege, refused to order deposition testimony regarding a sentencing
report prepared for court by an assistant to the Georgia Supreme Court who argued that he
was functioning as a judicial law clerk or attorney for the client; upon review District Court
259
260
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a federal jury on bribery charges, two district court judges in the
Eleventh Circuit filed a complaint under the Judicial Councils Reform
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,264 alleging, inter alia,
that Judge Hastings “engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts and has violated
several Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct[.]”265 In the course of its
investigation, the Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of the
Eleventh Circuit sought to enforce subpoenas of Judge Hastings’s
secretary and three law clerks or former law clerks. The judge and his
staff resisted compliance with the subpoenas on several grounds,
including that the subpoenas sought information that was covered by a
testimonial privilege protecting from disclosure of “confidential
communications among an Article III judge and members of his staff
regarding the performance of his judicial duties.”266 This privilege was
likened to the Executive privilege protecting presidential
communications, the protection afforded Congress under the Speech and
Debate Clause, and the common-law attorney-client privilege.267
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that it could find no
cases applying a confidential judicial communications privilege, but
stated that “the probable existence of such a privilege has often been
noted.”268 The court then reviewed and quoted extensively the dicta
discussed above from Nixon v. Sirica, New York Times v. United States,
Soucie v. David, and United States v. Nixon, the opinions that had alluded
to a privilege for communications among judges and between judges
and their law clerks relating to judicial deliberations that found support
in the common law and constitutional principles, such as separation of
powers and the inherent power of each branch to ensure that it can

found it ‘“unnecessary to rule on whether or not the Magistrate correctly
analyzed . . . claim of judicial and/or attorney-client privilege[]’”); Nunley, supra note 224,
at 83 (discussing an unreported case involving assertion of judicial privilege by federal
magistrate judge in challenge to grand jury indictments). Also, a 1979 California state
investigation of possible misconduct by state supreme court judges, in which a judicial
testimonial privilege was asserted, generated some academic commentary. See, e.g.,
Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361; Comment, supra note 101, at 1230–31. For a discussion
of the California matter, see infra notes 290–93.
264
Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 ((codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332,
372), repealed by Pub. L. 107-273, Div. C, Title I, § 11043(a)(1)(B), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat.
1855).
265
See Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1491–92.
266
Id. at 1492–93, 1517–18. The judge and his staff also raised challenges to the
jurisdiction of the court and the constitutionality of the Judicial Council’s Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. Id. at 1494, 1499.
267
Id. at 1518.
268
Id.
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effectively discharge its duties.269 Emphasizing the critical importance of
confidentiality in fostering the candor that is necessary for the decisionmaking process that was central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of
the qualified privilege protecting presidential communications in United
States v. Nixon, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Judges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid
discourse with their colleagues and staff to promote the
effective discharge of their duties. The judiciary, no less
than the executive, is supreme within its own area of
constitutionally assigned duties. Confidentiality helps
protect judges’ independent reasoning from improper
outside influences. It also safeguards legitimate privacy
interests of both judges and litigants.
We conclude, therefore, that there exists a privilege
(albeit a qualified one[]) protecting confidential
communications among judges and their staffs in the
performance of their judicial duties.270
The court indicated that this qualified privilege is limited “to
communications among judges and others relating to official judicial
business such as, for example, the framing and researching of opinions,
orders, and rulings.”271 In the Hastings matter, this condition was clearly
met so as to establish the presumption of privilege as to the testimony
sought from the law clerks since the investigating Committee sought to
question them about discussions among the judge and his staff members
concerning pending cases. Nevertheless, further analysis was required
because of the qualified nature of the privilege.272 That the court found
the privilege to be qualified is not surprising given its reliance on the
analogy to the Executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, where the
Supreme Court had concluded neither the President’s need for
confidential advice nor separation of powers would justify an absolute
privilege.273 Determining whether the presumptive privilege applies
requires a weighing of the need of the investigating party seeking the
information against “the degree of intrusion upon the confidentiality of
privileged communications[.]”274 Measuring the need for access requires
consideration of “the importance of the inquiry for which the privileged
269
270
271
272
273
274
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information is sought; the relevance of that information to [the] inquiry;
and the difficulty of obtaining the desired information through
alternative means.”275
Applying this balancing process to the circumstances involving the
Judicial Council Committee’s investigation of Judge Hastings, the court
determined that the testimony of the law clerks would be allowed. The
court found the matter to be of “surpassing importance[]” to society
given the potential outcome—either exoneration of the judge or a
recommendation for impeachment—and the gravity of the allegations
against the judge, particularly bribery, which have implications for “‘the
public confidence in the judiciary, [and] the independence and
reputation of the accused judge[.]’”276 The court also believed that the
information sought from the two law clerks, regarding their role in the
case in which the alleged bribery occurred, to be highly relevant despite
the fact that the Committee had access to the law clerks’ previous grand
jury and criminal trial testimony.277 In assessing the strength of the
judge’s interest in confidentiality, the court analogized again to United
States v. Nixon, where the Supreme Court found the President’s
generalized interest in confidentiality was overridden by the needs of the
criminal process, and found the judge’s interest only generalized. It also
found that any intrusion on confidentiality was mitigated by the fact that
the law clerks’ testimony would be to a committee of federal judges,
“uniquely cognizant of the need to safeguard” the communications of
the judge and his staff, and that the Act required that privileged
documents and testimony received by the Committee remain
confidential.278 The court specifically left open questions about the
Id.
Id. The court noted that bribery and treason were the two constitutionally specified
“‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’” which would justify impeachment. Id. at 1522 n.31
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4).
277
Id. at 1522. The court explained that there may be matters that were not covered
previously, that transcripts of testimony were not a substitute for live testimony where the
Committee could make its own credibility determinations, and that the strength of the
privilege was somewhat weakened by the fact that the law clerks had already testified and
therefore breached confidentiality. Id. at 1522–23. The court declined to decide whether
this prior testimony could be seen as a waiver of the privilege.
278
Id. at 1524–25. In support of this point, the court cited the Supreme Court’s order in
United States v. Nixon that ordered in camera examination by the district judge as a means
of protecting confidentiality interests. The court acknowledged in a footnote that
information that the Judicial Council deems necessary for purposes of impeachment can be
released, id. at 1525 n.34, a point that commentators have seized upon in questioning the
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. See Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 142–43. On the other
hand, it is clear that the confidentiality protections of either in camera review or review by
a committee of judges will protect, to a substantial degree, confidentiality interests for the
majority of judges as to whom no finding of wrongdoing will occur.
275
276
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applicability of the privilege in circumstances other than those in the
Hastings case, such as where the alleged misconduct involved is less
serious than the “impeachable offense of bribery[,]” or the privilege is
asserted for a reason other than the “generalized need for
confidentiality[,]” or the privilege is asserted in a proceeding other than
under the Act.279
The most recent mention of judicial privilege in federal court
occurred in another case in which the testimony of law clerks was
sought, this time in connection with a civil proceeding challenging the
Texas election district plans that had been assigned to a three-judge
federal district court.280 The defendants sought to recuse two of the
federal court judges who had been assigned to the case on the grounds
that there may have been improper ex parte communications with one of
the judges or his law clerks, and the district court judge in Terrazas v.
Slagle 281 was delegated the task of determining whether depositions of
the judges’ law clerks would be allowed to support the defendants’
recusal argument.282 Although the court quashed the subpoenas to the
law clerks on the grounds that their testimony could not answer the
question of whether the judges were actually influenced by any alleged
communications, in dicta it briefly noted that the defendants recognized
“the sanctity of communications between the judges and their law
clerks” and acknowledged “existence of a ‘limited judicial privilege’
protecting those communications.”283 Moreover, the court explained:
“All counsel admit that public inquiries by the litigants as to the internal
operations and communications of the Court will, not may, destroy the
integrity of our present legal system. This Court will not be a party to
that destruction.”284

Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1525. Commentators have generally assumed that the privilege
could be asserted in other contexts, such as a civil or criminal trial. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 224. It should also be noted that Hastings II has been cited by the Court of
Military Appeals [now Court of Appeals for the Armed Services] in support of its
determination that a privilege protecting judicial communications exists. See Nunley, supra
note 224, at 94–95.
280
See Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex 1992), aff’d by Richards v. Terrazas,
505 U.S. 1214 (1992), and by Slagle v. Terrazas, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
281
142 F.R.D. 136 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
282
Id. at 137–38.
283
Id. at 138–39 (citing Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1520). The court also stated that it believed
that the real aim of the defendants was to disqualify the judges by the mere tactic of having
the law clerks testify, as there is legal precedent for a rule that “if a law clerk testifies as a
witness in a case before his judge, the judge must disqualify himself.” Id. at 139.
284
Id. at 139.
279
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The Judicial Deliberations Privilege in State Court

A privilege attaching to judicial deliberations and communications
has also received some attention and express acceptance in state courts.
In fact, a somewhat obscure 1919 case from the New York Surrogate
Court, In re Cohen’s Estate,285 may have been the first case actually to
recognize a judicial deliberations privilege. In that case, a challenge was
made to the attorney’s fees awarded to the attorney who was the
proponent of a will in probate. The challenger sought the depositions of
the chief clerk and stenographer to the then retired surrogate (judge).
The court, analogizing to the common-law attorney-client privilege and
citing public policy, found that the relationship between the judge and
his assistants was a confidential one and that discussions of matters
relating to the court’s decisions were privileged.286 Exposing such
matters would offend “the dignity of the court” and be inconsistent with
“[t]he fair administration of justice[.]”287 While the court did not
expressly address whether this was an absolute or qualified privilege, it
did suggest that a judge could be questioned “regarding acts which were
directed against the proper administration of the law, as, for example,
his advice to destroy public records in his office, or direction to commit
forgery or perjury.”288 Finally, from the court’s opinion, it seems clear
that the court considered this common law privilege for communications
between a judge and those in a confidential relationship with the judge
to be a well established corollary of the common-law attorney-client
privilege.289
When the question of a judicial communications privilege next arose
in the states, sixty years later, it was in the context of a 1979 investigation
into alleged judicial wrongdoing by justices of the California Supreme
Court. In 1978, the court had allegedly improperly delayed the decision
in a controversial case until after judicial elections had taken place in
order to avoid the possible negative impact of their positions on the

174 N.Y.S. 427 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1919).
Id. at 428–29.
287
Id. at 428.
288
Id. at 428–29. This can be seen as somewhat analogous to the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege, under which the privilege does not attach, where the
communication with the attorney is for the purpose of the commission of a crime or a fraud
by the client. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).
It also appears to be similar to the exception to the privilege recognized in Hastings II for
serious judicial misconduct. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
289
See In re Cohen’s Estate, 174 N.Y.S. at 428. The court also cited as relevant the rules that
grand juries and judges cannot be called to testify as to the basis for their decisions. Id.
285
286
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election of one or more justices, including Chief Justice Rose Bird.290
When the Commission on Judicial Performance subpoenaed law clerks
to the justices to testify, two of the seven justices instructed their clerks
not to testify; staff members of other justices testified as to conversations
that had presumably been confidential.291 Also, one of the justices,
Justice Newman, specifically citing judicial privilege for confidential
information, declined to answer most of the substantive questions asked
by the Commission. Although the Commission, relying on United States
v. Nixon, rejected the privilege, it apparently did not compel the judge to
answer the questions as to which privilege had been claimed.292 The
Commission ultimately failed to bring charges against any of the
justices.293
A recent Minnesota case in which the affidavits of two former law
clerks were offered by a criminal defendant in support of his motion for
a new trial and post-conviction relief has drawn attention because the
Minnesota courts did not apply, or even raise, the issue of a judicial
communications privilege.294 In Greer v. State,295 the defendant in a
murder case repeatedly unsuccessfully sought the removal of the trial
judge on the grounds of bias and improper ex parte contacts with the

290
See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361; Comment, supra note 101, at 1230–31 & n.7;
Frank Greenberg, Judicial Misadventures in California: A Response to Professor Tribe, 65 A.B.A.
J. 1493, 1493 (1979); Nunley, supra note 224, at 82; Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance,
and Change: A History of Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 1960–1990, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2049, 2075 n.88 (1993). The story of the alleged delay was leaked to the press on the
morning of election day in 1978 causing a major controversy that resulted in Chief Justice
Bird calling for an investigation of the allegations and leaks by the California Commission
on Judicial Performance. Greenberg, supra, at 1494; Irene A. Tesitor, Calif. Commission
Won’t File Charges in Probe of Supreme Court, 63 JUDICATURE 296, 296 (1980). The Judicial
Council of the state altered the strict rule of confidentiality applicable to investigations by
the Commission on Judicial Performance to require that the hearings of the Commission in
this case only be held in public. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 489 n.11 (1979);
Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 363, 402; Greenberg, supra, at 1494; Laurence H. Tribe,
Trying California’s Judges on Television: Open Government or Judicial Intimidation, 65 AB.A. J.
1175, 1177 (1979).
The modification requiring public hearings was declared
unconstitutional in Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d at 499. Subsequently, the Mosk
decision was abrogated by an amendment to the California Constitution requiring public
judicial performance hearings. Adams v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 8 Cal. 4th 630,
638 (1994).
291
Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361.
292
See Nunley, supra note 224, at 82. Thus, absent an intractable situation requiring
court-ordered enforcement or quashing of the subpoenas, no court actually addressed the
deliberations privilege in the California matter.
293
Tesitor, supra note 290, at 296.
294
See Thompson, supra note 178, at 15–16.
295
673 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 2004).
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prosecutor and jury.296 Sometime after the trial, the defendant’s lawyer
obtained the affidavits of two former law clerks to the trial judge. The
affidavits, which included statements by the former law clerks that the
judge had told them that he had denied the defendant’s challenges for
cause “‘because he was angry with [defense counsel,]’” were offered in
support of post conviction relief on the basis of actual bias.297 The
defendant did not explain how or when the affidavits had been obtained,
no objection to their entry in the record was made, and the briefs in the
case did not raise issues regarding the production of the affidavits.298
Without commenting on the evidentiary propriety of the law clerks’
affidavits, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower court’s
denial of post conviction relief, noting that “[e]ven if presented during
appellant’s numerous recusal motions, it is unlikely that the law clerks’
affidavits would have formed a basis in themselves for removal of [the
j]udge . . . .”299
At least one commentator, Professor Peter Thompson, found the case
troubling in the court’s failure to address the propriety of “the use of
affidavits from the judge’s law clerks disclosing private aspects of the
trial judge’s decision-making process[.]”300 Noting that the affidavits in
the Greer case contained the former law clerks’ “subjective opinions
about the judge’s thought processes[]” and disclosed the “judge’s
statements, presumably made in the privacy of the judge’s chambers[]”
in the course of the decision-making process, Professor Thompson
warned that the court’s failure to address this invasion of the judicial
decision-making process is a dangerous precedent that would encourage
other litigants in the future to attempt to get information from court
personnel in order to overturn court decisions.301 Because of the strong
policy arguments supporting the protection of confidential
communications between judges and their law clerks relating to judicial
integrity and efficiency, and because of the lack of clarity as to the legal
sources for the protection of that confidentiality, Professor Thompson
urged the state to take affirmative steps to assure confidentiality of in296
See id. at 152–54. Given that confidential law clerk information was sought to be used
to obtain removal of a judge for bias, the Greer case appears quite similar to the Curry case
in Massachusetts.
297
Id. at 154. The affidavit of one of the former law clerks also contained the law clerk’s
assessment of the judge’s anger based on the judge’s “‘tone of voice, . . . agitated manner
and . . . low frustration level[]’” and the clerk’s impression that the judge’s reason for not
sending a post trial juror questionnaire was that two juror notations that the they believed
the judge favored the prosecution would be evidence of bias. Id. at 154.
298
Id.; Thompson, supra note 178, at 16.
299
Greer, 673 N.W.2d at 157.
300
Thompson, supra note 178, at 14.
301
See id.
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chamber discussions.302 Among the suggested solutions were adopting a
mandatory law clerk code similar to that adopted by the federal courts,
enacting a statutory judicial communications privilege, developing the
common-law privilege in the next case in which the issue was presented,
and requiring contractual confidentiality agreements for judicial
employees.303
A recent, and probably the most broad, application of a judicial
deliberations privilege occurred in a somewhat unusual 2005 Illinois
case. In Thomas v. Page,304 an Illinois Supreme Court justice brought a
defamation case against a newspaper, reporter, and editor based on
articles that the paper had published asserting that the justice was
improperly influencing the court’s decision in an attorney discipline case
for political reasons.305 The defendants sought documents and testimony
from the other justices of the court and their law clerks that related to the
attorney discipline case. The justices filed a motion to quash, asserting
the “‘Doctrine of Judicial Privilege.’”306 The trial court found that Illinois
recognized a judicial deliberations privilege as to communications
between a judge and the judge’s own law clerks, but not as to the
communications between a judge and another judge’s law clerks or
between law clerks. Furthermore, the trial court held that the plaintiff
justice, by filing the defamation case, had waived the privilege as to his
communications with other judges, his law clerks, and other judge’s law
clerks. Nevertheless, the trial court certified for interlocutory appeal the
issues surrounding the recognition and application of a judicial
deliberations privilege to the Illinois Supreme Court Justices and law
clerks in this case.307
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that “[i]t is wellsettled that a judge may not be asked to testify as to his or her mental
See id. at 16–18.
Id. at 17–18. Professor Thompson asserted that while law clerks should be able to
provide information regarding judicial misconduct through appropriate channels such as
judicial conduct boards, direct communications with the litigants by law clerks should be
prohibited. Id. at 18.
304
837 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
305
John Flynn Rooney, Court to Decide If Deliberation Privilege Exists, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
May 13, 2005, at 1. The case involved a lawyer running for county prosecutor who
apparently, during her election campaign, had offered county jobs in exchange for
campaign contributions. Id. One article in the paper accused Justice Thomas of the Illinois
Supreme Court of engaging in “‘a little political shimmy-shammy[]’” in connection with
the discipline case. Id. at 24; see also Brian Mackey, Give Up the Privilege Shield, Justices Asked
in Libel Case, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 5, 2005, at 1.
306
Thomas, 837 N.E.2d at 487.
307
Id. at 488. The issues relating to the judicial deliberations privilege were found to be
“questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion[,]”
the resolution of which may advance the ultimate conclusion of the litigation. Id..
302
303
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impressions or processes in reaching a judicial decision[,]”308 apparently
because the issue of whether Illinois recognizes the judicial deliberations
privilege was seen as directly related to this basic proposition. The court
cited the dicta from the previously discussed federal cases recognizing
such a privilege and expressed its agreement with the rationale of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for recognizing a confidential
communications privilege in Hastings II—that the effective discharge of
judicial duties requires the ability to have candid conversations with
other judges and judicial staff and that “‘[c]onfidentiality helps protect
judges’
independent
reasoning
from
improper
outside
influences . . . [and] safeguards legitimate privacy interests of both
judges and litigants.’”309
Furthermore, the court applied Dean Wigmore’s four-part test for
determining whether particular communications should be privileged
generally and concluded that a judicial deliberations privilege clearly
satisfied the test.310 The communications between judges and court staff
obviously occur with the expectation that they are confidential.
Moreover, this confidentiality is essential to the relationship between
judges and their staff, which requires that in deciding cases, judges be
able to receive “open and honest” advice and exchange views with other
judges and staffs “freely and frankly[.]”311 For effective judicial decisionmaking, judges must be assured that these communications may be
completely candid and will not later be made public.312 The court also
found “a strong public policy favoring the protection of the

Id. (citing Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 307, (1904)); Washington v. Strickland,
693 F.2d 1243, 1263 (5th Cir.1982), rev’d on other grounds, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); see also United
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1994);
State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 735 (W. Va. 2000).
309
Thomas, 837 N.E.2d at 489 (quoting Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1520); see id. at 489–94
(explaining the rationale, extent, and limits of the judicial deliberations privilege).
310
Id. at 489–90. As discussed previously, see supra text accompanying note 227, the
Wigmore test is as follows:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
Id. at 489 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285,
at 527 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.1961)) (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
311
Id.
312
Id. at 489–90.
308
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confidentiality of intra-court communications made in the course of the
judicial decision-making process[]” in that it is the public that is the
intended beneficiary of the confidentiality protection.313 This is because
the “very integrity of the process often rests on judges’ candid
communications with their colleagues and staffs” that contribute to “the
impartial and independent resolution of matters” in the public interest
that could be undermined by the “pressures of public opinion” were
intra-court communications disclosed.314 For these reasons, the court
also believed that the damage that could occur to the decision-making
process from “disclosure of such communications would, in almost
every instance, be far greater than the benefit which might be gained by
those seeking disclosure.”315 Accordingly, the court held that a judicial
deliberation privilege exists for the confidential communications
between judges and between judges and their staff members in the
course of official court business.316
Having recognized a judicial deliberations privilege, it remained for
the court to determine its scope, including whose communications were
covered and whether the privilege was absolute or qualified. The court
had little difficulty concluding that the privilege should extend beyond
communications between judges and between judges and their own law
clerks. Noting that law clerks are staff to the court as well as the judge
for whom they immediately work and that law clerks occasionally confer
confidentially with other judges to the benefit of the decision-making
process, the court concluded that the privilege should extend to
communications between “a judge and another judge’s law clerk[.]”317
Furthermore, the court held that the privilege should extend to
communications among law clerks that are part of the deliberative
process because the “clerks frequently discuss cases among themselves
in order to clarify and distill the issues” before discussing the case with
the judge.318 This “test[ing of] their analysis of a case before conferring

Id. at 490.
Id.
315
Id.
316
Id. at 491–92. In so holding, the court firmly rejected the defendants’ arguments that,
consistent with Illinois case law rejecting the creation of a deliberative process privilege for
municipal workers, the creation of new privileges by the judiciary is “strongly
disfavored[,]” and that the creation of a judicial privilege for judges themselves would raise
the “‘appearance of impropriety[.]’” Id. at 490. The court stated as follows: “the judiciary,
as a co-equal branch of government, supreme within its own assigned area of constitutional
duties, is being asked to exercise its inherent authority to protect the integrity of its own
decision-making process.” Id.
317
Id. at 491–92.
318
Id. at 491.
313
314
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with their judges . . . strengthen[s] the integrity of the judicial decisionmaking process.”319
The court next briefly addressed the defendant’s argument that any
deliberations privilege should be a qualified one, as the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held in Hastings II.320 The court first indicated that it
believed the privilege that precludes judges from being required to
testify about their mental processes and motivations in deciding cases
has been treated as absolute.321
In concluding that the judicial
deliberations privilege it was recognizing was also absolute, the court
relied on its view that the privilege was already “narrowly tailored,
applying only to intra-court communications made in the course of the
judicial decision-making process and concerning the court’s official
business[,]” and that “[a]nything less than the protection afforded by an
absolute privilege would dampen the free exchange of ideas and
adversely affect the [judicial] decision-making process.”322
After
answering the certified questions, the appellate court remanded the case
to the trial court.323
The issue of the existence of a deliberative privilege most recently
arose in Michigan. Apparently fearing that one of the justices of the
Michigan Supreme Court intended to publicize information about the
court’s internal deliberations on cases, a majority of the court enacted an
emergency administrative order expressly addressing the “Deliberative
Privilege and Case Discussions in the Supreme Court,” and providing as
follows:

Id.
Id. at 492.
321
Id. at 492–93 (citing of State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 735 (2000)).
322
Id. at 493. The Appellate Court declined to address the issue of whether the filing the
defamation claim by one of the justices constituted a waiver of the privilege as to that
justice’s communications or as to the privilege claims of the other justices. Id. at 494.
323
Id. at 496. The case has continued to be quite active and controversial. After the
Appellate Court’s decision finding a deliberations privilege, the defendants sought an
immediate appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois. Mackey, supra note 305. The majority
of Supreme Court Justices, upon defendant’s motion, recused themselves from hearing the
petition; and, therefore, the Appellate Court’s decision stood. Brian Mackey, Newspaper
Wins Pyrrhic Victory With Recusal Motion, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 9, 2006, at 1. Justice
Thomas prevailed in a jury trial for a $7 million verdict, which was reduced by remittitur to
$ 4 million. Because of the involvement of the Supreme Court Justices in the trial,
defendants’ appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was assigned to the same Appellate Court
panel that decided the privilege issue. See Brian Mackey, Judge Nearly Halves Libel Award to
State’s Chief Justice, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 2, 2007, at 1; Tony Mauro, Newspaper Smacked
With Damage Award Fights Back, Claims Trial of Illinois Justice’s Lawsuit Was Unfair, LEGAL
TIMES, June 18, 2007, at 8. Defendants filed a federal court civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the state claiming that they have not received a fair hearing because of the
application of the privilege and the justices’ involvement in the case. See id.
319
320
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All correspondence, memoranda and discussion
regarding cases or controversies are confidential. This
obligation to honor confidentiality does not expire when
a case is decided. The only exception to this obligation is
that a justice may disclose any unethical, improper or
criminal conduct to the JTC [(Judicial Tenure
Commission)] or proper authority.324
The four-justice majority stated that the purpose of the order
was to preserve “the integrity and confidentiality of the
court’s deliberative process and to reflect practices that
have characterized [the deliberations of] the Michigan
Supreme Court, and to the best of our knowledge every
other appellate court within the United States, including
the United States Supreme Court, since their
inception . . . .”325
The rule has been viewed as formalizing a deliberative privilege
traditionally applicable to “the internal case deliberations of the court
and its staff[.]”326
The foregoing shows that a judicial deliberations privilege, with
roots in the common law as well as constitutional, functional, and
separation of powers principles, is well-entrenched in both state and
federal courts. In fact, not a single court opinion that has actually
addressed the question of the existence of the privilege has rejected it.327
The relatively small amount of attention to the privilege in case law and

324
Richard D. McLellan, supra note 177 (quoting Admin. Order-2006-8); see Todd C. Berg,
Supreme Court Confidential, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
2278937; Allan Falk, Commentary: Admin Order 2006-8 Should be Supported, MICH. LAW.
WKLY., Feb. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2278967.
325
Berg, supra note 324. Michigan Lawyer’s Weekly emailed 40 states about their
confidentiality practices or rules. Six of eight state Supreme Courts who responded
(Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, and Tennessee, and West Virginia) indicated that
they had “‘long-standing’” rules, practices, or policies on confidentiality of court
deliberations. Id.
326
Id.; see Falk, supra note 324; McLellan, supra note 177. The Michigan Supreme Court
held a public administrative hearing on the order on January 17, 2007. Id.
327
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the Crossen and Curry appeals avoided
addressing the existence of a judicial deliberations privilege, indicating that it need not
address the issue given the fact that a lawyer’s efforts to obtain judicial deliberative
communications with a law clerk would, in any event, be impermissible because “[t]he
administration of justice requires respect for the internal deliberations and processes that
form the basis of judicial decisions, at very least while the matter is still pending.” In re
Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406. See text infra section IV.F.
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secondary sources should not be attributed to the novelty or tenuousness
of the privilege. Instead, it probably stems from a number of factors,
including the relative infrequency with which the issue of a judicial
deliberations privilege has arisen or is likely to arise. Related to and
contributing to the infrequency is the obvious need for confidentiality of
judicial deliberative communications and an attendant privilege for
those communications.328 In this regard, it should be remembered that
the launching point for much of the analysis that led federal courts to
conclude that deliberative process and Executive privileges existed for
the Executive Branch of the government was the assumed existence of
such an inherent privilege for the judiciary.329 Where challenges to the
assumed privilege of confidentiality of judicial deliberations have arisen,
courts have formally acknowledged the privilege through judicial
common law-making as in In re Cohen’s Estate,330 Hastings II,331 and
Thomas v. Page,332 or by judicial rule as in Michigan.
Moreover, as the case law has recognized, including the Eleventh
Circuit’s Hastings II and the Illinois Appellate Court Thomas v. Page,
acceptance of at least a qualified privilege333 that applies to
communications among judges and their staff members relating to
judicial deliberations is clearly supported by the policies applicable to
communications privileges generally. Indeed, the case for a judicial
deliberative communications privilege is arguably more compelling than
most, given the impact on the quality of justice that the absence of the
privilege is likely to have and the constitutional values protected by the
privilege.334
Unquestionably, the relationship among judges and
between judges and their law clerks is premised upon the confidentiality
of communications, especially concerning the judges’ deliberations.335
See Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 89–90, 114–15.
See supra text accompanying notes 242–61.
330
See supra text accompanying notes 285–89.
331
See supra text accompanying notes 268–70.
332
See supra text accompanying notes 308–22.
333
The Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion that the privilege is absolute is not wellsupported by the court’s own analysis and is inconsistent with the rationale underlying
deliberative privileges generally–that at some point the values being served by the
privilege are less important than the values served by access to information, at least in
official investigations of serious criminal wrongdoing and judicial misconduct. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 274–76 (explaining that the judicial privilege was not
applicable under the facts of Hastings II because the need for the privilege was overridden
by the needs of the criminal process); supra text accompanying note 260 (explaining that the
privilege in United States v. Nixon was outweighed by the needs of the criminal judicial
process).
334
See supra text accompanying notes 269–70, 284, 287, 311–15; Catz & Lange, supra note
224, at 115–19, 144–45.
335
See supra text accompanying notes 116–20.
328
329
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Courts and judges have been emphatic that the confidentiality of
communications is essential for effective decision-making in the public
interest. It not only allows for the uninhibited exploration, debate, and
testing of ideas in the formulation of decisions, but it insulates judges
from intrusion by other branches of government, public pressures, and
popular opinion that can be inconsistent with justice, and other
interference with judicial impartiality, independence, and efficiency.336
Indeed, judicial efficiency and finality in the administration of justice
could be seriously undermined in the absence of a judicial deliberations
privilege, given the incentive that litigants—such as those in the present
Curry matter and the Minnesota Greer case—337often have to leave
virtually no stone unturned in order to get the result in their case
overturned.
Presumably, critics of the privilege, as critics of the confidentiality
surrounding chambers generally, focusing largely on the United States
Supreme Court, would essentially rest their opposition on the historical
distortion or inaccuracy concerning, and the public’s general loss of
information about, the courts’ operations and procedures that are
engendered by confidentiality.338 As noted previously, however, there is
always a loss of truth, accuracy, and information attendant to the
application of a confidential communications privilege, but the value of
confidentiality and privacy is considered to serve greater public
interests.339 Thus, in this regard it has been noted:
Equally strong but opposing values of truth and
individual privacy have come to a balance [in other
privileges], allowing some claims of privacy to
transcend the goal of producing “every man’s evidence”
in court. Public policy dictates that we maintain a
judiciary free of interference from other branches of
government and from the population at large and the
judicial privilege is an example of a privilege that easily
passes the truth/privacy balancing test.340

336
See supra text accompanying notes 114–21, 128, 270, 302, 307; Milne, supra note 224, at
231–34.
337
See Thompson, supra note 178, at 14, 16; supra text accompanying note 301.
338
See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 363, 403–04; Arthur Selwyn Miller & D.S. Sastri,
Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing the Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFF. L.
REV. 799, 802–06, 822–23 (1973); Milne, supra note 224, at 230–31.
339
See supra text accompanying notes 226–27.
340
Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 144; see also Milne, supra note 224, at 231–34.
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Some commentators have asserted that given the infrequency of its
use outside the context of judicial corruption, a judicial deliberations
privilege is really not needed.341 This ignores that the existence of the
privilege itself provides protection for judicial deliberative
confidentiality and the values it serves in several ways. First, a process
exists that governs the access to, and use of, deliberative
communications. Assuming that the communications between a judge
and law clerk are shown to meet the threshold requirement of being
made in connection with judicial function, such as the court’s
deliberations on a case, the information is presumptively privileged and
the party seeking the information bears the burden of establishing that
their need for the information outweighs the values served by the
assertion of the privilege in the particular instance. The determination of
these issues most likely will occur in the context of an in camera review
in connection with a case or a confidential judicial conduct proceeding
by a judicial body342—circumstances that will protect confidentiality
until a determination is made that disclosure is required.
Furthermore, while the exact showing of need required in order to
overcome the assertion of the privilege has not been clearly delineated,
based on the cases decided to date in the area of the executive and the
judicial deliberative privilege, it is probably wrong to assume that mere
allegations of some form of judicial misconduct or mistake are sufficient.
Thus, in United States v. Nixon, the Court’s conclusion that the President’s
generalized interest in confidentiality did not outweigh the
“demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial[,]”
emphasized the negative impact that application of the privilege would
have on the “fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice[]” protected by the Confrontation and
Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.343 The
Court’s opinion appears to indicate that the result might not be the same
if what was involved was “the need for relevant evidence in civil
litigation[.]”344 Similarly, in Hastings II, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals referred to the Judicial Council Committee’s investigation of
Judge Hastings as being of “surpassing importance[]” particularly in
light of the gravity of the allegations of bribery—one of the two expressly
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 224, at § 5674 (noting “the rarity in which such
communications would be relevant to a proceeding that did not involve judicial
corruption[]”).
342
See id.; Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1524. This is, of course, assuming that the privilege is in
fact qualified as opposed to an absolute privilege.
343
418 U.S. 683, 711–13 (1974).
344
See id. at 712 n.19.
341
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mentioned impeachable offenses in the Constitution—and the context of
the Committee’s investigation for purposes of making a
recommendation as to impeachment of a federal judge.345 The court left
open the possibility that judicial privilege might prevail “in other
contexts, such as where the investigation is aimed at conduct less serious
than the potentially impeachable offense of bribery[] . . . or where a
privilege is invoked in a proceeding other than an investigation under
the Act.”346
Certainly, mere allegations of more general improper judicial
conduct, such as bias and ex parte contacts, should not be sufficient to
even trigger the balancing process under the qualified privilege, much
less provide sufficient grounds for overcoming the privilege.347 To
conclude otherwise would virtually vitiate the value of the privilege,
invite frequent intrusions into the judicial deliberations process by
disappointed litigants grasping for any grounds upon which to obtain a
different result outside the normal appeal process, and increase litigation
costs.
Recognition of a narrowly prescribed privilege, which can only be
overcome upon a party’s production of evidence of a substantially
important need related to criminal wrongdoing or serious judicial
misconduct, will serve as a disincentive to the time-wasting, costimposing, and potentially harassing behavior reflected in cases like In re
Cohen, Greer v. State, and, particularly, the Curry case, where litigants
have demonstrated that they apparently are willing to go to substantial
lengths to obtain a different result in their cases by intruding into the
confidential relationship between judges and their law clerks. Parties
would unlikely pursue obtaining information from law clerks and other
court staff if they knew it is unlikely that the information will be legally
admissible because of the privilege. Also, as discussed in sections IV.D,
IV.E, and IV.F below, not only does the likelihood of not being able to
use the information serve as a disincentive, but the existence of the
privilege triggers other doctrines under tort and lawyer professional
Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1522 & n.31.
Id. at 1525. Obviously, if the privilege is absolute as in the Illinois Thomas v. Page case,
no showing of need can overcome the privilege.
347
Cf. Liteky v. United States., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (stating that judicial opinions
based on evidence or events occurring during prior proceedings generally do not constitute
disqualifying bias); Greer v. State, 673 N.W. 2d 151, 157 (Minn. 2004) (holding law clerk
affidavits are legally insufficient to establish bias and improper ex parte contacts); Terrazas
v. Slade, 142 F.R.D. 136, 138–39 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding law clerk affidavits on ex parte
contacts are not a legally sufficient basis for recusal). Indeed, in In re Crossen, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the statements by the law clerk
regarding possible judicial bias would not constitute ‘“cognizable evidence of judicial
misconduct or a disqualifying bias.’” 880 N.E.2d 352, 373 (Mass. 2008).
345
346
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responsibility law that allow penalties to be imposed upon lawyers who
interfere with a privilege or induce another to breach a privilege.348
The proper application of the judicial deliberative privilege should
be analogous to, and is supported by the rationale of, the rules
prohibiting the admission of testimony by jurors regarding their
deliberations349 and prohibiting unsupervised post-verdict contact by
lawyers.350
For example, in the leading Massachusetts case of
Commonwealth v. Fidler,351 a criminal defendant sought a new trial based,
in part, on an affidavit that his lawyer had obtained after the trial from
one of the jurors that discussed alleged misconduct that had occurred
during the jury’s deliberations.352 The Supreme Judicial Court first
reiterated the well-established rule barring impeachment of verdicts
through juror testimony, except where that testimony shows improper
extraneous influence.353 This rule is designed to protect jurors from
harassment (by losing parties who try to come up with evidence of
misconduct) and to preserve the quality of the deliberations process
See text infra text accompanying notes 358–94.
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 224, § 5674; FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (juror testimony
only allowed as to “(1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury’s attention, (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the
verdict form[]”).
350
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fidler, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Mass. 1979); Florida. Bar v.
Newhouse, 498 So. 2d 935, 936–37 (Fla. 1986); United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967
(1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 9101 (1985); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d)
(no lawyer initiated post verdict communications with the jury without leave of court for
good cause shown, and “[i]n no circumstances shall such a lawyer inquire of a juror
concerning the jury’s deliberation processes.”), available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/
rpc3.htm#Rule%203.5. At the time of Fidler, the Massachusetts Disciplinary Rule 7-108(D)
prohibited only contacts with a juror “‘calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or
to influence his actions in future jury service.’” Commonwealth v. Solis, 553 N.E.2d 938,
941 (Mass. 1990) (quoting then extent DR-7-108(D)). The rule was amended to formally
implement the Fidler decision. See Alice Saker, Note, Massachusetts’ Revision of DR 7-108(D):
Attorney Postverdict Communication With Jurors, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 719–20 (1992).
Interestingly, the relevance of these principles to the lawyer communications with law
clerks was apparently recognized by lawyer Crossen in the Curry case. Crossen specifically
asked that another attorney in his firm look at these cases in researching the propriety of
the sham job interviews with the law clerk. See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15.
351
385 N.E.2d 513 (1979).
352
The purported misconduct included allegations that the jury considered evidence and
comments that it had been instructed to disregard, and that the jury was exposed to
information not admitted at trial. Id. at 515. The affidavit apparently had been obtained as
a result of a communication initiated by a juror. Id.
353
Id. at 516–17. Examples of extraneous influence include an unauthorized jury view,
outside communications, and consideration of documents not in evidence. Id. at 517.
While juror testimony is allowed as to the existence of such influence, it is not allowed as to
the impact that the extraneous matter had on the jury’s actual deliberations. See id. at 516,
519.
348
349
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because allowing admission of such evidence would “‘make what was
intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public
investigation[—]to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference.’”354 The rule is also intended to diminish the
incentives for jury tampering, promote finality of decisions, and
maintain confidence in the jury’s decision.355
Because the Court in Fidler was concerned, however, that the mere
inadmissibility of most juror testimony was not sufficiently protective of
the jury system, it addressed methods that would be allowed for
gathering admissible evidence. It established a rule requiring that “any
post-verdict interviews of jurors by counsel, litigants, or their agents”
must be conducted under court direction and supervision.356 This rule
was found to be necessary for the following reasons: “unrestricted posttrial interviews . . . [(1)] would defeat the important interests protected
by restrictions on the use of juror testimony to impeach verdicts[;]” (2)
“could lead to harassment of jurors, exploitation of jurors’ thought
processes, and diminished confidence in jury verdicts[;]” and (3) could
result in interrogation that exceeds the proper scope.357 Finally, in
“emphatically” condemning post-verdict contacts by lawyers and
litigants with jurors, the court stated that any lawyer or litigant who does
so “‘acts at his peril, lest he be held as acting in obstruction of the
administration of justice.’”358
Like the restrictions on litigant and lawyer post-verdict contacts with
jurors and the use of juror evidence, a judicial deliberations privilege
applicable to communications with law clerks and judicial control of the
method by which a determination is made as to whether the privilege
applies will serve virtually identical important policy interests, inhibit
lawyer harassment of participants in the judicial process, protect the

Id. at 516 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)).
Id.
356
Id. at 519. Thus, to obtain a post-verdict interview with a juror, a lawyer for a party
would first have to bring to the court’s attention by motion some evidence that extraneous
matters tainted the jury’s deliberations. The court would then decide what, if anything,
further is required, including whether post-verdict interrogation under the court’s
supervision will be allowed. Where lawyers receive unsolicited information, they may
only investigate it as necessary to determine whether it should be brought to the court’s
attention. See id. at 520 & n.12.
357
Id. at 519; see also United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir. 1985)
(“Permitting the unbridled interviewing of jurors could easily lead to their harassment, to
the exploitation of their thought processes, and to diminished confidence in jury verdicts,
as well as to unbalanced trial results depending unduly on the relative resources of the
parties.”).
358
Fidler, 385 N.E.2d at 520. Lawyers may investigate unsolicited information only as
necessary to determine if it is “worth bringing to the judge’s attention.” Id.
354
355
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frankness and completeness of deliberative discussion, preserve public
respect for the deliberative process, and serve the interests of finality.
Just as the Fidler case presented an opportunity for the state’s highest
court to adopt what effectively amounts to a privilege protecting jury
deliberations, the Curry matter presented the court with a rare
opportunity to recognize a deliberative privilege.359 Indeed, the Curry
case clearly demonstrates that both clarity in the law and very strong
disincentives are needed to prevent lawyers from attempting to intrude
into the communications between judges and their law clerks that are
part of the deliberative process. Although adoption and application of
the privilege in Curry would not have altered the outcome given the
numerosity of lawyers’ violations of the rules of professional conduct
there,360 it would have put all lawyers on notice that, in the future, postjudgment efforts to obtain information about the court’s deliberations
from law clerks or former law clerks is not only generally impermissible

The court unquestionably has the power to recognize the privilege. See Babets v. Sec’y
of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Mass. 1988)
(acknowledging the court’s power to adopt common law privileges such as the deliberative
process privilege, but declining to adopt an executive deliberative process privilege for
Massachusetts); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied sub nom.
Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985) (stating that courts have power to answer novel
questions of law and provide relief where no precedent exists). Although the court in
Babets declined to adopt the deliberative process privilege for Executive Branch agencies, it
did so in a context that is arguably distinguishable from that involving a judicial
deliberative communications process. The court’s decision not to recognize the privilege
rested primarily on the following factors (1) the fact that the court’s general approach had
been to leave the creation of privileges to the legislature’s determination because the court
believed the legislature is in the best position to balance the competing social values
usually involved in creating privileges; (2) the Massachusetts Legislature had created a
statutory deliberative process privilege that applies until the final decision has been
reached; and (3) the executive agency involved in Babets had failed to meet its burden of
showing that the privilege was necessary for effective decision-making. Babets, 526 N.E.2d
at 1264–66 & n.8. In this regard, the court specifically noted that the agency’s argument
that absence of the privilege would chill intra-agency communications was speculative and
conjectural. Id. at 1266. The Illinois court in Thomas v. Page faced the same issue when it
recognized an absolute judicial deliberations privilege because the Illinois Supreme Court
had previously declined to adopt the executive deliberative process privilege. See supra
text accompanying note 314. There, the court noted it was not being asked to create a
privilege for another branch of government, but instead “the judiciary, as a co-equal branch
of government, supreme within its own assigned area of constitutional duties, is being
asked to exercise its inherent authority to protect the integrity of its own decision-making
process.” Thomas v. Page, 837 N.E.2d 483, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). As the court in Thomas
recognized, the court has the necessary first-hand information regarding the need for the
judicial deliberations privilege and is in the best position to balance the interests involved.
360
See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (listing all of the lawyers’ actions that the
BBO found to violate the rules of professional conduct).
359
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but likely to be a fruitless effort because the information obtained would
likely be inadmissible.
D. Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Inducement of Breach
Although recognition of a judicial deliberations privilege applicable
to the communications between judges and law clerks would most
clearly and directly discourage deleterious intrusions into judicial
decision-making, other legal doctrines also may deter such intrusions
and provide a basis for sanctions against lawyers who attempt them.
Law clerks have a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of the
information they have obtained during the course of their employment
that would preclude using or disclosing confidential information during
and after their employment.361 Moreover, in those jurisdictions that
require law clerks to sign a confidentiality agreement or subscribe to a
confidentiality oath, a contractual duty of non-disclosure would arise.362
Thus, law clerks who breach their fiduciary or contractual obligations
may be subject to liability, although the potential remedies available may
not be all that effective in preserving the court’s interests in
confidentiality. In most cases, damages from the breach would be
difficult to measure, injunctive relief could not cure past indiscretions,
and a constructive trust remedy would only be relevant where the law
clerk had profited from the breach.363 More importantly, however, it is
also possible that the breach of fiduciary or contractual duty of
confidentiality could be used as the basis for professional discipline

361
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1248–50; supra note 171 and accompanying text (in
Gregorich, a former staff attorney law clerk breached a fiduciary duty by using a
confidential court memo); see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 & n.11 (1980)
(holding that CIA employee in position of trust has a fiduciary obligation not to use or
reveal confidential information); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396(b) (1958),
amended by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) (duty of agent not to use or
disclose confidential information is acquired during agency, unless authorized by the
principal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 & Reporter’s Note (1979) (imposing tort
liability for breach of fiduciary duty: “One breach of fiduciary duty that is more commonly
regarded as giving rise to an action in tort is the disclosure of confidential information.”);
Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426,
1431–32, 1444–48, 1459–60 (1982) (discussing breach of confidentiality actions generally).
362
Comment, supra note 101, at 1248; see supra note 178 and accompanying text
(discussing confidentiality agreements); Vickery, supra note 361, at 1444–48 (discussing
confidentiality contract actions generally).
363
Comment, supra note 101, at 1250. Perhaps in the situation in which a former law
clerk published a book that revealed confidences, the constructive trust remedy could be
meaningful. Cf. Snepp, v. United States, 444 U.S. at 515–16 (the Supreme Court approved
the imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds from a book by a former CIA agent
who breached contractual and fiduciary obligations).
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against a law clerk or former law clerk who has been admitted to the
bar.364
Furthermore, and of particular relevance to circumstances like those
in the Curry matter, not only may liability for breaches of confidentiality
be imposed on law clerks, but under emerging doctrines liability may be
imposed on those who induce the law clerks’ breaches. Thus, the
Restatement of Torts not only recognizes liability for the breach of a
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, but also extends liability to one “who
knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust[.]”365 In
Alberts v. Devine,366 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied
this “general rule that a plaintiff may hold liable one who intentionally
induces another to commit any tortious act that results in damage to the
plaintiff[]” in a case involving the induced breach of a fiduciary duty of
confidentiality.367
In Devine, a minister’s supervisors obtained
confidential information from the minister’s psychiatrist that was used to
keep the minister from being retained. In recognizing the theory of
liability, the court first held that a fiduciary obligation of confidentiality
arose as part of the physician-patient relationship and that recovery of
damages in tort was available for a physician’s violation of that duty.368
To establish liability against the minister’s superiors, the plaintiff had to
show that they (1) “knew or reasonably should have known of the
existence of the physician-patient relationship;” (2) intended to induce or
reasonably should have anticipated their actions would induce
364
Thus, in the Illinois case in which a former law clerk had utilized a confidential court
memorandum for personal purposes in an election campaign, the disciplinary authority
recommended a four-year suspension from practice.
Supra notes 168–69 and
accompanying text. Breaches of confidentiality by law clerks could also be considered to
constitute actions that are “prejudicial to the administration of justice[,]” so as to run afoul
of provisions like ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d). See infra text
accompanying notes 398–412. See also supra note 159 and accompanying text, discussing
confidentiality under the 1998 Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks, including
the provision that “[a]ny breach of these provisions is prejudicial to the administration of
justice and therefore will be subject the law clerk to appropriate sanctions.”
365
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. c (1979) (citing § 876). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) provides liability for harm caused by tortious conduct of a
third person where one “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself[] . . . .”
Actual physical assistance or participation is not required; mere “[a]dvice or
encouragement” is sufficient. Id. § 876 cmt. on cl. (b).
366
479 N.E.2d 113 (1985).
367
Id. at 121. For similar applications see, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243
F. Supp. 793, 795 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (action against insurance company that induced
physician to reveal confidential patient information); Morris v. Consol. Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d
648, 650 (W. Va. 1994) (action against employer that induced physician to reveal
confidential information).
368
Devine, 479 N.E.2d at 120.
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disclosure of patient information; and (3) “did not reasonably believe
that the physician could disclose that information . . . without violating
the duty of confidentiality[.]”369
While the majority of tort cases involving liability for breaches of the
confidentiality duty appear to involve physician-patient or banking
relationships, the basic principle and rationale underlying that principle
should apply to other confidential relationships such as lawyers and
clients, counselors and advisees, and law clerks and judges.370 Thus, in
circumstances like those in Curry, assuming that the law clerk has a
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, there would be no question as to
satisfaction of the first two elements of the tort: The lawyers not only
knew of the judge-law clerk relationship, but specifically targeted that
relationship to induce the law clerk to divulge information about that
relationship and the judicial deliberative process in the Demoulas case.
The only question, then, is whether they would have reasonably believed
that the law clerk could divulge the specific information they were
seeking without violating his duty of confidentiality. As will be
discussed below,371 this element should also be met in the factual
circumstances of the Curry matter.
Where the duty of confidentiality is established by the terms of the
employment contract, there is also a similar potential claim for
interference with a contract or inducement of a breach of contract.372 The
Restatement of Torts recognizes liability for pecuniary loss from the
breach of a contract where “[o]ne . . . intentionally and improperly
interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry)
between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract . . . .”373 To be accountable
Id. at 121.
See Vickery, supra note 361, at 1431–32. Perhaps one reason for the absence of cases
involving attorney inducement of breaches of confidentiality relates to the fact that such
actions are often caught early and serve as the basis for motions to disqualify counsel in
litigation. See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 386.
371
See infra text accompanying notes 406–09, 418–19 (discussing lawyers’ reasonable
knowledge of the confidentiality of deliberative communications between a law clerk and
judge).
372
See Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s Former
Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and
Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 979–81 & n.717 (2003); see also Floor Graphics,
Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 04-3500 (AET), 2006 WL 2846268, at
*4–5 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (recognizing a claim for tortious interference with contract,
including a confidentiality provision under New Jersey law); Givens v. Mullikin, No.
W1999-01783-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1839128, at *9–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2000)
(recognizing a cause of action against a law firm for inducing a breach by a physician of a
contractual duty of confidentiality).
373
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
369
370
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for interference or inducement one must have knowledge of the
contract,374 but the types of conduct that are considered inducement
“may be any conduct conveying to the third person the actor’s desire to
influence” the third person to not perform the contract, including “a
simple request or persuasion exerting only moral pressure[,]” “a
threat[,]” or “the promise of a benefit[.]”375 That inducement must also
be improper, which requires evaluating and balancing a number of
factors, most important of which is the “nature of the actor’s
conduct[.]”376
Ordinarily,
conduct
involving
fraudulent
misrepresentations, threats of illegal conduct, actions contrary to
“established public policy[,]” and “[v]iolation[s] of recognized ethical
codes . . . or of established customs or practices” relating to certain
activities will be seen as improper.377 In a case like the Curry matter, it
appears that the lawyers’ conduct would be considered improper,
particularly in light of the fraudulent misrepresentations made to the law
clerk regarding the non-existent job opportunity, the threats of disclosure
of the law clerk’s bar application violation, and the lawyers’ violations of
the ethical code applicable to their contacts with the law clerk
generally.378 Actual knowledge of the express contract between the law
clerk and the court, including the confidentiality term, however, may be
absent, rendering interference with the contract claim unavailable.
Of course, the availability of a tort remedy for inducement of a
breach of a duty of confidentiality, whether as an action based on breach
of a fiduciary duty or on express contract, depends on the existence of
damages to a particular plaintiff, judge, or the court to whom that duty is
owed, and it may be difficult to measure those damages.379 One possible
374
375
376

See id. § 766 cmt. j.
Id. § 766 cmt. k.
Id. § 767. The other factors are:
(b) the actor’s motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor
and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.

Id.
Id. § 767 cmt. on cl. (a).
See supra notes 8–13, 87–88 and accompanying text; text infra Parts IV.E—F (discussing
ethical violations).
379
See supra text accompanying note 363; Comment, supra note 101, at 1250. Under the
Restatement, because the actions sound in tort rather than contract, the potential damages
available are broader and not constrained by limitations in contract damages such as that
377
378
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situation in which damages could be shown is where a judge is required
to expend resources in replying to the public disclosure of confidential
deliberative information. For example, in a system with elected judges,
the public disclosure of confidential information obtained from a law
clerk might require a judge to expend funds during an election to explain
or counter that disclosure.380 Although the absence in most cases of the
availability of significant monetary damages may make the use of
inducement actions unlikely, and therefore reduce their potential
effectiveness as a deterrent to efforts to acquire confidential judicial
deliberations information, as discussed below in sections IV.E and IV.F,
the conduct giving rise to such actions in the context of inducing
breaches of the duty of confidentiality by law clerks may serve as a basis
for disciplinary actions against lawyers under state rules governing
lawyer conduct.381
E. Intrusion upon Third Party Legal Rights
The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit using “methods of
obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights” of others.382 The exact
scope of this section and the precise nature of the legal rights
encompassed are not entirely clear. In this regard, the comment to Rule
4.4 states: “It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include
legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons
and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the
client-lawyer relationship.”383 Thus, as a general matter this section has
the loss caused by the breach be within the contemplation of the contracting parties. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. d (1979). Thus, damages could include
“pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract[,]” consequential damages legally caused by
the breach, and damages for any reasonably expected emotional distress or damage to
reputation. Id. § 774A(1).
380
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 169–70 (explaining the Illinois Gregorich case, in
which a former law clerk used a deliberative memo in a campaign election against a judge).
381
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2002) (“Respect for Rights of Third
Persons”) (emphasis omitted); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (“conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice[]”); see also MASSACHUSETTS CANONS OF ETHICS
AND DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981), available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo
/disciplinaryrules.pdf (same language).
382
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2002).
383
Id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 1. The language specifically identifying “privileged relationships[]”
as being among the rights protected was added to the comment in 2002. CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 418 (6th ed. 2007). One treatise on lawyer professional conduct
simply states that under this section “a lawyer who obtains evidence or information for a
client may not violate the law.” RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL
ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 4.4-2(a), at 872 (2007–
08). The disciplinary rules of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility did not contain
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been applied to lawyer efforts to obtain confidential or privileged
information that is protected by law,384 including information protected
by rules of civil procedure such as discovery rules protecting work
product,385 information that is protected by the attorney-client
privilege,386 and other litigation-related confidential information.387 It
an equivalent provision regarding intrusions on the legal rights of another, but improper
acquisitions of confidential information may have been addressed under the provision
governing conduct considered “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” See infra Part
IV.F.
384
See generally ABA/BNA AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 71:805 (2007); CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 383, at 418; Clark v.
Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs. Inc., 797 N.E.2d 905, 911–12 & n.10 (Mass. 2003) (stating
that there is an abundance of authority that lawyers gathering information from former
employees of opposing party must “strictly . . . avoid matters that are privileged or
confidential”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 (2000)
(in communicating with non-clients, lawyers are prohibited from trying to obtain
“information that the lawyer reasonably should know the nonclient may not reveal without
violating a duty of confidentiality to another imposed by law.”). Examples of protected
information include information protected under the attorney-client privilege, workproduct immunity, or the doctor-patient privilege, but the Restatement also indicates that
the confidentiality imposed by law is based on the “law of agency, evidence, and unfair
competition and similar bodies of law[,]” and notes the overlap with tort law because one
who knowingly obtains from an agent confidential information as to the principle
“commits an actionable wrong against the principal.” Id. § 102 cmt. b.
385
See 2 GEOFFREY. C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 40.4,
at 40–12 (3d ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. b
(2000).
386
See Arnold v. Cargill, Inc., No. 01-2086 (DWF/AJB), 2004 WL 2203410, at *7–8, *14 (D.
Minn. Sept. 24, 2004) (disqualifying plaintiffs’ lawyers for violating Minnesota Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4 by acquiring privileged and confidential documents from former
management employee of defendant); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Hora,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-CV-1429, 2005 WL 1387982, at *11–13, *18 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005)
(disqualifying a lawyer who acquired attorney-client information through opponent
party’s employee); Becker, supra note 372, at 954–57 (acquiring attorney-client privilege
information from former employees was the basis for disqualification, sanctions, and
discipline under Rule 4.4); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91359 (1991) (attempt to acquire privileged information from former employee of opposing
corporate party lawyer could violate Rule 4.4); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408, n.14 (1997) (“Gaining from a former government
employee information that the lawyer knows is legally protected from disclosure for use in
litigation nevertheless may violate Model Rules 4.4, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) and also may result in
court-imposed sanctions.” (citing case where law firm was disqualified when it
interviewed former government employee regarding discussions with government counsel
about plaintiff’s case)).
387
See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 40.4, at 40-10 to -11 (conduct involving
infiltrating opponent’s camp to acquire litigation strategy or obtaining evidence by
subterfuge violate Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4); N.J. Sup. Ct. Adv. Comm. on
Prof. Ethics Op. 680 (1995) (surreptitious copying of confidential documents in possession
of attorneys for adverse party violates Rule 4.4); see also Patriot Scientific Corp. v. Moore,
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has also been applied in other contexts, such as attempts to obtain
confidential patient-psychiatric information,388 confidential personnel
files and information,389 and confidential criminal records information.390
Furthermore, because state rules of professional conduct also establish a
general legal right to confidentiality from one’s attorney that is broader
than the evidentiary attorney-client privilege for confidential
communications,391 these confidentiality rules would also form the basis
for a violation of Rule 4.4 where a lawyer attempts to obtain confidential
client information from another lawyer.392 Finally, although no cases on
178 F. App’x. 18, 22–23 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (lawyers’ inducement of former attorney for
opposing party in patent suit to breach fiduciary duty of client confidentiality violated
California Rule of Professional Conduct 1-120 concerning inducement of another to violate
rules of conduct and justified disqualification of inducing lawyer); N.Y. State Ethics Op. 749
(2001) (lawyers may not use software that examines and traces modifications to electronic
transmissions received from other parties or their counsel; to the extent this gives lawyer
access to confidential communications between another lawyer and client, it is an
impermissible intrusion into the lawyer-client relationship).
388
See Conn. Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 96-4 (1996) (under Rule 4.4, a lawyer cannot acquire
psychiatric records of a client's ex-wife made confidential by statute); Pa. Bar Ass’n
Informal Op. 93-135 (1993) (Rule 4.4 prohibits a lawyer from surreptitiously gaining access
to opposing party’s witness’s psychiatric records that are confidential under state case law).
389
See United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. 43, 47–48 (D. P.R. 1995) (lawyer use of
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 civil subpoena ex parte to obtain confidential police personnel records for
use in criminal case violated Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4); EEOC v. Hora, Inc.,
2005 WL 1387982, at *13–14, *18 (lawyer who acquired confidential personnel and other
proprietary information through opponent party’s employee violated Rule 4.4 and was
disqualified); see also, Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 486–89 & n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(lawyer use of FED. R. CIV. P. 45 civil subpoena ex parte to obtain telephone records from
third parties for use in case violated Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct
4.4).
390
See BBO Public Reprimand No. 2005-21 IN RE: CAROL A. GILBERT, 21 MASS. ATT.
DISC. REP. 280, 281 (LEXIS NEXIS 2005) (lawyer’s improper acquisition of criminal offender
record information (“CORI”) for use in a probate and family proceeding violated
Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4).
391
See, e.g., MODEL RULES PROF’L OF CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (unless client consents or
exception applies, information acquired by lawyer that relates to representation must not
be disclosed); id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (noting that the confidentiality duty under the rules
encompasses more than attorney-client communications protected by privilege).
392
Cf. Patriot Scientific Corp., 178 F. App’x at 22–23 (lawyers’ inducement of former
attorney for opposing party in patent suit to breach fiduciary duty of client confidentiality
violated California Rule of Professional Conduct 1-120 concerning inducement of another
to violate rules of conduct and justified disqualification of the inducing lawyer); Rentclub,
Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 654, 658 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (lawyer
inducement by payments to former employee to reveal confidential information about
opposing party’s management practices and other litigation-relevant information violated
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-1.6 because the duty of attorney
confidentiality “imposes upon attorneys a correlative duty to refrain from inducing others
to disclose confidential matters[]” and is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
under Florida Conduct Rule 4-8.4(d), thereby also resulting in disqualification of lawyer.).
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point are available, it would seem that the legal rights embodied by the
tort actions for inducement of breach of confidentiality, whether as a
matter of contract or fiduciary duty, should independently be protected
under Rule 4.4 and serve as the basis for discipline.393
As discussed previously in Part IV.D above, lawyers’ efforts to
acquire confidential judge-law clerk information may run afoul of tort
doctrines relating to inducement of the breach of duty. Also, as
discussed below in Part IV.F, such efforts may violate the rules of
professional conduct relating to “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]”394 However, the application of these
doctrines and rules can be complicated, uncertain, and require nuanced
interpretations, thereby leaving the level or extent of protection for
confidential judicial deliberations information in a highly ambiguous
state. Rule 4.4, protecting legal rights of third parties generally, presents
a more direct analytical path. Where a jurisdiction has enacted formal
codes of conduct that include provisions imposing on law clerks and
other court personnel a duty of confidentiality as to the court’s
deliberative process,395 Rule 4.4’s proscriptions on violating the legal
rights of third parties in attempting to obtain evidence should prohibit
efforts by lawyers to induce law clerks and former law clerks to violate
those confidentiality codes. Such codes arguably establish legal rights to
confidentiality for the benefit of judges and courts that are analogous to
the confidentiality protections established by statutes, evidence rules,
and case law that have been found to be encompassed by Rule 4.4.396
Moreover, in jurisdictions that formally recognize the existence of at least
a qualified judicial deliberations privilege, the application of Rule 4.4
should be even more straight forward given the wide acceptance of the
basic proposition that the rule is intended to prohibit intrusion upon
such evidentiary privileges. Thus, where there is either a law clerk
confidentiality code or a judicial deliberations privilege, the message of
393
Cf. Becker, supra note 372, at 981 (violation of private confidentiality agreements may
trigger sanctions under ethics and civil rules). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. b (2000) (stating that the section does not apply to
“confidentiality duties based only on contract”). The Restatement seems to recognize the
overlap between ethical protections for confidential information and tort law because one
who knowingly obtains from an agent confidential information as to the principal
“commits an actionable wrong against th[at] principal.” Id. On the other hand, it
concludes that because an agent can contract for a degree of confidentiality greater than
that ordinarily established by law and the confidentiality rights protected are based on
“fundamental and general law such as the attorney-client privilege. . . . [C]onfidentiality
duties based only on contract are not within the Section.” Id.
394
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2002); see also text infra Part IV.F.
395
See supra notes 170–80 and accompanying text.
396
See supra notes 379–90 and accompanying text.
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what is expected from lawyers should be much clearer; therefore, the
expected deterrence should be much greater, than where the application
of Rule 4.4 is dependent on a jurisdiction’s finding that a law clerk has a
fiduciary or contractual duty of confidentiality, the inducement of a
breach of which by a lawyer is encompassed by the rule.
F. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and its predecessor
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR1-102(A)(5) contain
provisions making it misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”397 This broad provision
is particularly relevant to the Crossen and Curry cases, the facts of which
occurred prior to adoption by Massachusetts of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, including the more narrowly-focused Rule 4.4(a), regarding
obtaining evidence in violation of third party rights.398 While Rule 8.4(d)
has been applied, so as to overlap conduct affecting the administration of
justice that is also covered by other rules,399 it has also been applied to
other conduct that is considered independently prejudicial to the
administration of justice.400 For purposes of this Article, the question is
whether the “prejudicial to the administration of justice standard,”
standing alone, should be interpreted to apply to the mere act of
attempting to acquire confidential judicial deliberative process
information from a former law clerk.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2002); see CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 383, at 575;
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384,
§ 101:501; 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65–11; see also MASSACHUSETTS
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES DR 1-102(A)(5), available at
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/disciplinaryrules.pdf (same language).
398
As discussed supra at notes 87–88 and accompanying text, the lawyers in the Curry
matter were charged with violating several then-applicable Massachusetts disciplinary
rules, including DR 1-102(A)(5), for their actions directed at the former law clerk. This
provision could also be drawn upon in jurisdictions that have not adopted Rule 4.4's
restrictions on acquiring evidence in violation of third party rights. See STEPHEN GILLERS &
ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 331 (2007) (explaining
that New York has “no direct counterpart to ABA Model Rule 4.4(a) or (b)[] . . . .”).
399
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384,
§ 101:502 (overlap with rules on competence and diligence); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 385, § 65.6, at 65-11 to -12 (noting overlap with rules limiting advocacy in Part 3 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct); CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 614 (5th ed. 2003)
(“encompasses conduct prohibited by other ethics rules[]”).
400
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384,
§ 101:502; 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12; CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 399, at 614.
397
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Given the breadth of the language of the Rule, it is not surprising
that it has been challenged as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
While generally courts have upheld the constitutionality of the
provision,401 in doing so, they have given the Rule a relatively narrow
interpretation.402 Conduct that “undermine[s] the legitimacy of[,]”403 or
interferes with, the judicial process triggers the application of Rule
8.4(d).404 Where the conduct does not violate another rule of professional
conduct, it must be “‘egregious’” and “‘flagrantly violative of accepted
professional norms.’”405 The Rule was intended “to address[] violations
of well-understood norms and conventions of practice only.”406 In
applying this standard, the perspective to be applied is that of “lawyers,
who are professionals and have the benefit of guidance provided by case
law, court rules[,] and the ‘lore of the profession.’”407 Accordingly, as a
rule “‘written by and for lawyers . . . [it] need not meet the precise
standards of clarity that might be required of rules of conduct for
laymen.’”408 Moreover, for an attorney to be on notice that particular
conduct is covered, it is not necessary that a court has previously
addressed similar circumstances.409
Not unexpectedly, given the unique circumstances in Curry, beyond
these general principles, little guidance can be gleaned from prior case
401
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384,
§ 101:502; 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 665.6, at 65-23; CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 383, at 592.
402
See, e.g., In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (Mass. 2004); 2 HAZARD
& HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12; see also Grievance Adm’r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d
262, 265 (Mich. 1997).
403
In re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (Mass. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
404
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384,
§ 101:502; CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra
note 399, at 614. While conduct that occurs during the course of court proceedings is
covered, the rule also extends to other conduct unconnected to a particular proceeding that
has a negative impact on the administration of justice. Id.; GILDA TUONI RUSSELL,
MASSACHUSETTS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 84.01[1], at 84-13 (2d ed. 2003).
405
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 379; In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d at 1099. But
see Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 572 A.2d 501, 505–06 (Md. 1990) (rejecting
flagrant or egregious standard; only requiring lawyer to be reasonably able to determine
appropriate conduct).
406
2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12; see also Fried, 570 N.W.2d at 265; cf.
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 556 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (stating that discipline should
not rest upon a “determination after the fact that conduct is unethical if responsible
attorneys would differ in appraising the propriety of that conduct.”).
407
Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1988) (citing In re Snyder, 472
U.S. 634, 645 (1985)); see also Ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n. v. Bourne, 880 P.2d 360, 362 (Okla.
1994); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Goldsborough, 624 A.2d 503, 510 (Md. 1993).
408
In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d at 1079.
409
Goldsborough, 624 A.2d at 511.
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law and treatises applying the “prejudicial to the administration of
justice” standard in answering the question of whether inducing a
former law clerk to breach the duty of confidentiality would violate the
Rule. While it is relevant that the Rule has generally been applied to
efforts to improperly influence the outcome of litigation,410 including by
improperly acquiring or using confidential information411 or trying to
taint the deliberative process,412 the applicability of the Rule to the mere
act of trying to obtain confidential information about judicial
deliberations in a particular case presents a novel question.
As this Article has extensively discussed in the context of law clerk
confidentiality and the judicial deliberations privilege, it seems clear that
allowing lawyers to intrude into the confidential judge-law clerk
relationship and the judicial deliberations process will seriously
undermine the judicial process.413 Such intrusions would be inimical to
the trust and candor essential to effective decision-making. Thorough
testing of ideas would be inhibited and judicial independence would be
threatened by increased exposure to public pressures and popular
opinion inconsistent with justice.414 With the loss of confidentiality
would also come increased costs to parties and to the administration of
justice generally resulting from challenges to the finality of judicial
decisions based on perceived defects in the deliberative process learned

410
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 383,
§ 101:502.
411
See, e.g., In re Allen, 783 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind. 2002) (holding that reading opposing
counsel's confidential documents at deposition is conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice); In re Moran, 840 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that lawyer
who posted confidential information on his website concerning attorney Grievance
Committee investigation into the conduct of a rival law firm engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that adversely reflected on his fitness as a lawyer); 2
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12 (secretly interviewing opposing party’s
expert witness and offering to pay for information about case preparation); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 (1997) (acquiring information legally
protected from disclosure from former government employee for use in litigation).
412
Grievance Adm’r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d 262, 267–68 (Mich. 1997) (lawyer retained
judges’ relatives on cases to get recusal; it is unethical conduct for a lawyer to tamper with
the court system or to arrange disqualifications); In re Keilor, 380 A.2d 119, 125 (D.C. 1977)
(conduct which taints the decision- making process is prejudicial to the administration of
justice; in this case, a lawyer represented a company using a law firm associate as an
arbitrator without telling the union representative); In re Orfanello, 583 N.E.2d 1277, 1278–
81 (Mass. 1991) (lawyer had ex parte contact with judge, telling the judge that a supporter
of his judicial nomination had a case scheduled to come before the same judge; this was an
effort to influence the disposition of the case and was prejudicial to the administration of
justice, and showed lack of fitness to practice).
413
See supra 90.
414
See supra text accompanying notes 108–11.
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about through lawyer communications with law clerks.415 Moreover,
exposure of the compromises and uncertainties that are necessarily a
part of the judicial deliberations process could erode public confidence in
the justice system.416 Finally, another potential harm that exists is harm
to the privacy and reputational interests of judges from the public
revelation of information from a law clerk that may be untrue, or may be
the product of misperceptions or personal biases.417
What is less clear is whether such intrusion in the name of zealously
protecting a client’s interests would clearly violate “accepted ethical
norms of the profession.”418 The answer to this question seems to
depend on whether reasonable lawyers could differ as to the propriety of
the conduct.419 Factors supporting a conclusion that such conduct is
generally viewed as impermissible include the pervasiveness of the
concept of the law clerk’s duty of confidentiality and the well-accepted
reasons for that duty, as well as the judiciary’s tacit assumption of the
existence of a judicial deliberations privilege.420 Also relevant is the
response of the other attorneys involved in the Demoulas case upon
learning of the efforts being made to acquire information about the
deliberative process from a former law clerk.421 In this regard, it should
be remembered that, except for lawyers Curry, Crossen, and Donahue,
the other attorneys raised serious questions as to the permissibility of
contacting the former law clerk. Moreover, the research memorandum
prepared for lawyer Crossen flagged the existence of at least a limited
judicial deliberations privilege.422
On the other hand, the fact that formal recognition of a judicial
deliberations confidentiality privilege applicable to former law clerks has
been limited and had not occurred in Massachusetts, and the fact that a
number of attorneys have expressed the view that Crossen, Curry, and
Donahue did nothing wrong,423 support an argument that in 1997 when
Crossen and the other lawyers induced the law clerk to breach his duty
of confidentiality, such conduct would not have been seen as flagrantly
inconsistent with professional norms. In the end, these arguments are
See supra text accompanying note 301.
See supra text accompanying note 301.
417
See supra text accompanying note 301.
418
See In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Mass. 2004).
419
See supra text accompanying notes 407–09.
420
See supra Parts II.B, III.C.
421
See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 122–25, 127 (at least three of the defense
team lawyers questioned the propriety of approaching the former law clerk about the case,
and apparently one lawyer, Edward Barshak, advised lawyer Donahue that he would leave
the case if the law clerk information was used.).
422
See supra note 70.
423
See sources cited supra note 7.
415
416
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unconvincing. The fact that a few lawyers fail to recognize the
boundaries between legitimate zealous advocacy and accepted ethical
norms of practice should not result in a dilution of those norms. This is
particularly true where virtually no authority or precedent existed at the
time that would have endorsed the type of intrusion into judge-law clerk
deliberative confidential communications that occurred here, but,
instead, the available information viewed through the eyes of a
reasonable lawyer would clearly have indicated that such an intrusion
was impermissible. Perhaps what is ultimately most damning, however,
is the fact that the lawyers seemed to know that what they were doing
was wrong. As the special hearing officer noted, rather than approach
the law clerk openly and directly for information about possible judicial
prejudgment, the lawyers attempted “first to trick[ and] later to frighten
Walsh into making statements he ‘otherwise would not have made.’”424
In their appeals to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
lawyers Crossen and Curry raised arguments regarding the lack of a
clear prohibition on communicating with a law clerk about judicial
deliberations. Crossen argued that the “prejudicial to the administration
of justice” standard was unconstitutionally vague when applied to his
actions. The court summarily rejected that argument, agreeing with the
BBO “that prior bar disciplinary law and prevailing professional norms,
as well as his own colleagues’ understandable misgivings about his
conduct, placed Crossen on notice that, in the Board’s words, ‘such
outrageous conduct’ was proscribed.”425 More importantly, the court
tersely brushed aside Curry’s argument that his contacts with the law
clerk were proper, given the absence of an explicitly recognized judicial
deliberations privilege in Massachusetts, stating, “efforts to pierce the
confidential communications of a former law clerk and a judge in a
pending matter to benefit one of the litigants also constitute ‘conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.’”426
The context and brevity of the court’s treatment of this issue is
problematic. On the one hand, it could be seen as an indication of the
obviousness of the widely-understood importance to the administration
of justice of the principle of the confidentiality of deliberative
424
Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 195 & n.75; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 370
(Mass. 2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 90, 92.
425
In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 379. In particular, the court drew attention to Crossen’s
efforts to obtain confidential information from the law clerk through threats. Id. The court
also specifically found that as an experienced attorney, Crossen “knew that the
communications about deliberative processes that flow between judge and law clerk were
confidential and an important aspect of the administration of justice.” Id. at 373.
426
In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406. In fact, the court stated that Curry’s actions showed “a
breathtaking lack of respect for the administration of justice[.]” Id. at 407.
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communications between judges and law clerks—a view that is
supported by a broad reading of the court’s statement that no one “is
free to induce or coerce a law clerk into revealing confidential
communications between the clerk and the judge about an ongoing
matter to benefit one of the litigants, in particular confidential
communications that the law clerk otherwise would not have
revealed.”427 On the other hand, the absence of substantial analysis of
the issue leaves at least some question as to whether, absent the deceit
and threats employed by the lawyers in Curry, the court would have
found that simply contacting the former law clerk for confidential
deliberative information would be impermissible under the “prejudicial
to administration of justice” standard. As argued above in this Article,428
a more extended analysis would clearly support that conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
The Curry case is a remarkable example of lawyers engaging in
clearly unacceptable conduct purportedly in the name of zealous
advocacy for a client. The focus to date by the public and bar discipline
system has been on the more sensational aspects of the case—the
elaborate phony job scam involving deceit and apparent extortion
directed at a former judicial law clerk by three lawyers, two of whom
previously had been well-regarded by the legal profession. This aspect
of the case was seen by the Massachusetts BBO as justifying the severe
sanctions of suspension and disbarment that were imposed on attorneys
Curry, Crossen, and Donahue, and it is this conduct upon which the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court focused in its review.
Overshadowed by the lawyers’ outrageous conduct, however, is an
arguably equally severe ethical lapse that should not be ignored. As this
Article has demonstrated, the mere act of attempting to acquire from a
former law clerk confidential information relating to the judicial
deliberations process itself runs afoul of rules of professional conduct
and ethical norms, thus warranting substantial discipline. That such
conduct impermissibly intrudes upon confidential relationships,
constitutes improper inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty, and is
prejudicial to the administration of justice should be made patently clear.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s review of the Curry and
Crossen cases offered a rare opportunity for the court to remove any
doubt that former judicial law clerks simply are not fair game for
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See supra text accompanying notes 401–24.
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lawyers seeking to acquire information about the judicial deliberation
process.
Although the court did appear to take a substantial step in this
direction when it seemingly indicated that efforts to obtain confidential
deliberative information from former law clerks would be inconsistent
with the proper administration of justice, that principle should have
been more fully explored and explained in the court’s opinions.
Moreover, the court passed up the chance to directly and more
effectively protect judicial deliberative confidentiality from improper
intrusions by also formally recognizing the judicial deliberations
privilege, a privilege that is essential for the effective functioning of the
judiciary.429 Adopting the privilege and appropriate procedures for
acquiring privileged information about the judicial deliberations where
warranted, such as those the court adopted regarding post judgment
lawyer inquiries about juror deliberations,430 would serve the legitimate
interests of advocates in acquiring evidence of improper judicial conduct
while preserving the quality of judicial decision-making. Moreover, the
formally recognized privilege, in conjunction with Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4, prohibiting intrusions upon privileged
relationships by lawyers,431 would make pellucid that law clerks cannot
be targeted by lawyers for information about the deliberative process.
Perhaps, with this clarity in the law, even lawyers apparently blinded by
adversarial zeal, such as those in the Curry case, would be restrained.
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